bound to adopt such constructions as the rules of law prescribed; but the same words would receive a different construction in the case of charities, from that which the law adopted in cases of individuals. A case more strongly in point than that of Siderfin's could not be cited. His Lordship had formerly seen almost all the private papers in that cause, and though the testator's gift was not complete, as the note by which he intended to specify the objects of his bounty was not found, yet the court disposed of his property to a charity, and excluded the next of kin. The present case resolved itself into this: Did the testator, looking at this clause in his will, intend to say, "I mean to give to these two charities, and such other charities as I shall name;" thereby declaring that he gave to charities: or did the clause mean this, "Unless I name other charities, I mean not to give to charities at all?" His Lordship had now only to say, that with a mind formed to sift and doubt, more than was consistent with his own comfort, he would pay as much attention to the case as the human mind could devote to any subject; he had a severe and arduous duty to perform, and should always feel the utmost pain in differing from persons on whose authority he placed a much greater value than on his own. The Lord Chancellor afterwards gave judgment at great length, and with a full explanation of the law upon the subject. His Lordship stated the cases, in which the property of a testator, left for general purposes, might be carried into effect, according to his views, or modified at the discretion of the court. In the present case, there was no doubt that the objects were legitimate, but they were not definite. There were two sources of uncertainty and difficulty. In the first place, the suns or divisions of the property, allotted to the different purposes, mentioned by the testator, were not fixed; and, in the second place, all the objects for which it was destined, were not specified. Neither of those circumstances, however, could affect the decision of the court, in any question regarding the rights of the testator's next of kin. The will here was pointed and definite. It designated two objects for the behoof of which the property of the testator was destined, the propagation of the Gospel in foreign parts, and the instruction of missionaries. The third was not specified, because the testator had not, at the time he made it, determined what it should particularly be; but he had left no uncertainty with regard to its nature; namely, that it should be a charity. This third division of the property therefore was left as little at the disposal of the next of kin, as if it had been actually destined for the propagation of the Gospel, or any other definite end. His Lordship therefore gave it as his judgment, that the third proportion of the legacy should neither be absorbed by the two specific distinctions mentioned in the will, nor revert to the natural heirs of the testator, but be devoted to such charitable purposes as should be thought proper by the court; and that the master should point out such as might be beneficial. MATRIMONIAL CAUSES. Fellowes, falsely called Stuart, v. Stewart, otherwise Stuart.-This was a proceeding at the instance of Miss Jane Fellowes, of St. Clement's Danes, describing herself as falsely called Stuart, and wife of William Dundas Stuart, against Capt. Wm. Stewart, of Dover, Kent, otherwise William Dundas Stuart, for nullity of a marriage that had been had in effect between them, on the ground of an undue publication of bans. The defendant was the son of a gentleman's servant in Edinburgh, but who afterwards became a retail dealer there in spirits and tobacco. He was born on the 15th of September, 1783, and baptized soon afterwards in Tron Kirk parish, Edinburgh, by the name of Wm. Stewart only. He was educated at Heriot's Hospital, and at a suitable age apprenticed out by that institution, but disliking his situation, left it for the army, and rose to his present rank of Captain. In the autumn of 1811, being resident in Eaton-street, Pimlico, he renewed an acquaintance he had formerly had with a Mrs. Corbet of the Strand, a countrywoman of his, by whom he was introduced to Miss Fellowes, who then resided in Nelson-square, Blackfriars-road. To this lady he represented himself as the son of a gentleman of large landed property in the county of Perth, and presumptive heir to the title and estates of the Right Hon. the Earl of Moray, in Scotland, and Baron Stuart, of Castle Stuart, in England. He also described himself by the names of "Wm. Dundas Stuart," and assumed the arms of the family of the Earl of Moray. By these means he succeeded in gaining Miss Fellowes's affections; but her mother positively refused her consent, from a dislike she had taken to Captain Stewart, which was so strong, that she declared she would not have him herself if he was to offer, even though he should succeed to the title and estates of which he boasted. The parties availed themselves, however, of a temporary absence of Miss Fellowes from home to effect their purpose, and a marriage accordingly took place between them on the 30th of October, 1811, at Saint Margaret's Westminster, in his assumed name of “ William Dundas Stuart," she being then but 18 years of age, and he 28. The marriage took place in pursuance of a publication of bans, effected through the medium of Miss Elizabeth Myne Jones, a friend of Miss Fellowes's. He gave her his name for this purpose, in the course of a morning's walk with her and Miss Fellowes, as "William Douglas Dundas Stewart;" and she, on her return home, committed them to paper, and the publication accordingly took place the first Sunday in those names. He afterwards, however, for some reason, thought proper to call on the church officer, and representing this as an error, persuaded him to omit the name of "Douglas," and the bans were, in consequence published the two following times with his names as "William Dundas Stuart," instead. The mother did not think proper to institute any proceedings to call the validity of the marriage in question during her daughter's minority; but but upon the minority ceasing, the daughter herself did so. It was contended on her part, that, though the stat. 26 Geo. II. commonly called the marriage act, did not expressly enact that all marriages solemnized by publication of bans, not in the true names of the parties, should be void, yet several cases had occurred in which the Court, in construing the two clauses, that the minister should not be obliged to publish the bans unless the "true" names of the parties were delivered to him, and that all marriages solemnized without publication of bans or licence from a proper authority should be void, had held that by the "true" names of the parties was meant the names by which they are commonly known to the world, in order that all persons interested might have notice of what was about to take place; and, therefore, that a publication in any other names, which should prevent parties from having that knowledge, was not a publication within the meaning of the act; and the Court was, in consequence, bound to enforce the letter of the law in support of its spirit, it being described an Act for the better preventing Clandestine Marriages ;" and declare any marriage had in virtue of such a publication null and void: and the circumstances of this case being, as it was contended, such as to bring it within the range of this doctrine, it was submitted, that the marriage in question must be declared void. It was contended on the other hand, that setting aside Captain Stewart's false representations of himself and circumstances, his real rank in life was fully equal to the expectations which Miss Fellowes was justified in forming; that she appeared herself very anxious for the alliance, and therefore the Court could not now, in a suit brought by her, consider these circumstances as forming a sufficient case of fraud to justify it in straining the letter of the law upon so slight a variation from the real name as that in which the bans had here been published. Sir John Nicholl observed, that the ground of nullity in this case was, that the publication of bans and the marriage had both taken place in false names. The party bringing the suit was a minor, her father dead, and her mother withholding her consent. This latter fact, however, was not a ground of nullity in itself, if the publication had been in the true names; but it was material in a case of this description, as tending to shew a fraud against the spirit of the act. By the act, and the decisions which had since taken place under it, it was established that the publication must be in the true names of the parties, which were the names by which they are most usually known, and upon the ground that all parties whose rights are affected by what is to take place may have due notice. The parties themselves too have an interest in such a publication, as there might be concealed up to that time, circumstances which it was of importance that they should know, and which might have a considerable influence on their determination relative to the marriage iself. What were the true names names had in some cases been made a matter of difficulty. It had been suggested whether or not names acquired by general use and reputation could supersede the original ones, but this the Court was not called upon to decide in the present case. It might also happen that the publication might take place incorrectly, either through the inadvertency of those who give them in, or those who receive them for that purpose, but this case was also exempt from that consideration. The names were evidently assumed for the fraudulent purpose of making it appear that the party was related to a noble family in the manner he stated. He then recapitulated the leading circumstances of the case, and observed, that there was not the least reason to suppose any such relationship existed as pretended. Miss Fellowes certainly appeared rather captivated with the prospect of a coronet, and her friend Miss Jones assisted in obtaining the publication of bans. Whether the publication being in the right names on one of the Sundays, and in the wrong ones on the others, would be a ground of nullity the Court was not called upon to determine. It would certainly regard a suit on such a ground with great prejudice, but in this case none of the publications had been in the true names. What, then, could have been the motive for giving the name of "Douglas" before Miss Fellowes, and afterwards withdrawing it? Doubtless for the purpose of confirming by so many Scotch names, the impression that he was related to the noble family of Moray, as who that knew "William Stewart" the liquor retailer's son of Edinburgh, would, on hearing the publication in the names of William Douglas Dundas Stewart" suppose it to be the same person? It was not necessary to shew actual fraud; it was enough if leading to a possibility of fraud; non constat that she might not have been prevented even by the introduction of the name of " Douglas" from making inquiries into the truth of those representations by which she had been so much deluded, and the discovery of the falsity of which might have altered her intentions as to the marriage. Upon the whole of the case, therefore, he was of opinion that this was not a publication within the meaning of the act, and that the assumption of name was for the fraudulent purpose of inveigling this young lady into a marriage effected wholly by fraud. The marriage was therefore pronounced null and void, with costs against the defendant. Stallwood v. Tredger, falsely called Stallwood.-This was a question as to the admissibility of a libel in a cause of nullity of marriage, by reason of the undue publication of bans, instituted by Mr. James Stallwood, of Hammersmith, Middlesex, against Maria his wife, describing her as falsely so called, and by her maiden name of Tredger only. The suit was instituted by letters of request from the Commissary Court of Surrey, the party proceeded against residing at Lambeth, within its jurisdiction, and the libel now offered pleaded the clause in the Marriage Act, Act, 26th Geo. the Second, which directs "that all bans of matrimony shall be published in the parish church, or in some public chapel (in which bans have been usually published), belonging to the parish or chapelry wherein the parties dwell; if they reside in different parishes or chapelries, the bans to be published in each; and if either of them reside in any extra parochial place (having no church or chapel in which bans have been usually published), then the bans to be published in the church or chapel of some adjoining parish or chapelry, in which case the minister shall certify the publication in the same manner as if either of the parties lived in such adjoining parish, and all other the rules of publication prescribed by the Rubrick, not altered, shall be duly observed, and the marriage solemnized in one of the churches or chapels where the bans have been published, and in no other place whatsoever." It then pleaded, that in May, June, and July, 1792, the parties in this case, intending to be married, and being respectively parishioners of St. Mary, Newington, Surrey, gave notice in writing to the minister of that parish, of their names, address, &c. in order to have the bans published. From the 17th of June, 1792, the church of St. Mary, Newington, was shut up, and under repair in order to be in a great part rebuilt and enlarged, and was presently afterward unroofed, and in great part pulled down, so that from that time until the 9th of February 1794, no divine service was performed in it. The entry for the publication of bans was, however, made in the bans book of St. Mary, Newington, which was taken to the adjoining church of Saint George, Southwark, and the bans there published on Sundays, the 29th of July, and the 5th and 12th of August, 1792, the curate making a memorandum in the margin to this effect:"published at Saint George's, Southwark, Newington church being under repair." The marriage was 30lemnized on the 13th of August following, on the site or ruins of Newington church; and the question was, whether it was void under the clause of the act cited, as having been solemnized in a different parish to that in which the bans were published. It was contended, in opposition to the admissibility of the libel, that this was not a case in the contemplation of the legislature, or within the mischief intended to be remedied by the act, the object of which was, "for the better preventing clandestine marriages." There were no words in the act imperative upon this point, or any enactment declaring in express terms such a marriage null and void. It would have been a good marriage before the act, and was so still, if not rendered null by it. It might be a marriage in which the persons celebrating it might be liable to punishment; it might be contrary to the directions of the statute, but it did not follow that the act itself would be null and void. There must be some words in the statute specifically declaring such a marriage null and void; but there were none such applicable to the present case; and what rendered them indispens able |