ARTICLE VII.

STUDIES IN CHRISTOLOGY.

BY PROFESSOR FRANK HUGH FOSTER, D. D.

IV.

IN resuming, after so long a time, the "Studies in Christology" which he began in this Review in 1892, the writer will take the liberty of changing somewhat the purpose of the studies. Occupying at that time the chair of Church History, he was mainly concerned with the historical problems of the subject, and particularly with the subtle attack which Professor Harnack, of Berlin, is making upon historical Christianity by the introduction of rationalistic dogmatic principles among the canons of historical investigation. Transferred, as he now is, to the department of Systematic Theology, he wishes to consider the problem more in its dogmatic aspects. The purpose of these studies shall no longer be chiefly historical, though the basis afforded by a review of the historical origin of the Chalcedon doctrine will be essential to a proper understanding of the problem of our own day and of what is to be offered in solution of the same; but the questions raised by Harnack will be left to the professional historians for the most part,-to whom they are commended as constituting a large part of the historical Aufgabe of the day, and quite as important for history as the questions of biblical criticism are for exegesis. The refutation of Harnack's mistakes in instance after instance, by a thorough discussion of the original authorities, would seem to one observer, at least, to be the imperative duty of the times. Monendo satisfeci officio meo. These more technic

ally historical disputations therefore aside, it will now be the writer's purpose to set forth what the problem in respect to christology really is, and to exhibit what the best modern thought has to offer by way of solution.1

V.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE BEFORE CHALCEDON.

The problem discussed in the church under the name of "christology" is, precisely defined, this: How is it that Jesus Christ is both God and man? What is the relation of the divine and human in Christ; that is, in the person of the incarnate, suffering, dying, risen, and living Christ?

Evidently before such a question could arise at all, there must have been considerable progress made in the church in dogmatic knowledge. The great discussions which resulted in the formulation of the doctrine of the trinity at Nice (325) and at Constantinople (381) precede chronologically, as they do logically, the Council of Chalcedon (451), for it is only when men are firmly convinced that Christ is God that the problem suggested by his human nature will press upon their minds and demand consideration. Yet, as the elements of the doctrine of the trinity were in the general feeling of the church long before careful thinking, brought out by particular exigencies, had led to precise formulation, so the elements of christology far antedated the discussions culminating at Chalcedon. In a sense the church always had a christology; and in a still larger sense, it was gaining a definite christology at the same time it was gaining the doctrine of the trinity. The study of our subject begins, therefore, in the anteNicene period.

1 I shall drop also the elaborate citation of authorities which I began in the former article, since historical proof is not now my chief point of interest. That I have written with constant reference to the original authorities and that these essays spring out of original studies will, I hope, be sufficiently evident.

The fundamental thought of the church from the beginning was that deity and humanity were united in Christ. This is plain upon the most hasty reading of Justin, Ignatius, and Irenæus, but we find in such writers as they no trace of philosophical reflection upon the theme, no evidence of difficulty in connection with its problems. The contest with Gnosticism was, however, calculated to stir up thought, and it did this. Tertullian, particularly, has much to say about the cause of the incarnation, which he always views as the divine act of the Logos in taking flesh upon himself. Since Gnosticism put so great a chasm between the divine and human, making the body in consequence of its material nature essentially evil and so hostile to the divine, the Gnostics were driven to the denial of the reality of the human body of Christ. He could not have a body because he would thus have been defiled and essentially disqualified for the office of Saviour. But he seemed to have a body, and it must, therefore, be explained, which was done by making it mere "seeming" (dókŋois), a phantom without reality. This was the view called Docetism. Tertullian, therefore, and the other polemics, declared in reply that the body of Christ was a real body. By this was preëminently meant the material part, the flesh, not of course to the exclusion of the immaterial soul, the existence of which in Christ is implied by some of the expressions of these fathers, but without particular reference to it. And when the point was first raised, it was not entirely clear to all whether Christ had a human soul (vxn) or not. But Origen affirmed that he had. "The Son of God, then, desiring for the salvation of the human race to appear unto men and to sojourn among them, assumed not only a human body, as some suppose, but also a soul resembling our souls indeed in nature, but in will and power resembling himself." This idea, once fully received, was never relinquished by the

church.

The movement which derives its name from Arius was

both a theological and a christological movernent. Arius agreed entirely with the church that there was divinity in Christ, but, in order to make this divinity consistent with the unity of God, he explained it as constituted by the Logos, who was a creature, the first of all created things and the medium of all other creation, who was "advanced" to divinity as a reward for his perfect holiness. Thus the unity of God was preserved, as he thought. It remained still to protect the unity of Christ. Divinity was in him and humanity, and he was one. How could this be? Arius' answer was simple. Let the Logos take the place in Christ of a human soul, and you have no divided personality, no double Christ, but a divine being capable through his human body of suffering as men do. Eudoxius later expressed it, “We believe in one Lord, incarnated but not made man (σаρкwlévτа OÙK Évavoρwπýσaνтa), for he did not receive a human soul but was made flesh.'" He adds "Instead of a soul you have God in flesh."

Thus Arius' solution of the problem involved the abridg ment of the humanity, and this was a denial, as the church viewed it, of the fundamental facts of the case. Accordingly Athanasius, who voiced the general churchly doctrine of his day, maintained the full humanity of Christ. Thus only was the deity to be protected from the charge of having suffered. The divine and human are perfectly united by the incarnation, so that we are to say that Christ is the Logos become Through this union the sufferings of the humanity become the proper sufferings of the Logos. Thus the church rejects the positions of A.ius, but she does little herself to bring the matter into a clearer light.

man.

Apollinaris (d. about 390) is the next theologian who attempts a solution of the problem. With Arius and associated thinkers, he rejected the idea of two perfect beings in Christ, God and man, since such a combination would never give unity of person, and upon this he laid the greatest stress.

There would then be two sons of God, one a son by nature, and the other by adoption. On the other hand, Christ is no merely inspired man "having God in him as one being may have another," but the Son of God dwelt in him in a more intimate manner than that. Hence we see that the two thoughts which seemed to Apollinaris essential and impossible to relinquish, were divinity and unity of person. Now, said he, if you have the voûs in the human part of Christ, you have personality, and hence these impossible two persons in Christ, since the vous, as conceived by him, was the center of volition. And further, he said, this voûs, if found in Christ, must partake of our sinfulness, and this would make Christ a sinner, and would destroy the possibility of our salvation. Therefore, to solve the whole problem, you have only to suppose that the Logos took, in the human nature of Christ, the place of the vous.

This attempted solution was also rejected by the church, for it was seen not to do justice either to the plain words or to the general impression of the Scriptures and to the necessity of a true humanity in a true Redeemer. By the years 374 and 376 two Roman synods had got far enough to affirm that the "Son of God took the human body, soul, and mind (sensum' for the Greek voûv)," and in 381 at Constantinople it was declared with special reference to these efforts that Jesus Christ was both "incarnate" and "made man’ (σαρκωθέντα . . . καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσαντα). But the church was not yet able herself to contribute anything of a positive nature to the solution of the great problem of two natures in one person.

One element in this solution had, however, received some attention from Athanasius and was to receive more from the two Gregories. This was the conception that the Logos was the personalizing principle in the God-man. We see it with Athanasius mainly in the emphasis which he laid upon the activity of the Logos in taking humanity upon