morning, and of all the officers composing the detachment, who left no exertions untried towards the success of the day. It is impossible to judge correctly of the strength of the enemy, but it is supposed to be about two thousand men. I have, &c.

E. STRETTELL, Lieutenant, commanding the detachment. Gorauh Sahun, January

1, 1815.

Captain Watson, A. A. G.

Sir, I am sorry to acquaint you, that the post of Persa Ghurrie, commanded by Captain Sibley, was this morning attacked by an overwhelming force of Gorkahs, who, I regret to say, carried their point after an hour's hard fighting, which ended in the repulse of our troops there, the loss of the gun, and every kind of baggage.

At break of day, when I was about to march for that post, we heard a heavy firing in that direction, when I pushed on with all possible speed; but within three miles of the place I met a vast number of wounded, and immediately afterwards some some of ficers, who informed me, that any attempt on my part to recover the fortune of the day must be unavailing, as the enemy's force was computed at full ten thousand. I am now halted on the eastern bank of the Seresowah, giving protection to the wounded who are coming in; and intend, as soon as possible, to move in the direction of Betteah, unless I shall receive other instructions from you.

I have, &c.

J. GREENSTREET, Major, Commanding 2d Batt. 15th Regt. Nat. Infantry.

Sir,-In my hurried report of yesterday I omitted to state the particulars of Major Greenstreet having been detached from the camp at Lewtun on the 31st, at three in the morning, for the purpose of reinforcing the post of Persah, with four companies of the 2d battalion 15th native infantry, in consequence of information that the Nepaulese were in some force, and intended to attack that post, though the letter received by me from Captain Sibley, dated so late as the 30th, makes no mention of any thing extraordinary. This will account for Major Greenstreet'; reports of yesterday forwarded.

I have received reports, dated 2d instant, from Lieutenant Strettell, stating that he had been joined at Gerasahun by two companies of the Chumparun light infantry under Ensign Watson, who had effected a timely retreat from a post five coss to the right of Barra Gurhee; and that he intended to march to join Captain Hay at that place immediately.

I trust that these detachments will have joined Captain Hay, and that the Ramghur battalion, under Captain Roughsedge, will also have made a junction, which will make them equal to sustain and repulse any attack the Nepaulese may attempt, as they will have five guns, besides the defences of the fort of Barra Gurhee having been made strong.

Lieutenant Strettell reports that he had one hundred and eighty seapoys fit for duty, and fortyone wounded, inclusive of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

I have this morning received reports from Major Mason, announcing

ricane season (already begun) might permit.

The 1st division from Barbadoes anchored in the bay of St. Louis, Mariegalante, on the 2d August, and from thence were ordered to threaten a landing to windward off Point-a-Pitre and Fort Fleur d'Epée, where the enemy was in force.

The 2d or leeward division assembling (but were not yet collected) at the Saintes, threatened the whole coast from St. Marie to Basseterre and Baillif.

It was deemed advisable to accompany the demonstration of a landing in force from Gosier, by a summons to surrender the forts, Point-a-Pitre and Grande-Terre. It was the Rear-admiral's intention and mine to have met the 1st division in the Venerable, which sailed from the Saintes for that purpose; calms and currents, however, prevented the Venerable from reaching the coast, and obliged the 1st division to anchor.

The appearance of the atmosphere denoted the approach of a hurricane; it became therefore necessary to give up secondary objects, and to embrace the first favourable moment for getting the fleet into the Saintes, for which the Commander in Chief made the necessary dispositions.

It was not until the night of the 7th that the whole force was assembled at the Saintes.

I had previously reconnoitred the coast, in the Barbadoes brig of war which Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Durham had sent with me for that purpose..

The internal state of Guadaloupe and the season were both so critical, that not a moment was

to be lost; I determined therefore to attack the enemy on the morning of the 8th intant.

Having made the necessary arrangements with the naval Commander in Chief, the whole fleet got under weigh at break of day, and stood towards the Ance St. Sauveur, where the landing most to windward was to be effected.

I had received information that the troops of the line, and militia under arms, altogether amounted to 6000. I determined, therefore, to throw my principal force between that of the enemy in Grande-terre and Basse-terre, where it was his intention to have assembled nearly the whole of his force, immediately after our demonstration to windward had of necessity terminated. My plan was to attack in three columns; the scarcity of boats and the surf, required that the whole should assist in each disembarkation, which was therefore effected successively. The first was made at the Ance St. Sauveur, where a detachment of the enemy, about 500 strong, moving from Grand-terre to join Admiral Linois and General Boyer, shew. ed a disposition to oppose the landing.

The brigs of war and gun boats, however, soon scoured that point, and eight hundred and fifty of the Royal York Rangers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Starck, disembarked (notwithstanding a heavy surf) without the loss of a

man.

Lieutenant-Colonel Starck had instructions to make a rapid movement to drive and disperse the enemy occupying the strong country and ravines of Trou-au

chun,

chun, Petit Carbet, and looking towards Trois Rivieres; to threaten the left flank and rear of the enemy, posted to oppose the landing at Grande Ance, and to drive him from the important communication of Pautrizel, which leads to turn the strong post of Dolé and Morne Palmiste, the latter being one of the principal keys to Basseterre.

Meanwhile the fleet dropped down to Grand Ance, to effect the principal landing, where the enemy was in force, and possessed a strong position, with batteries commanding the landing place, which was susceptible of obstinate defence. The brigs of war and a gun-boat placed to enfilade soon obliged the enemy to abandon his guns, one of which only, a long twelve pounder, was found mounted.

The surf was very great, and one of the gun boats was lost, but the exertions of the navy, and the steadiness of the troops, surmounted overy difficulty.

The 15th and 25th regiments, with the remainder of the 1st and 2d brigades, under Major-Generals Sir Charles Shipley and Stehelin, were safely disembarked.

I immediately moved forward the troops to drive the enemy; but if he had before any hopes of maintaining his position for the night, a sharp fire of musquetry, by which we speedily drove him from Pautrizel, placed his left flank en l'air, and obliged him to retire.

The approach of darkness left no farther means of attack that night, and I placed the troops in their bivouac.

At break of day on the 9th,

the troops were put in motion in two columns; the 1st brigade, under Major-General Sir Charles Shipley, moved upon, and occupied Dolé; the 2d under MajorGeneral Stehelin, marched upon the left of the Morne Palmiste, by Pautrizel. It appeared that Comte de Linois and General Boyer had evacuated Dolé in the night. The enemy, however, shewed himself in considerable force on the left of the Morne Palmiste, and on the face of that mountain, commanding the main road to Basseterre: his advance occupied Petit's plantation.

Captain Leith Hay, my aid-decamp, was ordered to gain the top of Morne Boucanier, by a difficult detour, with a rifle company of the Royal West India Rangers and light company of the 6th West India regiment, to alarm the enemy's right flank and rear, which being accomplished, obliged him to withdraw; his posts where every where driven, and he retreated to the Morne Palmiste.

I determined to push the enemy as rapidly as was possible, considering the nature of the country, of which every part is not only susceptible of defence, but is even difficult of access without resistance, especially under the heat of a tropical sun.

A heavy cannonade now announced the disembarkation of the 3d brigade, under MajorGeneral Douglass, in the vicinity of Bailliff, and to leeward of Basseterre. I had instructed him to seize the Batterie des Trois, to occupy the capital, to mask, or if practicable, to take Fort St. Charles by a coup-de-main, to

open

open his communication with the columns moving to the attack of Morne Palmiste, and to menace his retreat from thence to Morne Houel.

Major-General Douglass was, if necessary, also to detach from his rear, for the purpose of taking the passes of Zougeres, Pont de Noziere and Constantine, commanding the approaches to the strong heights of Matouba, in reverse so that the enemy might not have the means of equivocating between those positions, but be compelled to choose at once his dernier resource.

The enemy, who had been driven by the vessels covering the landing, collected on the heights, and attacked the light company of the 63d regiment, who were advanced; they gallantly maintained their ground against upwards of three hundred of the enemy, who came down to attack them. Captain Lynch and Lieut. Wigley were wounded on that occasion.

Major-General Douglass, in person, supported them by part of the York Chasseurs, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ewart, and he was immediately driven with

I received information that the Commandant of Grande-Terre, with the whole armed force, was, as I expected, moving in my rear to form a junction with the main body at Morne Houel. I accordingly reinforced my rear-guard to protect our communications, and occupied in force all the passes of the Gallion, a river running through a formidable ravine at the foot of Morne Palmiste. Thus the troops from Grandeterre were completely cut off from forming their junction, which they attempted without success by paths through the wood, late in the afternoon, but with light sufficient to point out to Comte Linois and General Boyer that all their plans of concentration were defeated.

After these laborious movements, which the troops executed in the most creditable manner, there was only time before night to place the columns in readiness to attack the formidable position of Morne Houel at day-break in the morning.

The troops accordingly took up their bivouacs. It rained heavily. At 11 o'clock p. m. in the night of the 9th, the commanding French engineer came to me on the top of Morne Palmiste verbally to propose a capitulation in the name of Le Comte de Linois, to which I replied, that the only terms I ever would accede to were already published in the proclamation issued on landing, and that I would not delay the attack on Morne Houel to wait for any farther communications. It was so dark, and the rain fell in such torrents, that the officer from the enemy and Captain Moody, my