rites of confarrcatio, or else through the operation of the fictitious bargain and sale (coemptio), completed by the prescriptive time of unbroken possession (usus), passed into the power and family of her husband. Whichever alternative condition was presented, there could be logically no question of the wife's property; it was, with all the rights of management and of succession appertaining to it, wholly in the hands either of the father or of the husband. Nevertheless, either an intuitive sense of the independent claims of womanhood and wifehood, or a recognition of economic advantages favourable to the wife, to the husband, and to the general public, gave rise to the custom of appropriating from the father's stock some of his property to the use of his daughter on her marriage, and for the general purpose of defraying the continuous expenses which would result from it. The property was called the dower or dos, and the rules relating to it were amplified under the nurturing protection of the Prætors, the comments of jurists, and the constitutions of emperors, into a tolerably systematic body of law. The dower or dos was, strictly speaking, a gift from the wife's father, made at the time of the marriage, for the use of the husband in meeting the family and household expenses to which the marriage would give rise. By a slight extension of the original principle, the dower might proceed not only from the father but also from the mother or other relations or even friends. Where the father was the giver, it has been customary to call it profectitia; where other persons were the givers, it has been called adventitia. And in the latter case, if there was an express agreement that it should be restored to the giver at the termination of the marriage, it has been called receptitia. Ulp. (vi. 3). There were originally more formal modes than one in which a wife's estate in dower might be created. At one time a solemn verbal manifestation Ulp. (vi. 1). of the giver's intention sufficed. dotis. It was regarded as an instance of what was known as the "verbal" contract, and seems to have be This was called dictio come obsolete long before Justinian's time, though the L. 44, § 1, D. Digest seems to contain allusions to it as to a (xxiii. 3). well understood practice. The prevalent habit, as alone recognized by law in Justinian's time, was either to engage, by the simple verbal contract of question and answer (stipulatio), to give the dower in the event of the marriage taking place, and so soon as it should take place, or else to give the dower at once, on the understood condition of having it returned if the marriage never took place. So soon as the marriage took place the dower was due, and profits and interest had to be accounted for in favour of the married persons. If it were not paid within two years, it could be sued for by the ordinary simple action arising out of the commonest contracts (condictio), and interest was calculated at the rate of four per cent., or one-third of the very highest legal rate. All sorts of property and interests in property might be the subject-matter of dower; thus, debts, leases, servitudes, as well as money and the fullest rights of ownership in real estate, might be given in this way. The property, too, so given, might be specifically described, or only estimated by weight, number, and measurement; and it is a question of fact whether the property was to be valued for the purpose. of actual sale or for that of calculating the liabilities of the parties (taxatio). The general rule was that the husband had plenary control of the dower, and of all its contingent profits and advantages, for the purpose of providing for the wants of himself, his wife, and his children. Before Justinian's time he was entitled to sell, with his wife's assent, but not to mortgage, it being intimated that a woman could understand the simpler process of sale, but not the less direct and familiar process of a mortgage or pledge. Justinian, however, seems to have not credited women with even this degree of understanding, because he disallowed even a sale of the dower estate. 15 C. (v. 13). The husband was responsible for his care of the property, and was bound to show as much diligence in protecting specific objects from injury, and the whole property from loss, as he might be expected to show in the ordinary management of his own affairs. Where the husband was in danger of being reduced to poverty, or of becoming an insolvent, the wife was enabled by a special process to intervene, and secure the management for herself, on condition of employing the property for the original purposes for which it was given. She was always preferred to all other creditors, even though they were protected by "real" securities. At the termination of the marriage, either by the wife's death or divorce, the husband was bound to make restitution of the dower estate to the persons who were entitled to it. These were, in the case of the dos profectitia,-or portion of the estate which came from the wife's father— the father and his heir. In the case of the dos receptitia they were, as of course, the givers who had presented the dower on the condition that it should be so restored. the case of the dos adventitia-which came from persons other than the father-Justinian provided that it should go to the wife and her heirs. By the earlier law it remained with the husband, Justinian specially enacted that the restoration of dower was due at once in the case of immovables, and within a year in the case of movables. In Besides the dower estate, properly so called, a husband or other persons might during the marriage increase their estate, or make gifts to the wife (donatio propter nuptias), which, being excepted from the ordinary prohibition of gifts between married persons, had to be managed on the same principles as the dower. In later times, it became a not infrequent custom for a woman to have property of her own (parapherna), which was wholly excepted from the regulations which applied to dower, and which, though usually in practice administered by the husband under a higher degree of responsibility than in the case of the dower estate, was, in fact, as much within the legal control of the wife for all purposes as if she were unmarried. It remains to be noticed that by the well-known marital U legislation of Augustus-entitled the lex Julia et Papia Poppaa, followed up by a constitution of Severus-fathers, both natural and adoptive, were compellable by the magistrate to find a fitting marriage for their daughters, and to provide them with an amount of dower proportioned to their own estate, and to the circumstances of the case. §4.-Guardians and Trustees in Guardianship. The subject of guardianship only belongs to the topic of the family, strictly so called, so far as the institution of the tutor or guardian to the person of the minor-and the curator-or managing trustee, may be treated as supplying the temporary defects in the composition of the family occasioned through death, immature age, or physical calamity, and as a means by which the final purposes of the family as a social group were carried to completion. It will be convenient to distribute the topic of guardianship generally, under the following heads :- (1) Nature and purpose of the institution of guardianship. (2) Modes of appointment of guardians to those under age, and of trustees in guardianship to other persons. (3) Rights, duties, responsibilities, and liabilities of guardians. (1) NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE INSTITUTION OF GUARDIANSHIP. Where, through the death of his father or other person in whose power he was, a citizen became his own master (sui juris) but was below the age of fourteen years, or, if a woman, at any age, a substitute for the deceased head of a household was temporarily provided, both to protect the interests of the youthful or incompetent person, and to guard the public against the consequences which might follow from want of judgment and experience. The office of guardian, so introduced, was regarded as a service of public moment, and not of mere private convenience or arrangement. It was imposed on certain classes of persons, or on certain individual persons, as a public burden or duty to be rendered to the State, which, in default of certain well-recognized grounds of exemption, could not be evaded, nor shifted to the shoulders of another. The severity of these principles, indeed, only applied to the guardians of those under age, or of women, though it is uncertain how long, or to what extent the guardianship of women existed. For persons between the ages of fourteen and twenty-five a laxer form of guardianship (curatela) was occasionally, though in accordance with strict rules, provided for the protection and management of their property; and it was the same in character,—as in name, as that by which the interests of the insane and insolvents were guarded against prejudice and loss. The guardian of those under age differed from all other classes of guardians, not only in the fact that such an official was universally appointed, but also in the significant circumstance that he controlled the whole life of his ward in addition to managing his estate and property. In the case of all classes of guardians the most rigid securities were taken, both at the time of their entering on the discharge of their functions and on their being released from it, for their faithful execution of the task entrusted to them. They were appointed by methods supposed to imply the highest amount of circumspection and caution; they were subject at every point and turn to magisterial control and, if necessary, intervention; they were bound, on surrendering their post, to present strict accounts, and to make good all deficiencies. Effective judicial remedies and special processes were in vogue for attaining these ends. (2) MODES OF APPOINTMENT. The history of the appointment of guardians follows very closely that of the history of Intestate and Testa |