LETTER LX.

DECEMBER 15, 1833.

MR. MADISON'S war message was passed to the committee of foreign relations in the House, a majority of which, viz., John Calhoun, S. C.; Felix Grundy, Tenn.; John Smilie, Penn.; John A. Harper, N. H.; Joseph Desha, Ken.; and Ebenezer Seaver, Mass., agreed upon and reported a manifesto, as the basis of a declaration of war. If these gentlemen had not been under the high excitement arising under Jeffersonian influence, how could they have thought it to be dutiful and patriotic to recommend an offensive war, in the then state of Europe, and especially of their own country? The manifesto sets forth the old grievances of blockades, orders in council, and impressments, all of them measures affecting the commercial part of the nation. Threefourths at least of this part were to be found north of the Delaware. The act declaring war was dated the 18th of June, 1812. If the causes of war were such as to warrant this declaration, it might be expected, that those who were in favor of it would be found to be residents north of the Delaware. This was not so; on the contrary, the planters and lawyers of the south and of the west, and others from those quarters knew better, than northern citizens, what measures were necessary to protect their property and to vindicate their rights.

In the House of Representatives the whole number of members was 128; of these 79 voted for the war; and of these (79) 62 resided south, and 17 north of the Delaware. The Senate consisted of 32 members, 19 of whom voted for the war, and 14 of these resided south of the Delaware; and 5 of the 19 north. Putting together the war members of both branches residing south of the Delaware, viz., 62 and 14, they make 76; which is four short of half of the whole number in both branches. Thus

the war may be said to have been a measure of the south and west, to take care of the interests of the north, much against the I will of the latter. The whole number of members in both branches residing north of the Delaware was 68, of whom only 21 voted for the war.

There is some ground for the opinion, that a portion of those members, who voted for the war in both branches, did so, because circumstances forced them to express an assent contrary to their own convictions of duty. In truth, the Jeffersonian party had created an excitement which the leaders could not control. There is one man now living, who has long been a tenant of a seat in the capitol, who can tell, if he would, with what extreme and foreboding reluctance he voted for the war, as the least of the appalling evils which haunted his mind and even his dreams.

The probability is, that the members from the west expected benefits from the war, which may have shut out all perceptions of expediency. They may have believed that their own regions would be the scenes of activity, enterprise and acquisition; and they may have been careless of consequences to the seaboard, leaving that to defend itself as it could. Our southern and western brethren saw fit to make the "experiment." Does any portion of them desire to see another of the same kind? It is not intended to cast any reproach on those who proposed or assented to the war; but to show what the perils of the country must always be, when the government of it is submitted to party men. The tyranny of party among its own members, is as inexorable and vindictive, as any which it exercises against its adversaries. Consider the state of the Representatives of the nation at this moment. What prevents the House of Representatives from doing what a large majority of them in their consciences believe ought to be done for the relief of the country? Are they not sensible men? Are they not the sincere friends of their constituents? Are they not desirous that their fellow-citizens should enjoy all the benefits of industry, and all the means of independence and happiness? Undoubtedly. Are they, then, fascinated

by the intelligence, the virtues and the public services of Andrew Jackson? Not at all. They probably think him a very unfit man for his station. By what spell, then, are they bound? By that all-powerful one which Mr. Jefferson created. They are party men. Those, also, were party men who laid the embargo and voted for war. The denunciations of their own partisans is more to be dreaded, than the dereliction of duty, and the reproaches and contempt of their own constituents. It was the same spirit in another form, which carried the arms of France throughout the continent of Europe, and occasioned the horrible scenes which disgraced the last ten years of the last century. The members of selfish parties may, and often do hate each other, as men, most sincerely. There may be such instances in certain honorable assemblies of the present day. But this does not impair fidelity in the common cause. Thus, it requires far greater magnanimity than can ever be expected from party men, to do what they know to be right; and to abstain from what they know to be wrong. The great leaders of the party in power now, had rather see the whole country as desolate as a territory in Asia after an army of locusts have encamped upon it, than to yield single point of party. The corrective lies with the people; they can set this matter right, and no other earthly power can.

LETTER LXI.

JANUARY 2, 1834.

THE friends of peace resisted the declaration of war in Congress, with reason, good sense, faithful love of country, and serious eloquence; but such weapons were powerless against the infatuation of PARTY.

They said, that neither the government nor the people were

prepared for war; that the removal of restrictions had induced the commercial part of our citizens to engage extensively in shipments, and that many millions, not insured against war risks, would fall into the hands of the enemy. They insisted, that the nation was destitute of all means of annoying the enemy on the ocean; and that the whole effective force of the United States (independently of militia) was incompetent to defend any one of our seaports and cities. That an army could not be made in a day; that, if the materials had been gathered, the officers and soldiers must undergo a course of discipline and camp experience, which the war-worn of Europe had declared could not be effected in less time than a year. They insisted not only that the country was utterly destitute of means to coerce an enemy, but equally so of means of defence, if the enemy should become the assail

ants.

That

They urged that impressment was not a cause of war; first, because war would not settle the right; and secondly, because Great Britain had always been willing to negotiate. That all other subjects of controversy had passed away, but the orders in council. That whether England had, or had not a right to pass retaliatory orders, it was well known that these orders would be rescinded as soon as France had annulled her decrees. the administration had asserted what no rational being in the nation believed but themselves, viz., that these decrees were repealed. They further insisted, that the present time was precisely that in which a war should not be begun. They described the state of Europe as one which, if there were no other reason, demanded delay. But this was not the most cogent reason. The government could not carry on a war without money. It had no dependence but on commercial revenue. War would greatly diminish, if not annihilate this. Loans, taxes, militia service must be resorted to. Soon the enemy would be on our coasts, and, defenceless as they were and would continue to be, a comparatively small force could keep two thousand miles of seaboard in continual, harassing and costly alarm.

If the object was the conquest of British provinces, there were no means prepared to this end; none which could be prepared, before the whole force that could be organized would be required for the sole purpose of defence along our own shores.

The friends of peace further urged upon the war party, that, if their purpose was the conquest of Canada, it was impracticable, and worse than worthless, if it could be accomplished. It is worth while to transcribe the opinion of that erratic administration-man, John Randolph, who was sometimes very right in his views, whatever may be said of him at others. What he said in 1806, in committee of the whole, was as true in 1812, as then. "There are three points to be considered: 1. Our ability to contend with Great Britain. 2. The policy of such contest. 3. Conceding both these points, then the manner in which we can, with the greatest effect, retort upon and annoy our adversary.

"Now the gentleman from Massachusetts has settled, at a single sweep, not only that we are capable of contending with Great Britain on the ocean, but that we are actually her superior! Whence does the gentleman deduce this inference? Because truly, at that time, when Great Britain was not mistress of the ocean, when a North was her prime-minister and a Sandwich the first lord of her admiralty; when she was governed by a counting-house administration; privateers of this country trespassed on her commerce. So, too, did the cruisers of Dunkirk. At that day Suffrein held the mastery of the Indian seas. But what is the case now? Do gentlemen remember the capture of Cornwallis on land, because. De Grasse maintained the dominion of the ocean? To my mind no position is more clear, than, if we go to war with Great Britain, Charleston, Boston, the Chesapeake and the Hudson will be invested with British squadrons. Will you call on the Count De Grasse to relieve them, or shall we apply to the Admiral Gravina, or Admiral Villeneuve, to raise the blockade? But you have not only a prospect of gathering glory, and what seems to the gentleman of Massachusets much dearer, profit, by privateering; but you will be able to make a conquest