There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge ArgumentPeter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, Daniel Stoljar In Frank Jackson's famous thought experiment, Mary is confined to a black-and-white room and educated through black-and-white books and lectures on a black-and-white television. In this way, she learns everything there is to know about the physical world. If physicalism—the doctrine that everything is physical—is true, then Mary seems to know all there is to know. What happens, then, when she emerges from her black-and-white room and sees the color red for the first time? Jackson's knowledge argument says that Mary comes to know a new fact about color, and that, therefore, physicalism is false. The knowledge argument remains one of the most controversial and important arguments in contemporary philosophy.There's Something About Mary—the first book devoted solely to the argument—collects the main essays in which Jackson presents (and later rejects) his argument along with key responses by other philosophers. These responses are organized around a series of questions: Does Mary learn anything new? Does she gain only know-how (the ability hypothesis), or merely get acquainted with something she knew previously (the acquaintance hypothesis)? Does she learn a genuinely new fact or an old fact in disguise? And finally, does she really know all the physical facts before her release, or is this a "misdescription"? The arguments presented in this comprehensive collection have important implications for the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness. |
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Page xx
... understanding of the argu- ment . That is the impetus behind the present volume . Its purpose is to gather together the main essays in which Jackson has presented - and later rejected2 - his argument , plus some classic and more recent ...
... understanding of the argu- ment . That is the impetus behind the present volume . Its purpose is to gather together the main essays in which Jackson has presented - and later rejected2 - his argument , plus some classic and more recent ...
Page xx
... understand , is not what we mean by light : we mean by light just that which a blind man can never understand , and which we can never describe to him . ( 1967 [ 1912 ] , pp . 27-28 ) Russell regards a certain sort of empiricism to be ...
... understand , is not what we mean by light : we mean by light just that which a blind man can never understand , and which we can never describe to him . ( 1967 [ 1912 ] , pp . 27-28 ) Russell regards a certain sort of empiricism to be ...
Page xx
... understand what you mean by ' seeing ' . You discover , we will further assume , that the pair of you have ... understanding , you endeavour to explain your point . You describe how , in that little camera which we call the ' eye ...
... understand what you mean by ' seeing ' . You discover , we will further assume , that the pair of you have ... understanding , you endeavour to explain your point . You describe how , in that little camera which we call the ' eye ...
Page 8
... not fully understand the meaning of the term ' red ' , or the concept of red . But he insists that it does not follow from this that any- thing ontological - like the denial of physicalism or the 8 D. Stoljar and Y. Nagasawa.
... not fully understand the meaning of the term ' red ' , or the concept of red . But he insists that it does not follow from this that any- thing ontological - like the denial of physicalism or the 8 D. Stoljar and Y. Nagasawa.
Page 19
... understand them . In effect , this position makes the charge against Jack- son's version of the knowledge argument that we noted when discussing Nagel's bat : the objection that the knowledge intuition can be explained psychologically ...
... understand them . In effect , this position makes the charge against Jack- son's version of the knowledge argument that we noted when discussing Nagel's bat : the objection that the knowledge intuition can be explained psychologically ...
Contents
Epiphenomenal Qualia | 39 |
What Mary Didnt Know | 51 |
Does She Learn Anything? | 57 |
Epiphenomenal Qualia? | 59 |
Dennett on the Knowledge Argument | 69 |
The Ability Hypothesis | 75 |
What Experience Teaches | 77 |
Motion Blindness and the Knowledge Argument | 105 |
What Mary Couldnt Know Belief About Phenomenal States | 241 |
Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument | 269 |
Did She Know Everything Physical? | 299 |
Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia | 301 |
Two Conceptions of the Physical | 309 |
Inexpressible Truths and the Allure of the Knowledge Argument | 333 |
So Many Ways of Saying No to Mary | 365 |
Postscripts | 407 |
Knowing What It Is Like The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument | 143 |
The Acquaintance Hypothesis | 161 |
Knowing Qualia A Reply to Jackson with Postscript 1997 | 163 |
Acquaintance with Qualia | 179 |
10 Phenomenal Knowledge | 197 |
Old Facts New Modes | 217 |
Phenomenal States Revised Version | 219 |
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Common terms and phrases
ability hypothesis acquaintance antiphysicalist argue blue Cambridge causal Chalmers chap Churchland claim cognitive color experience color vision Consciousness David Lewis distinct epiphenomenal Epiphenomenal Qualia epistemic intension epistemic possibilities example Frank Jackson Fred imagine introspection Journal of Philosophy knowledge argument Lewis Loar Lycan Marianna Mary gains Mary knows Mary learns Mary's metaphysical Mind mode of presentation motion nature Nemirow Nida-Rümelin nonphysical normally sighted o-physical object overt powers Oxford phenomenal belief phenomenal concepts phenomenal information phenomenal knowledge phenomenal quality phenomenal redness Philosophy of Mind physical facts physical information physical property physical theory physicalism is false physicalist plausible possible worlds posteriori premise priori problem propositional attitudes propositional knowledge propositions qualia question reason recognitional concepts red thing relation release relevant representation Reprinted role sense sky appears sort Stoljar stroboscopic supervenience suppose t-physical taste Vegemite thesis thought tion University Press Vegemite visual experience
Popular passages
Page xx - Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-andwhite books and through lectures relayed on black-and-white television. In this way she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world. She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of "physical...
Page xx - She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of "physical" which includes everything in completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts consequent upon all this, including of course functional roles. If physicalism is true, she knows all there is to know. For to suppose otherwise is to suppose that there is more to know than every physical fact, and that is just what physicalism denies.