computation, will, in fact, continue through the very extended space of three hundred and sixty-five thousand years. If we mistake not, holy scripture affords no example of such a mode of interpretation, unless it be in the very instance in question: and to say that this is the true interpretation in the instance questioned, without being able to cite a parallel, seems to us to be begging the whole question. Nor do the arguments which our author endeavours to derive collaterally from the quotations he makes, and the positions he lays down, at all convince us that his statement is correct. On such a subject, a subject which relates to the plans of a sovereign God, and which may appear to us defective only because we perceive but a part of them, we believe that nothing but clear scripture warrant, should be the ground of our conclusions.

On the whole, the discourse before us must, we think, be considered as exhibiting a specimen of truly evangelical thought and eloquent address, but yet, when critically considered, defective as a discourse founded on the text which the author selected, and its excellence somewhat abated by a few occasional blemishes.

RELIGIOUS AND MORAL DISCUSSIONS.

THE question, Whether a man may lawfully marry his brother's widow, or wife's sister, has been frequently referred to the consideration of the synod of New-York and Philadelphia, and to the general assembly of the presbyterian church. Much time has been spent in discussing it, and frequent decisions have been made about it; yet the case still recurs, and there are few meetings, without some reference of that kind brought forward. This circumstance is remarkable, and deserves attention. It may be ow. ing, in some measure, to the different decisions, which have been made; but principally, I apprehend, to a common persuasion, in the minds of christians, that the law, in Lev. xviii. forbidding such connexions, is obligatory on all men.

This appears to have been the persuasion of the christian church, in almost all its branches, since the beginning, until, of late, some have been disposed to reject the authority of that law; and while this persuasion remains in the minds of christians, it will be in vain to expect to silence the question, by public decision or authority. It will still remain a troublesome case of conscience, demanding a serious and scriptural resolution.

The resolution of the case will depend on the views which we ought to have of the law above mentioned, viz. whether we should consider it, as of a moral nature, and binding on all men; or merely ceremonial, and binding only on the Jews.

In support of its general obligation, the following observations are suggested.

I. The law itself, from its general complexion, appears to carry in it sufficient evidence of this. It was given by divine authority, and stands in the sacred record, making one entire section by itself. It relates to one subject, of a general nature and of great importance; viz. the right direction and government of those propensities, which God has implanted in human nature. It contains several precepts, which are indisputably of a moral nature. Nothing appears, in the whole section, which can be said to be merely ceremonial, or so adapted to the Jewish peculiarity, as to confine it to that nation only. And, as if on purpose to guard against its being accounted merely ceremonial, the violations of it are called " abominations, and abominable customs; the doings of the land of Egypt, and of the land of Canaan;" for which they were punished, v. 3, 26, 27. Yet every one knows that ceremonial abominations, were not applicable to the Egyptians and Canaanites.

This being the character which is given by God himself to the breaches of this law by nations who never were subjected to any ceremonial usages, and which, (from v. 27.) may be considered as having a respect to all the precepts in the same section, is sufficient to shew that the law is not to be regarded as merely ceremonial. And notwithstanding it was delivered to the Jews, incorporated with their other laws, and made subservient to their constitution; yet this will not be sufficient to disprove its general obligation, when we consider,

1. That to them were committed the oracles of God; those scriptures, of which it is said, that they are divinely inspired, and profitable for doctrine; for reproof; for correction; for instruction in righteousness." It may be a familiar way with some, to call the scriptures of the old testament, Jervish scriptures, and to consider them as no way obligatory on christians; but this notion ought to be utterly rejected. God chose and separated that people, not with a partial respect to themselves, but to be the repositories of light and instruction for the benefit of the world. That this law therefore is found among those early revelations, is not an argument against, but rather in favour of its general obligation; and especially, if it is found to contain nothing which

can restrict it peculiarly to the national and typical condition of the Jews.

2. The moral law, or that summary of it which we have in the decalogue, (Exod. xx.) was given, in like manner, to the Jews, incorporated with their other laws, and adapted to their form of government; yet this does not impair its universal obligation. We ought not to think that any system of regulations would be given by God for the government and duty of men, in any condition whatsoever, but what should contain the moral law.

3. This law of kindred does not appear to be so connected with any of the peculiar regulations of the Jews, as to impair its general obligation. Besides the laws which related to their typi cal character, there were other ordinances, designed to preserve them as a distinct people from the rest of the world, and which related to the distinction of tribes and families; the preservation of genealogies, and inheritances; and the rights of redemption, &c. but none of these are contained in this law: so far from this, other laws were provided for these purposes, one of which (viz. that a man should marry the widow of his brother, who had died without issue) appears to be in direct opposition to one of the precepts of this law. Whatever favourable aspect the general law of kin might have upon the Jewish constitution, which rendered it fit, that it should be revealed to them, and through them to the rest of the world, as other parts of the moral law were; yet, it does not appear that any of these objects or peculiarities mentioned, could be accomplished by this law; or that any one precept in it had a special reference to them; nay, instead of this, it might be reasonably thought that some of them might have been more effectually promoted, not by prohibiting, but by allow ing marriages, in their own families, as well as in their own tribes. And therefore it may be a reasonable presumption, that one special use of this law, with respect to them, was, to guard against their taking encouragement to such liberties, from those peculiar regulations.

II. The subjects of the law are of a general nature; belonging, equally, to all men; viz. Marriage; kindred; the right use and direction of those propensities which God has implanted in human nature.

These subjects are of great importance. Express laws about them appear to be necessary; and, from the goodness of God, such might be reasonably expected. Moral duty is agreeable to reason, and the obligation may commonly be observed by intelligent and attentive minds; yet special revelation was necessary,

to teach and enforce it, with sufficient authority, on mankind. Accordingly our wise and good lawgiver has not left us to search after the knowledge of our duty, by reasoning and inquiry; but, by express precept, or fair and easy consequence, has instructed us in every thing, which relates to our government and happiness. The main subject of this law, with which the present case is concerned, is marriage and kindred. It is of this the law treats, in the first place; for it would be unreasonable to understand the sixth verse, as meaning any other kind of approach, but marriage. About this connexion, some instructions are given, in other parts of the word of God. Adam seems to have had a special revelation about it, which led him, when Eve was presented to him, to declare the law of marriage, and the relations and duties it should create, though he had yet no knowledge of them by experience. As this was a very important institution, from whence our various relations and duties should arise; as it was a law eminently conducive to the orderly continuance and happiness of the human race; and distinguishing man from other animals, which were to be propagated in the same way, by natural generation; and as it was upon a subject, wherein beyond all others, man, undirected and unrestrained, would be disposed to go wrong, and to imitate the brutes; so it is reasonable to conclude, that the wisdom and goodness of God, would not leave us destitute of express and necessary directions upon what related to that subject.

Particularly, with respect to the law of kindred; we think, that an express law was necessary, to ascertain the degrees in which it may be lawful, or unlawful to marry. Such a law was necessary, 1. To promote uniformity among men, in that matter, and to prevent confusion. It is observable that this is one design of the law under consideration. The violation of it is called confusion, ch. xx. 12. which may signify some derangement of that order of relations and duties, which God has established for the good of mankind; or something injurious to the health and vigour of the human constitution. What the consequences of this confusion might be, in any of these respects, we may not clearly see; but we may justly conclude, that the wisdom of God, who does nothing in vain, must know, that it would have some bad effect, with respect to the well-being of the human race; otherwise he would not have given a law to prevent it. Every law of God must be adapted to some good end, though we, who have to judge by our imperfect notions of the fitness of things, or partial experience, may not be able, in some cases, to discover it. H. de St. Pierre observes, "The majestic obscurity of the laws of nature results

from the multiplicity of her resources, and the profundity of our ignorance. The law of adaptation is the source of all our discoveries and the foundation of all our reasonings, and regulates our ideas of what is beyond our examination. We are ignorant, that there are men in the planets, but we are assured there must be eyes there, for there is light. This law awakens a sense of justice, and informs of a future world. It is an invincible proof of a God, for such infinite adaptations could never be the effect of limited wisdom." But if there is such obscurity in the laws of nature, though steady and uniform; and the great law of adaptation, or the fitnesses of things, often leaves us in the dark about them; it may be expected to be still more so in some of these laws which are to govern free agents, whose perversity and various habits are sufficient to interrupt the operation of any laws, however useful they may be to promote good order among men, or the health and strength of the human constitution. When we have divine direction, that should be our rule.

2. It will be allowed that there is such a crime as incest, and that, in some degrees, marriage would be unlawful; as in that of parents and children; brethren and sisters; which would evidently confound relations, and disturb their correspondent duties: But as kindred extends beyond these relations; the question will be, what shall determine the lawful boundary? If there is no express law, it must be left to capricious fancy, to affection or passion, or to the imperfect sense of moral obligation, which the reason of every man and woman may suggest. A principle, weak and variable, and without authority, even in the plainest cases; and much more incapable to decide, in cases where the shades of moral good and evil are not so distinctly marked.

3. The wisdom of God has appointed, that mankind should subsist, in families and relationships (in the scriptures, called kindred or kin, v. 6. and elsewhere). And it is evident, that this constitution of things greatly contributes to the good order, the education, government, improvement and happiness of men. From these relations certain obligations and duties arise, which ought to be distinctly felt and discharged. Many of these duties are inculcated in the word of God, and the neglect or violation of them is accounted an evidence of a depraved mind. It would therefore be improper, that this order of things should be disturbed, or any of these duties superceded, by confounding those relations, at least in some degrees. This renders it necessary that such degrees should be determined by adequate authority. But we know not any such authority, but God; nor any express law, except this, given by him on that subject.