Britain. But he thinks it proper to say that he believes that he possesses no influence adequate to induce satisfaction or contentment with the condition of affairs as it now exists. I am, sir, your obedient servant, SIR: Your despatch of the 19th of February, No. 602, has been received. It brings back to us from London the rumors which are set afloat here of revival of the energies of the insurgents, and of military and political embarrassments on our own side, obviously with a design to effect sinister financial or political purposes. It has been our misfortune from the first to have the double task of correcting such reports here, and afterwards discrediting them. in Europe. If desertions and divisions are signs of exhaustion, the insurgent cause is weaker to-day than it was a year ago. If growing unanimity in favor of the attitude of the government indicates improvement, the Union cause stands immeasurably better than it has done at any former period. SIR: Your despatch of the 18th ultimo, No. 599, has been received. In a despatch written you by this mail, I have treated the case of the Sea Bride in the light thrown upon it by recent events. SIR: I have to acknowledge, with much satisfaction, the receipt of your despatch of the 18th of February last, No. 600, in which you inform me that Mr. P. McD. Collins has succeeded in obtaining from the British government the right to continue his proposed telegraphic communications from Russia through the English possessions in northwestern America. I a am, sir, your obedient servant, CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, &c., &c., &c, WILLIAM H. SEWARD. No. 876.] Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, March 14, 1864. SIR: Your despatch of the 18th ultimo, No. 601, has been received. The President attaches much importance to the case referred to, in view of the existing state of relations with Great Britain and her provinces. Your proceedings in this matter are approved. I am, sir, your obedient servant, CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, Esq., &c., &c., &c. WILLIAM H. SEWARD. No. 618. Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward. LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: I have to acknowledge the reception of despatches from the department, numbered from 852 to 858, inclusive; also, a printed circular, No. 46, dated the 6th of February; likewise, a telegram in cipher, dated the 1st in stant. * * * The last week has been marked by one brief debate in the Commons on the relations with America, in which Mr. Roebuck led off. A copy of the Times containing a report of the debate is included with those sent in my No. 619. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. No. 619.] Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward. LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: I have the honor to transmit copies of the Times of the 15th and 16th instant, containing a report of the proceedings in the House of Lords on the appeal in the Alexandra case. The decision will be given on an early day after the Easter recess. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. [From the London Times, Tuesday, March 15, 1864.] THE ATTORNEY GENERAL VS. SILLEM AND others. This case comes before their lordships on appeal from the court of exchequer chamber for the purpose of their considering whether the grave and momentous question raised as to the proper construction to be placed upon the foreign enlistment act is to be determined, or whether all the enormous expense incurred and the vast labor expended in the matter are to be thrown away in consequence of a technical difficulty. The technical point is, however, one of very considerable importance, being whether the learned judges of the court of exchequer have power, under the twenty-sixth section of the Queen's remembrancer's act, to make such rules as would give the advisers of the crown in this instance a right of appeal which they did not possess at the time the verdict of the jury at the trial was delivered in favor of the defendants. In consequence of the lord chief baron and the attorney general being unable to agree as to the effect of the direction of the former to the jury at the trial, it was found to be impracticable to present a bill of exceptions, and the alternative of moving for a new trial on the ground of misdirection was adopted. This rule the court of exchequer granted, but discharged upon argument. The attorney general had previously applied to the court of exchequer to exercise a power it was assumed the barons possessed, under the twenty-sixth section of the Queen's remembrancer's act, to make rules giving him a power of appeal to the court of exchequer chamber. In accordance with that application the court of exchequer drew up the following rules the day before the rule for a new trial was moved for: "COURT OF EXCHEQUER, REVenue Side. "In pursuance of the provisions contained in the 26th section of the 22d and 23d of Victoria, cap. 21, entitled 'An act to regulate the office of Queen's remembrancer and to amend the practice and procedure on the revenue side of the court of exchequer,' "It is ordered that the following provisions of the common law procedure act, 1854, be extended, applied, and adapted to the revenue side of the court of exchequer : 66 "1. In all cases of rules to enter a verdict or nonsuit upon a point reserved at the trial, if the rule to show cause be refused or granted, and then discharged or made absolute, the party decided against may appeal. 66 2. In all cases of motions for a new trial upon the ground that the judge has not ruled according to law, if the rule to show cause be refused, or if granted be then discharged or made absolute, the party decided against may appeal, providing one of the judges dissent from the rule being refused, or when granted being discharged or made absolute, as the case may be, or provided the court in its discretion may think fit that an appeal should be allowed, provided that where the application for a new trial is upon matter of discretion only, as on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of evidence, no such appeal be disallowed. 3. The court of error, the exchequer chamber, and the House of Lords shall be courts of appeal for this purpose "4. No appeal shall be allowed unless notice thereof be given in writing to the opposite party or his attorney and the Queen's remembrancer within four days after the decision complained of, and such further time as may be allowed by the court or a judge. 5. The appeal herein before mentioned shall be upon a case to be stated by the parties, (and in case of difference, to be settled by the court or a judge of the court appealed from,) in which case shall be set forth so much of the pleadings, evidence, and the ruling or judgment objected to as may be necessary to raise the question for the decision of the court of appeal. 6. When the appeal is from the refusal of the court below to grant a rule to show cause, and the court of appeal grant such rule, such rule shall be argued and disposed of in the court of appeal. 7. The court of appeal shall give such judgment as ought to have been given in the court below, and all such further proceedings may be taken thereupon as if the judgment had been given by the court in which the record originated. 8. The court of appeal shall have power to adjudge payment of cost, and to order restitution, and they shall have the same powers as the court of error in respect of awarding process and otherwise. 9. Upon an award of a trial de novo by the court, or by the court of error, upon matter appearing upon record, error may at once be brought, and if the judgment in such or any other case be affirmed in error, it shall be lawful for the court of error to adjudge costs to the defendant in error. 46 10. When a new trial is granted on the ground that the verdict was against evidence, the costs of the first trial shall abide the event unless the court shall otherwise order. 46 11. Upon motions founded upon affidavits it shall be lawful for either party, with leave of the court or a judge, to make affidavits, in answer to the affidavits of the opposite party, upon any new matter arising out of such affidavits, subject to all such rules as shall hereafter be made respecting such affidavits. 66 6 12. Notice of appeal shall be a stay of execution, provided that within eight days after the decision complained of, or before execution delivered to the sheriff, bail to pay the sum recovered and costs, or to pay costs when adjudged, be given in like manner and to the same amount as bail in error is required to be given under the rules of this court made on the 22d day of June, 1860, or as near thereto as may be applicable, provided such bail shall not be necessary to stay execution in cases where the appellant is the crown, the attorney general on behalf of the crown, or the Prince of Wales or the Duke of Cornwall for the time being.' "The foregoing rules shall come into operation and take effect forthwith, and apply to every cause, matter, and proceeding now pending." Under the power of appeal given by these rules the attorney general brought the case before the court of exchequer chamber, which court, however, by a majority of four to three, rejected the appcal, on the ground that the barons had not power to make the rules in question. This appeal was then brought to reverse the judgment of the court of exchequer chamber. The attorney general, the solicitor general, the Queen's advocate, Mr. Locke, and Mr. Thomas Jones appeared on behalf of the crown; Sir H. Cairns, Mr. Mel lish, Mr. Karslake, and Mr. Kemplay represented the respondents. The attorney general and the solicitor general addressed their lordships on behalf of the crown on Friday last. Sir H. CAIRNS this morning addressed their lordships for the respondents, and in referring to the making of the rules in question by the court of exchequer, felt assured, notwithstanding he never doubted that the learned judges of the court of exchequer had been throughout actuated by no other motives than those of expediency, propriety, and wisdom, that their lordships would look narrowly to orders which, after one of the litigants had obtained a verdict and judgment. attempted on the application of the other side to give a right of appeal which might neutralize or upset that verdict and judgment. The attorney general had been unable to discover any trace of a precedent for such an act, and he was quite sure no private suitor would have had the audacity to ask a court to make general orders which would affect his particular case so as to give him a right of appeal which he had not before. Looking at the rules themselves, it was difficult to lay the finger upon one which was properly framed. The framers appeared to have entirely misapprehended the meaning of the common law procedure acts, and to have drawn up the rules when laboring under that mistake. Entirely forgetting that the common law procedure acts had to deal with appeals from the whole of the different courts of record throughout the kingdom, they had in their third rule created three courts of appeal from the court of exchequer, viz: the court of error, the court of exchequer chamber, and the House of Lords, using the phraseology of the act in a case which the act did not contemplate. The Queen's remembrancer's act authorized certain clauses of the common law procedure acts to be applied and adapted to the revenue side of the court of exchequer, but the framers of the rules had not stated what rules they intended to be applied, or how they were to be adapted. They had left that part of their duty to be carried out by the litigants themselves. The barons of the exchequer might just as well have thrown those acts bodily upon the table, and said that they should be applicable to the revenue side of their court, and have left their suitors to find out in what way they were to be applied, according to their own particular whim, fancy, or interest. Before the passing of the common law procedure acts there was nothing applicable to the judgments of the courts of common law which could properly be called an appeal, and those acts had strictly defined the cases in which an appeal should be given. The legislature had carefully given a right of appeal in a particular way to litigate on the revenue side of the exchequer, and therefore there was no necessity for the extraordinary power claimed by the appellants. If the legislature had desired to give further powers of appeal, why had they not expressly given them? With regard to the 26th section of the Queen's remembrancer's act, it had been urged on behalf of the crown that this act had been framed for the purpose of giving the subject ample powers of appeal. Now, he contended the legislature had in view the advantage of both the crown and the suitor in not permitting such an appeal, as every principle touching the collection of the revenue could be decided in the convenient form of a bill of exceptions. It was greatly to the advantage of the crown that vexatious appeals should not be brought, and equally advantageous to the private suitor that the crown should not have a right of a multiplicity of appeals, one after another, as it was proverbial that an enlarged power of appeal was greatly in favor of the litigant with the longest purse, and who pursued his power of appeal with the greatest vigor. The LORD CHANCELLOR. What actions are now brought on the revenue side of the court of exchequer as between subjects? Sir H. CAIRNS. None, my lord. The LORD CHANCELLOR. Then what do you mean by saying that there is the side of the subject to be looked at in the matter? Under what disadvantages do subjects on the revenue side of the exchequer labor that are not shared by subjects on the plea side of that court? Sir H. CAIRNS was speaking as to the relative interests of the crown as plaintiff against the subject as defendant. The LORD CHANCELLOR remarked that it was stated to be the intention of the legislature to make the practice on both sides of the court of exchequer as nearly as possible identical. Sir H. CAIRNS thought that might be done without giving this right of appeal. The LORD CHANCELLOR said that one of the propositions of the attorney general was that the 35th section of the common law procedure act of 1854 made a certain mode of appeal part of the practice of the plea side of the court, and then the practice of the plea side was transferred to the revenue side, thus transferring the right of appeal. Sir II. CAIRNS said that would be found to be an equally fallacious contention with anything advanced by the other side. He then proceeded to put the |