ble the Commander in Chief, the failure of an attack made this morning on a stockade, about a mile west of the fort of Jumpta, and which was planned with the double view of dispossessing the enemy of a strong position, and cutting off their supply of water, which it commanded.

From every information I possessed, together with what Major Ludlow, who command at Nahun from the 20th inst had been able to obtain, and the previous local knowledge of Major Richards, I formed the plan of a combined attack. One column was commanded by Major Ludlow, who was directed to proceed to the left of the fort, whilst Major Richards, with another column, was to make a detour to the right, and take up a position on the other side of the fort, by which means I had every expectation of completely depriving the enemy of their watering places. The columns I made so strong as to be ample for the object in view; and I derive some satisfaction from the assurances, that both Majors Ludlow and Richards thought them sufficient.

It was calculated that both columns should march so as to reach their respective points of attack considerably before day-break; but it is much to be regretted, that Major Ludlow's column did not arrive at its position till long after that time: it was of course perceived by the enemy, who took every advantage of the discovery.

Major Ludlow reports, that he had at first the most flattering hopes of complete success, the enemy being driven from his ad

to retire into his stockade; but the Goorkahs here took advantage of a brave but ill-timed dash of the column, which Major Ludlow endeavoured in vain to restrain; and after an arduous conflict, in which I fear our loss is great, (but I am at present unable to detail it), the column was obliged to retreat.

The slaughter of the enemy, Major Ludlow states, to be very great, and he speaks in the highest terms of the gallant exertions of the officers and men under his command. Much as I deplore this failure, I have the consolation in thinking, that it has not tarnished the British arms.

Copy of a letter from Major-gen. Sir David Ochterlony, K. C. B. commanding the third division, to the Adjutant-general.

Sir, I have the honour to inform you, that the movement of the reserve, to cut off the supplies of the enemy, has induced him to evacuate all the stockades except the two immediately under the fort. He made a very bold and spirited attempt on the reserve this morning, but was repulsed to a distance; but I anticipate another in the course of the night or to-morrow morning, and have in consequence reinforced the reserve with the 2d battalion of the 7th, the strongest in the lines; and two 6-pounders are going off at the moment I am writing.

I cannot at present enter into any particular details, but hope to be able to give you satisfactory ac

counts

to-morrow,

I have the honour, &c.

D. OCHTERLONY.

Camp, half-past 4, p. m.

Dec. 29, 1814.

The Goorkahs, in the stockade of Debooka Teiba, though surrounded, have not yet surrendered. I have not yet an official report, but my Hirkarrah informs me the people in the stockade have surrendered.

Copy of a letter from Major-Gen. John Sullivan Wood, commanding a division of the field army, to the Adjutant-General.

Sir, I have the honour to report to you, that the plan of operations, contained in my letter of the 1st of January, was postponed that evening until the 3d instant, in consequence of the information I then received, contrary to all previous representations, that no water could be obtained nearer the fort (the name of which is now discovered to be Mujcote) than Mahapore, being a distance of three miles. On the 2d inst. arrangements were made with the Commissariat for the carriage of water, for the Europeans and Musselmen, in leathern bags, and for the Hindoos in pots; and it was resolved to establish entrenched posts at Mahapore and Ramchae, a high ground near the fort, and to place a detachment at Paharea, a peak about half way between the two former, for the purpose of keeping up the communication. Thus my detachment was unavoidably to be divided into four parts, if it succeeded in carrying the successive steep,

form the outline of the whole ridge west of Mujcote. In the evening, however, this plan was abandoned, in consequence of the receipt of fresh intelligence brought by two spies sent by the Rajah Ruttun Sing, which described the road along the ridge as rendered altogether impracticable, and from the advice and information of a Brahmin Cauckunnudde Sewarree, a native of the hills, but for many years past resident in Goruckpore, and attached to the Rajah. This man, after insisting on the threatening nature of the difficulties presented by the Mahapore Hill, which were abundantly obvious, recommended that the detachment should cross the Tenavee, occupy Bupunulpore, about ten miles from Simlar, and, there leaving the supplies and baggage, push on to Paipa, where grain, &c. would be found more than sufficient for the whole detachment, and from whence Nyacote might be attacked on its north side, where the well that supplied the garrison was situated; but in the first place he recommended that the redoubt at Jutgurgh, cross the foot of the hill of Mujcote, and one mile west of Bootwul, should be reconnoiteredand carried, and the deserted town of Bootwul laid in ashes. He placed the success of this affair beyond doubt; and said, that the terror inspired by the first impression of our arms would have a most beneficial effect on our subsequent operations.

The whole plan appeared so reasonable, and he answering for its success, and offering to assist in the execution with such confidence

confidence and enthusiasm, that I resolved to begin by reconnoitring and attacking Jutgurgh next morning. Major Comyn, with the greater part of the detachment formerly placed under his command, was directed to advance between Jutgurgh and Bootwul, so as to turn the left of the position, while the main body should attack it in front and on the right flank his force consisted of seven companies, that with me of twentyone; and we marched from camp as soon as the dispersion of the fog would admit of it. I am grieved to say, that instead of debouching from the wood in an open plain, in front of the work, as we had been led to expect, I arrived with my Staff and the foremost of the advanced guard within fifty paces of it, before it was discovered; a very heavy and galling fire then opened from the redoubt, which was returned by the few men who accompanied my staff and myself to reconnoitre, until the head of the column and the guns arrived. His Majesty's 17th foot, who led the column, headed by their gallant commander, Colonel Hardyman, supported by the grenadiers of the 2d battalion 17th, and the 14th regiment native infantry, advanced upon the works; while the grenadier and one battalion company of his Majesty's 17th, succeeded in gaining the hill on the right of the redoubt. This party was led by a brave and cool officer, Captain Croker, who drove the enemy before them up the hill, killing a chief Sooraj Tappah; still the fire from the enemy, concealed by the trees, was kept up with great obstinacy, and the hill, which rose immediately

behind the work, was filled with troops, rendering the post, if it had been carried, wholly untenable; I therefore determined to stop the fruitless waste of lives, by sounding retreat.

The conduct of the whole of the troops engaged merits my entire approbation, as expressed in the order, a copy of which is enclosed." That order is too concise to do justice to my sense of the merits of individual officers.

For the friendly and judicious advice afforded by Colonel Hardyman, second in command, I shall ever feel much indebted; and I owe my best acknowledgments for the zealous conduct and active assistance afforded me by the staff, who were all with me.

Nothing could exceed the ardour evinced upon every occasion by Lieutenant Morrison, Field Engineer, and the deprivation of the aid afforded by his professional talents and excellent judgment, enhances the severe loss I havesuffered from his dangerouswound.

The severe wound which Captain M'Dowell received in the early part of the action, deprived us of the services of a most gallant and zealous officer.

Lieutenants Points and Pickerin were with the foremost parties, and fell, when nobly pressing through the enemy's fire near the redoubt: the first dangerously, and the other severely wounded.

I cannot express how greatly I admired the animated conduct of my Brigade-Major Captain Hiott, in cheering the men to the attack after being dangerously wounded, nor how deeply I feel the loss (which I pray may be temporary) of his services, both as a friend,

in whose able counsel I have long had reason to confide, and as an officer who is an ornament to his profession.

A subsequent report states the lcss of the enemy in killed and wounded to have been two hundred, among whom were one of their principal Sirdars, and four others of inferior rank.

Some confusion occurred in consequence of the majority of the bearers having thrown down their loads, but the soldiers, both European and native, brought away most of the boxes of ammunition. Konckanaddee Sewaree, who misled the detachment, was a man who was particularly recommended by Dr. Buchanan, and from whose information that gentleman constructed his map of Nepaul.

Having pointed out the fort to me, when within fifty yards of it, he suddenly disappeared, and I am still ignorant of his fate; if he is with the enemy, I can have no doubt of his treachery.

I have, &c. JOHN S. WOOD, Major-Gen. Camp, Simlar, January

4, 1815..

Copy of Letters and Enclosures from Major-General Bonnet Marley, commanding a division of the Field Army, to the Adjutant-General.

Sir,It is with the deepest concern and regret, I beg to transmit, for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, the enclosed letters, reporting the disastrous results which occurred yesterday morning, by the enemy attacking and carrying our two posts of Persah and Summundpore, after a considerable,

but ineffectual resistance on the part of our troops, against the overwhelming numbers and superior means opposed to them.

On receipt of Major Greenstreet's report at noon, I strengthened the post of Barra Gurhee, opposite to the Sucktie Pass, under Captain Hay, with two howitzers and a six pounder (the former called out from the train at Betteah, for the purpose of being attached to the column under Captain Roughsedge, as detailed in my letter of the 12th ultimo, and the latter posted at Burra Gurhee, by Major Bradshaw); at the first formation of these advanced posts, and which I had withdrawn in prosecution of the ulterior arrangements for our advance, only two days before, and after forwarding orders to Captain Roughsedge, who was on his march towards my camp from the neighbourhood of Janickpore, and to Captain Blackney, posted at Summundpore, (the position from whence the Hurrechurpere columns were to have marched), directing them all to concentrate at Barra Gurhee, I marched toward Persah at two, p. m. as well to support Major Greenstreet, as to cover our depôt and artillery, the whole of which had been directed to advance towards Persah, and where it was my intention to have joined the train, and proceeded towards the Bochiake Pass.

It was four o'clock in the afternoon, after coming some miles, that a Sawar arrived from Gerasahun with the enclosed letter from Lieutenant Strettell, giving an account of the fate of Captain Blackney's detachment. I have directed that officer to proceed

with the detachment to Betteah, where further orders will await him.

I marched last night nine miles, till my progress was stopped by a considerable nulla, which it was impossible to have crossed in the dark without great confusion and risk. This morning I again march ed, and am now encamped on the high road from Betteah to Persah, which completely covers the advance of the battering train, which marched from the former place on the 1st, agreeably to the orders I had sent Major Mason, as soon as his letter, reporting the arrival of the battering train, reached

me.

As the enemy appeared to have retired into the forest, I trust Major Mason will be able to join me to-morrow or next day.

I shall do myself the honour of transmitting correct returns of the casualties, on both occasions, as soon as I can collect the reports.

I have, &c.

B. MARLEY, Major-Gen. Commanding. Camp, Serrisowah, Jan.

2, 1815.

Reports from Lieutenant Strettell and Major Greenstreet, inclosed in the preceding.

Sir, It is with the deepest regret that I have to acquaint you, for the information of Major General Marley, that the left wing, 2d battalion 22d regiment native infantry, was this morning attacked, and compelled to retire.

The enemy advanced about five o'clock this morning in three golahs, and immediately opened a very severe and well directed fire

from about twenty pieces of cannon (as well as could be judged). Captain Blackney, and all the officers of the wing, did their utmost endeavours to bring on our sepoys to the charge, which failed in every attempt, from the very destructive fire which opposed them. It is with the utmost sorrow I am to mention, that after the action had continued about ten minutes with equal ardour on each side, we were deprived of the directions and assistance of Captain Blackney and Lieutenant Duncan, who, I fear, are both killed, having been severely wounded and disabled. On the fall of these two gallant officers, the sepoys became quite dispirited, and began to retire with some confusion, upon which the enemy advanced upon and destroyed our tents by fire. The village of Summunpore, in which was the commissariat depôt, was burnt in the commencement of the action by the enemy. Finding that the detachment had suffered most severely, added to the great numbers and strength of the enemy, it was judged most prudent to retire; and as the enemy had taken possession of the road to Barra Ghurrie, we directed our course to this place, at which we have just arrived. I am unable to state the exact loss of the detachment, as the stragglers are coming in every moment. It is my intention to march to-morrow morning towards the head-quarters of the army, when I shall have the honour to state the particulars more fully to the MajorGeneral. I cannot conclude without paying the tribute so justly due to the merits of the two brave and valuable officers who fell this morning,