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Jumna and Touse riversj and the British authority once established in the valley, posts could have been extended from thence along those rivers to a distance sufficient to deprive Ummeer Sing of his middle line of communication, and to force him, on the event of his being compelled, or finding it expedient to abandon his western conquests, to seek a retreat by the only line for it, which would then be left him, along the foot of the snowy mountains. The unfortunate events before Kalunga retarded, and for a time completely frustrated, the views of the Commander in Chief, and deprived the 3d division of the army under Colonel Ochterlony, of the support and co-operation it was to derive from the 2d division after the occupation of the Dhoon, in a combined attack on the Goorkah power and possessions in Sirmoor. The fall of Kalunga, the secure occupation of the Dhoon, and the expulsion of the enemy, wliich is stated to be complete, from the districts lying between the rivers Touse and Jumna, have in part accomplished the objects of the campaign in that quarter, and led to the immediate resumption of the original plan of operations intended to be pursued to the westward of the Jumna.
The battering train was to have left Deyrah on the 6th inst. and it was expected the remainder of the division would descend the Tiraley Pass on the 8th or 9th, on its route to Nahan, which the Commander in Chief has ordered should be through the protected Seikh country, and the Muckunda Pass, with a view to avoid the difficult pass of Guttansun, and the
defiles leading directly from the Kaerdar valley towards Nahan.
Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of a detachment of the Jield army commanded by Colonel Mawby during the siege of Kalunga and subsequent attack on Bulbudder Sing,from the'iotk of November, 1814, to the Id December, both inclusive. Total of Killed and Wounded—1 major, 5 captains, 6 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 7 native commissioned officers, 35 havildars and Serjeants, 4 drummers, 425 rank and file, 1 gunner, 11 mattrosses, 2 golaundause, 4 gun lascars, 1 driver, 4 bhcetees, 1 magazine man.
Copy of a letter from Major-gen. Sir Gabriel Martindell, K.C.B. commanding the second division of the field army, dated Camp, Noginund, December 20, 1814, to the Adjutant-general.
Sir,—With reference to my letter, dispatched by express this morning, I have now the honour to inform you, that Major Ludlow took possession of Nahun at one o'clock to-day.
I have the honour, &c.
G. M*ART1N0ELL, Major
Gen. commanding detachment. Camp, Noginund, Dec. 20, 1SH.
Extract of a letter from Majorgen. Sir Gabriel Martindell, K. C. B. dated Camp, at Nahun, December 27, 1814.
It is with unfeigned regret that I have to report to you, for the
.information of the right honourable the Commander in Chief, the failure of an attack made this morning on a stockade, about a mile west of the fort of Juinpta, and which was planned with the double view of dispossessing the enemy of si strong position, and cutting off their supply of water, which it commanded.
From every information I possessed, together with what Major Ludlow, who command at Nahun from the 20th inst had been able to obtain, and the previous local knowledge of Major Richards, I formed the plan of a combined attack. One column was commanded by Major Ludlow, who was directed to proceed to the left of the fort, whilst Major Richards, with another column, was to make a detour to the right, and take up a position on the other side of the fort, by which means I had every expectation of completely depriving the enemy of their watering places. The columns 1 made so strong as to be ample for the object in view; and I derive some satisfaction from the assurances, that both Majors Ludlow and Richards thought them sufficient.
It was calculated that both columns should inarch so as to reach their respective points of attack considerably before day-break; but it is much to be regretted, that Major Ludlow's column did not arrive at its position till long after that time: it was of course perceived by the enemy, who took every advantage of the discovery.
Major Ludlow reports, that he had at first the most flattering hopes of complete success, the enemy being driven from his ad
vanced position, and compelled to retire into his stockade; but the Goorkahs here took advantage of a brave but ill-timed dash of the column, which Major Ludlow endeavoured in vain to restrain; and after an arduous conflict, in which I fear our loss is great, (but I am at present unable to detail it), the column was obliged to retreat.
The slaughter of the enemy, Major Ludlow states, to be very great, and he speaks in the highest terms of the gallant exertions of the officers and men under his command. Much as I deplore this failure, 1 have the consolation in thinking, that it has not tarnished the British arms. . .
Copy of a letter from Major-gen. Sir David Ochterlony, K. C. B. commanding the third division, to the Adjutant-general.
Sir,—I have the honour to inform you, that the movement of the reserve, to cut off the supplies of the enemy, has induced him to evacuate all the stockades except the two immediately under the fort. He made a very bold and spirited attempt on the reserve this morning, but was repulsed to a distance; but I anticipate another in the course of the night or to-morrow morning, and have in consequence reinforced the reserve with the 2d battalion of the 7th, the strongest in the lines; and two 6-pounders are going off at the moment I am writing.
I cannot at present enter .into any particular details, but hope to be able to give you satisfactory accounts counts by express in the course of to-morrow,
I have the honour, &c.
Camp, half-past 4, p. m. Dec. 2J), 1814. The Goorkahs, in the stockade of Dcbooka Teiba, though surrounded, have not yet surrendered. I have not yet an official report, but my Hirkarruh informs me the people in the stockade have surrendered.
Copy of a letter from Major-Gen. John Sullivan Wood, commanding a division of the field army, to the Adjutant-General.
Sir,—I have the honour to report to you, that the plan of operations, contained in my letter of the 1st of January, was postponed that evening until the 3d instant, in consequence of the information I then received, contrary to all previous representations, that no water could be obtained nearer the fort (the name of which is now discovered to be Mujcote) than Mahapore, being a distance of three miles. On the '2d inst. arrangements were made with the Commissariat for the carriage of water, for the Europeans and Musselmen, in leathern bags, and for the Hindoos in pots; and it was resolved to establish entrenched posts at Mahaiwrc and I\amchae, a high ground near the fort, and to place a detachment at P;iharea, a peak about half way between the two former, for the purpose of keeping up the communication. Thus my detachment was unavoidably to be divided into four parts, if it succeeded in carrying the successive steep,
narrow, and woody peaks, which form the outline of the whole ridge west of Mujcote. In the evening, however, this plan -was abandoned, in consequence of the receipt of fresh intelligence brought by two spies sent by the Rajah Ruttun Sing, which described the road along the ridge as rendered altogether impracticable, and from the advice and information of a Brahmin Cauckunnudde Sewarree, a native of the hills, but for many years past resident in Goruckpore, and attached to the Rajah. This man, after insisting on the threatening nature of the difficulties presented by the Mahapore Hill, which were abundantly obvious, recommended that the detachment should cross the Tenavee, occupy Bupuuulpore, about ten miles from Simlar, and, there leaving the supplies and baggage, push on to Paipa, where grain, &c. would be found more than sufficient for the whole detachment, and from whence X vacate might be attacked on its north side, where the well that supplied the garrison was situated; but in the first place he recommended that the redoubt at Jutgurgh, crocs the foot of the hill of Mujcote, and one mile west of Bootwul, should be reconnoiteredand carried, and the deserted town of Bootwul laid in ashes. He placed the success of this affair beyond doubt; and said, that the terror inspired by the first impression of our arms would have a most beneficial effect on our subsequent operations.
The whole plan appeared so
reasonable, and he answering
for its success, and offering to
assist in the execution with such
confidence confidence and enthusiasm, that I resolved to begin by reconnoitring and attacking Jutgurgh next morning. Major Comyn, with the greater part of the detachment formerly placed under his command, was directed to advance between Jutgurgh and Bootwul, so as to turn the left of the position, while the main body should attack it in front and on the right flank : his force consisted of seven companies, that with meof twentyone; and we marched from camp as soon as the dispersion of the fog would admit of it. I am grieved to say, that instead of debouching from the wood in an open plain, in front of the work, as we had been led to expect, I arrived with my'Staff and the foremost of the advanced guard within fifty paces of it, before it was discovered ; a very heavy and galling fire then opened from the redoubt, which was returned by the few men who accompanied my staff and myself to reconnoitre, until the head of the column and the guns arrived. His Majesty's 17th foot, who led the column, headed by their gallant commander, Colonel Hardyman, supported by the granadiers of the 2d battalion 17tb, and the 14th regiment native infantry, advanced upon the works; while the grenadier and one battalion company of his Majesty's 17th, succeeded in gaining the hill on the right of the redoubt. This party was led by a brave and cool officer, Captain Croker, who drove the enemy before them up the hill, killing a chief Sooraj Tuppah; still the fire from the enemy, concealed by the trees, was kept up with great obstinacy, and the hill, which rose immediately
behind the work, was filled with troops, rendering the post, if it had been carried, wholly untenable; I therefore determined to stop the fruitless waste of lives, by sounding retreat.
The conduct of the whole of the troops engaged merits my entire approbation, as expressed in the order, a copy of which is enclosed. That order is too concise to do justice to my sense of the merits of individual officers.
For the friendly and judicious advice afforded by Colonel Hardyman, second in command, I shall ever feel much indebted; and I owe my best acknowledgments for the zealous conduct and active assistance afforded me by the staff, who were all with me.
Nothing could exceed the ardour evinced upon every occasion by Lieutenant Morrison, Field Engineer, and the deprivation of the aid afforded by his professional talents and excellent judgment, enhances the severe loss I havesuffered from hisdangerouswound.
The severe wound which Captain M'Dowell received in the early part of the action, deprived us of the services of a most gallant and zealous officer.
Lieutenants Points and Pickerin were with the foremost parties, and fell, when nobly pressing through the enemy's fire near the redoubt: the first dangerously, and the other severely wounded.
I cannot express how greatly I admired the animated conduct of my Brigade-Major Captain Hiott, in cheering the men to the attack after being dangerously wounded, nor how deeply I feel the loss (which I pray may be temporary) of his services, both as a friend,
in in whose able counsel I have long had reason to confide, and as an officer who is an ornament to his profession.
A subsequent report states the less of the enemy in killed and wounded to have been two hundred, among whom were one of their principal Sirdars, and four others of inferior rank.
Some confusionoccurred in consequence of the majority of the bearers having thrown down their loads, but the soldiers, both European and native, brought away most of the boxes of ammunition.
Konckanaddee Sewaree, who misled the detachment, was a mail who was particularly recommended by Dr. Buchanan, and from whose information that gentleman constructed his map of »epaul.
Having pointed out the fort to me, when within fifty yards of it, he suddenly disappeared, and 1 am still ignorant of his fate 5 if he is with the enemy, J can have no doubt of his treachery. I have, &c. John S. Wood, Major-Gen. Camp, Simlar, January 4, 1815..
Copy of Letters and Enclosures from Major-General Bonnet Marley, commanding a division of the Field Army, to the Adjutant-General.
Sir,—It is with the deepest concern and regret, I beg to transmit, for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, the enclosed letters, reporting the disastrous results which occurred yesterday morning, by the enemy attacking and carrying our two posts of Persah and Summundpore, after a considerable,
but ineffectual resistance on the part of our troops, against the overwhelming numbers and superior means opposed to them.
On receipt of Major Greenstreet's report at noon, 1 strengthened the post of Barra Gurhee, opposite to the Sucktie Pass, under Captain Hay, with two howitzers and a six pounder (the former called out from the train at Betteah, for the purpose of being attached to the column under Captain Roughsedge, as detailed in my letter of the 12th ultimo, and the latter posted at Burra Gurhee, by Major Brailshaw); at the first formation of these advanced posts, and which I had withdrawn in prosecution of the ulterior arrangements for our advance, only two days before, and after forwarding orders to Captain Roughsedge, who was on his march towards my camp from the neighbourhood of Janickpore, and to Captain Blackney, posted at Summundpore, (the position from whence the Hurreehurpere columns were to have marched), directing them all to concentrate at Barra Gurhee, I marched toward Persah at two, p. m. as well to support Major Greenstreet, as to cover our depot and artillery, the whole of which had been directed to advance towards Persah, and where it was my intention to have joined the train, and proceeded towards the Bochiake Pass.
It was four o'clock in the afternoon, after coming some miles, that a Sawar arrived from Gerasahun with the enclosed letter from Lieutenant Strettell, giving an account of the fate of Captain Blackney's detachment. I have directed that officer to proceed