L. 9 pr. D. de her. inst. (28, 5) (ULPIAN.): Quotiens volens alium § 28. heredem scribere alium scripserit in corpore hominis errans, veluti frater meus,' 'patronus meus,' placet, neque eum heredem esse, qui scriptus est, quoniam voluntate deficitur, neque eum, quem voluit, quoniam scriptus non est. L. 57 D. de O. et A. (44, 7) (POMPONIUS): In omnibus negotiis contrahendis, sive bona fide sint sive non sint, si error aliquis intervenit, ut aliud sentiat puta qui emit aut qui conducit, aliud qui cum his contrahit, nihil valet, quod acti sit. § 29. Motive, as affecting Furistic Acts. The general rule is that the motives from which juristic acts § 29. proceed are immaterial. It is therefore, as a rule, a matter of indifference whether a person has gained his object by the juristic act or not. If, for example, he buys a book, thinking it deals with one thing, whereas it really deals with another, the sale is nevertheless perfectly good. His motive is immaterial. Falsa causa non nocet. Such is the general rule. There are nevertheless some exceptional cases where the motive is material in the eye of the law. These are the four cases of metus, dolus, error in substantia, and donatio. I. Metus. Metus occurs when a person is forced to a juristic act under the influence of fear arising from a threat. The threat is called 'vis compulsiva,' and is distinguished in this sense from 'vis atrox' or 'absoluta,' i. e. sheer physical force. The object of the threat is to secure the conclusion of the juristic act, whatever it may be, a transfer of ownership, a promise to pay money, and so forth. Roman civil law, in such cases, upholds the transaction as perfectly valid and binding, but the praetor supplies the person intimidated with the means of cancelling, by process of law, the effects of the act which was thus forced upon him. These means are, firstly, the actio quod metus causa, an action for the recovery of property available against anyone who is actually the richer, at the time, by the transaction in question; secondly, the exceptio quod metus. § 29. causa, i. e. a special defence allowed to a person who is sued on an act he performed under the influence of fear. Metus is, thirdly, a ‘justa causa' for the granting of 'in integrum restitutio' (§ 43). L. 1 pr. D. quod met. c. (4, 2): Ait praetor: QUOD METUS CAUSA L. 14 § 3 D. eod. (ULPIAN.): In hac actione non quaeritur, II. Dolus. Dolus occurs when one party to an agreement is induced to conclude a juristic act by means of the deliberate deception practised on him by the other. One party, in short, is defrauded by the other. Here again the civil law upheld the transaction as perfectly valid and binding, but the praetor granted certain legal remedies against the fraudulent party by means of which the civil law effects of the transaction were nullified. These remedies were, firstly, the actio doli and, secondly, the exceptio doli. The object of the actio doli (which was merely a subsidiary remedy, applicable only if there were no other kind of legal redress) was to obtain indemnification for all loss resulting from the juristic act, involving, in some cases, a rescission of the whole transaction. It only lay against the defrauding party himself, or his heir, but not against third parties who had profited by the transaction. The exceptio doli was a special defence to an action taken by the defrauding party, or his legal successor, on the transaction in question. There was also, thirdly, an 'in integrum restitutio propter dolum' (§ 43). L. II D. de dolo (4, 3): Verba autem edicti talia sunt: III. Error in Substantia. 'Error in substantia' is a mistake concerning some essential quality of the subject-matter of the agreement, i. e. concerning some quality which places the article for commercial purposes in a different category of merchandise. Thus it would be an error in § 29. substantia, if I were to mistake a gilt vessel for one of solid gold, vinegar for wine, or a female slave for a male one. In all these cases the subject-matter of the agreement is specifically indicated. Both parties mean precisely the same individual thing. There is, in other words, complete 'consensus in corpore.' Thus 'error in substantia' is the very opposite of 'error in corpore,' for the former presupposes complete consensus as to the subject-matter of the agreement, whereas in the latter there can be no consensus, because each party is thinking of a different subject-matter. In the case of an error in substantia, one party can be proved to have believed the subject-matter to possess some essential quality which in truth it does not possess. There need not be any fraud on the part of the other; he may be labouring under precisely the same mistake. The mistake, such as it is, is a mistake of motive, a mistake which gives rise to the necessary will, the consensus, in a word, to the juristic act, in precisely the same manner as metus and dolus in the previous instances. The juristic act is complete, and on principle, again, perfectly valid and binding. Falsa causa non nocet. In certain exceptional cases however, where there is a bilateral contract, a person, who, under the influence of an excusable error in substantia, becomes a party to such a contract (e. g. a sale), may impeach the transaction on the ground of such error in substantia. In the great majority of juristic acts (traditio, pledge, promise of bounty, depositum, commodatum, &c.) an error in substantia is, like any other motive, immaterial, as far as the legal validity of the act is concerned. Its legal relevancy is confined to obligatory transactions with promises of mutual consideration, such as sale, letting and hiring, &c. And when we say that error in substantia is material in such cases, we do not mean that it vitiates the entire transaction, nor again that there is any particular legal remedy for impeaching it. What we mean is merely, that in virtue of the bona fides which governs all such transactions, an error in substantia must necessarily modify the effects which they produce, and modify them, not merely according to praetorian law, but ipso jure, i. e. according to the civil law. Where I clearly intend to purchase § 29. wine, but through some excusable error purchase poison, it would be inconsistent with the requirements of good faith which govern the contract of sale, if I were simply condemned to pay the price, and were debarred from demanding a rescission of the sale,-unless indeed there are particular circumstances which make such a treatment of the case unfairly prejudicial to the vendor. For it is of the essence of every contract of sale, as well as of all other transactions which generate bilateral obligations (§ 63), that the parties are not simply bound to perform what they actually promised, but are merely obliged to act up to the requirements (the full requirements, however) of good faith and honesty in the mutual dealings between man and man1. IV. Donatio. A gift (donatio) is an act of bounty by which one person increases the property of another. Early Roman law had already subjected the power to make gifts to certain restrictions by the lex Cincia, 204 B. C. In Justinian's law transactions which have for their object the making of a gift are, on account of this motive, governed by the following rules 1. Gifts between husband and wife are void (§ 81, end). 2. Gifts exceeding a certain maximum (fixed by Justinian at 500 solidi, about £234) are void to the extent of such excess, unless the donor registers the gift in court (insinuatio), thereby formally manifesting his intention of bounty. 3. Gifts are revocable on the ground of gross ingratitude on the part of the donee, e.g. if he compasses the donor's death, or scandalously libels him. The donatio mortis causa is a gift conditional on the donee surviving the donor. In regard to the rules just stated as well as in some other respects, donationes mortis causa are not governed by the law applicable to donationes, but by the law of legacies (§ 105). L. I pr. D. de donat. (39, 5) (JULIAN.): Donationes complures facit, quam ut liberalitatem et munificentiam exerceat: haec § 29. proprie donatio appellatur. § 1 I. de donat. (2, 7): Mortis causa donatio est, quae propter mortis fit suspicionem: cum quis ita donat, ut, si quid suum. $30. The Qualifications of a Furistic Act. The normal effects of a juristic act may be modified by a col- § 30. lateral agreement between the parties to the act. The modifications which the parties thus agree to engraft on the act are what we call the 'qualifications' of a juristic act. Of such qualifications three are the most important: condicio, dies, modus. I. Condicio. A 'condition' is an uncertain future event on the occurrence of which the parties agree to make the effect of the transaction dependent. A condition is 'suspensive' when the commencement, and 'resolutive' when the termination of the operation of the act is made to depend on its occurrence. On the fulfilment of a suspensive condition, the juristic act produces ipso jure its normal legal results, effecting a transfer of ownership, creating a liability, &c., as the case may be. And, conversely, on the happening of a resolutive condition the normal effects of the act cease ipso jure. Uncertainty is the peculiar characteristic of a condition in the legal sense. Hence the so-called 'condiciones in praesens vel in praeteritum relatae,' the impossible and the necessary conditions are not, in the strict legal sense, conditions at all. § 4 I. de V. O. (3, 15): Sub condicione stipulatio fit, cum in aliquem casum differtur obligatio, ut, si aliquid factum fuerit |