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co-operate with Pope's army on the proved to be the evacuation of the en

Rapidan.

General McClellan himself made a show of activity, either with the view of creating a diversion in favor of General Pope or of concealing an important manoeuvre of his own army, which will soon be related.

campment at Harrison's Landing, which
was finally accomplished. on the Aug.
16th of August. On that day the 16.
advance had reached Williamsburg, pre-
paratory to a removal of the whole
army from the peninsula of Virginia
formed by the York and James rivers.
The success with which this manoeuvre
was accomplished was creditable to the
prudence of McClellan, who had suc-
ceeded in eluding the vigilance of the
enemy, by whom nothing was attempted
to embarrass the movement.
It was

Malvern Hill, which had been the last and bloodiest scene of the six days' struggle during McClellan's retreat, was now occupied by a column under the command of General Hooker, after a Aug. severe artillery engagement with 5. the the enemy. This position, how- reported* | ever, was only held a single day, when General Hooker skilfully retired on the approach of the enemy in great numbers, who were allowed to re-occupy the hill without resistance.

Greatly annoyed by the enemy's frequent interruptions to his only communication, McClellan drove the enemy away from the right bank of the James River, which he occupied with a considerable force. He thus secured his camp, his gun-boats, and transports from the fire of artillery to which they had been hitherto exposed. Having thus provided for the safety of his army, he at the same time bent all his energies toward restoring it to its former effective condition. The sick, wounded, and incapable were sent away by thousands, and the serviceable were got ready for immediate and active duty, preparatory to a movement in co-operation with the new campaign in Virginia.

The important manoeuvre for which McClellan had been preparing his army

"that Major-General McClellan had stoutly protested against its policy, and even went so far as to repair to Fortress Monroe, from there to hold telegraphic communication with the authorities at Washington, and if possible to induce them to alter their plan of operations.

"General McClellan contended that inasmuch as Pope has drawn the largest portion of the rebel forces to the Shenandoah valley, our army could march into Richmond within twentyfour hours after receiving orders to that effect. But the Army of the Potomac must leave its advanced position, give up the hard-earned laurels won on the peninsula, and return-where? Probably to a place where stereotyped dispatches may be sent every day that everything is quiet on the lines of the Potomac.' There is not a man in McClellan's entire army, who has the faculty to reflect upon the state of affairs, that does not hang his head in

→ Correspondent N. Y. Herald, Aug. 19.

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MAP OF

THE SUTH WESTERN PART OF THE UNITED STATES

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Entered according to Act of Congress D.1864 by Virtue Forston & Co. in the clerks office of the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

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Scale a Eng Milan

100

THE WAR IN THE WEST.

359

mortification at the idea of a retrograde however, by a movement which secured movement. Every one regrets it, and the safety of an army so dearly cherished the question among them naturally for its proven courage, and set it free to arises, What are we to do next?" perform that service to the country of The public confidence was encouraged, which it was known to be capable.

CHAPTER XXX.

The Character of the War in the West.-Beauregard's Army broken up.-Disposition of its parts.-General Bragg succeeds Beauregard.-Rumors in regard to the latter.-Movements of Bragg.-Van Dorn at Vicksburg.-Kirby Smith at Chattanooga.-Price on the Mississippi.-Disposition of the Union Generals in the West.-A war of Posts. -Advantage to the Enemy.-The Guerrilla Warfare.—Audacious Exploits of Morgan.-His Raid into Kentucky.Ohio and Indiana invaded.-General Alarm.-Safe return of Morgan.-His Deeds summed up.-Again in the Saddle-Capture of Gallatin.-Attack on McCook.-Exploits of Forrest. -Nashville in Danger.-The Activity of the Enemy in East Tennessee.-Attack on Tazewell.-Capture of Clarksville.-Morgan again at Gallatin.-Bragg concentrates a large Force at Chattanooga. -Great Designs.-Agitation in Kentucky.-Action of Magoffin.-His Resignation.-His Successor.-Trouble in Missouri.—Activity of Guerrillas.

1862.

AFTER the retreat* of the enemy un- | centrated hosts which had struggled toder General Beauregard from Cor-gether on the field of Shiloh, and had inth, the character of the war in so long confronted each other before the West became changed. The con- Corinth, wore broken into detachments,

• The following is the enemy's account of Beauregard's retreat from Corinth :

"The enemy before Corinth would not accept battle in the open field, although his forces greatly exceeded ours. Between the first and the last of May we marched out of our intrenchments four times and offered him battle. At Farmington, on the 9th, we attacked his position and took it, almost without resistance. He made no effort to reinforce or support the brigades which occupied that place, and they soon retired before the superior forces we brought against them.

"This, and subsequent events, proved that the enemy was resolved not to give us battle except behind his own breast-works, and when he would have in his favor every advantage which superiority of position, of forces, and of means could give him. He sought to invest Corinth, and by means of his vast resources and of his convenient dépôts on the Tennessee River to compel its surrender.

"After full consideration of these facts, General Beauregard resolved to withdraw his army to a position where the enemy would be compelled either to give battle in a fair field or to confess before the world that he dare not do The preparations for withdrawing the forces com

So.

menced about one week before we left Corinth. The interval was occupied in cutting out and opening wagon roads to our rear, and in moving the sick, the heavy baggage, and the surplus stores of the army.

"On the 28th the troops, ready for battle, moved out from their intrenchments and took position before the lines of the enemy.

"The writer of this can only state what was subsequently done by the Army of the West, commanded by General Van Dorn. For more than two days and nights we remained within a mile or little more of the enemy's main forces. During this time we had several inconsiderable affairs with his advanced troops. A Texas regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, attacked two regiments on the morning of the 29th and drove them back to their main body, after inflicting heavy loss.

"A hastily constructed redan, in which were placed two twelve pounders and two twenty-four pounders of a field battery, gave great annoyance to the enemy, silencing his guns whenever he brought them up, and driving off in confusion a large force of infantry.

"At eleven o'clock on the night of the 30th the advanced brigade of the Army of the West commenced to

some of which were sent to reinforce the armies in Virginia, some to guard and

withdraw from before the army commanded by General John Pope. The rear-guard moved at about half-past one o'clock A.M.

The night was dark. The ambulance, ord

nance, and artillery train was long, and the column moved very slowly, so that it was eight A.M before the rearguard had crossed Bridge Creek, five miles from where it had moved at half-past one A.M.

"The whole army, with every wheeled vehicle belong

ing to it, having passed this creek, the rear-guard remained to obstruct and defend the passage until the army could

have time to take up its position for battle, in the event of the enemy's resolving to follow us.

"The passage of the creek was soon effectually block

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66

'We marched slowly, stopping to obstruct all passes,

until about five o'clock in the afternoon, when we rejoined the army, encamped upon a creek about eleven miles from our camp at Corinth. The cavalry of the rear-guard rejoined us about sunset, and reported no signs of the enemy being in our rear.

"The next day we marched thirteen miles, and encamped several miles beyond Booneville; on the next day we marched to Baldwin, about twelve miles, and took position to receive an attack in case the enemy could resolve to make one. We waited for him here six days, when we moved to Tupello for the sake of better water. From the first to the last of this extraordinary movement we had no intimation of a desire for action on the part of the enemy or any portion of his forces. It is difficult to account for this upon any other supposition than that he dared not attack us. Military men, and the common sense of the people, will ascribe his conduct to this cause alone.

"No movement was ever conducted with more complete success than was our change of position from the immediate front of the enemy to where we now are, without loss of men or material. We destroyed in Corinth an inconsiderable amount of stores. A railroad bridge over the Tuscumbia was ordered to be burned at sunrise of the 31st ult. The officer charged with the duty executed it according to his orders. Unfortunately, seven trains of cars loaded with stores had not yet passed, and were consequently destroyed by our troops. On the 30th the enemy sent a detachment of cavalry down to Booneville, which we failed to intercept. This detachment appears to have been cleverly commanded; it got well behind us, destroyed our railroad train of stores, and escaped the parties which had been sent to attack it.

"Besides these, there were no contretemps or accidents

strengthen the various posts in Missouri, Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Georgia, and South Carolina, and others to take part in the guerrilla warfare which now pre

vailed in most of those States.

General Beauregard, having been relieved of the command of the Confederate army of the Mississippi, was succeeded by General Bragg. The mysterious movements of the former gave rise to much vague conjecture. At one time he was reported to be actively engaged in the defence of Richmond, whither, undoubtedly, many of his best troops had been sent; at another, to have been removed from command and disgraced for his retreat from Corinth; and again, to have retired for ever from service, so broken in spirit and weakened in mind as

to interfere with the complete execution of one of the most remarkable feats of the war.

"The statements of General Pope that he took 10,000 prisoners and 15,000 stand of arms can be readily explained by those who know the fervor of his sanguine imagination. The results of his 'hard pushing' in pursuit of an enemy he dared not come up with, will be found to be as real as the gushing artesian wells which his official reports developed on the staked plains, during the three years' expensive explorations which he conducted in those regions.

"It is more inexplicable that the commander-in-chief of the enemy's great army can undertake to satisfy his public by such chaff as is contained in his official dispatch of the - inst., and that he should endeavor to gloss over his failure by forwarding to his Government the transparent inventions of General John Pope. How depraved must a people be, how degraded a Government, when, in this age of intelligence and of moral progress, its great military commanders lay aside truth and resort to shallow falsehoods to serve as temporary substitutes for victories they dare not attempt!

"This movement of General Beauregard will convince all military men that he is the master of General Halleck in the art of war. And all will perceive that our troops are regarded by the enemy as very formidable antagonists, since they dare not engage us when greatly outnumbering us, unless protected by their gun-boats or breast-works "

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