There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge ArgumentPeter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, Daniel Stoljar In Frank Jackson's famous thought experiment, Mary is confined to a black-and-white room and educated through black-and-white books and lectures on a black-and-white television. In this way, she learns everything there is to know about the physical world. If physicalism—the doctrine that everything is physical—is true, then Mary seems to know all there is to know. What happens, then, when she emerges from her black-and-white room and sees the color red for the first time? Jackson's knowledge argument says that Mary comes to know a new fact about color, and that, therefore, physicalism is false. The knowledge argument remains one of the most controversial and important arguments in contemporary philosophy.There's Something About Mary—the first book devoted solely to the argument—collects the main essays in which Jackson presents (and later rejects) his argument along with key responses by other philosophers. These responses are organized around a series of questions: Does Mary learn anything new? Does she gain only know-how (the ability hypothesis), or merely get acquainted with something she knew previously (the acquaintance hypothesis)? Does she learn a genuinely new fact or an old fact in disguise? And finally, does she really know all the physical facts before her release, or is this a "misdescription"? The arguments presented in this comprehensive collection have important implications for the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 67
Page xviii
... discuss in " Mind and Illusion . " 3. Some critics of the second part point out that no amount of knowledge of what one's world is like amounts to knowledge of , for example , who one is in one's world , or of what one's own part of ...
... discuss in " Mind and Illusion . " 3. Some critics of the second part point out that no amount of knowledge of what one's world is like amounts to knowledge of , for example , who one is in one's world , or of what one's own part of ...
Page xix
... discussions of the knowledge argument that counts , e.g. , functional and topic - neutral properties as physical ) if physicalism is true . But then she could have known about them when inside the room . For example , I can- not see how ...
... discussions of the knowledge argument that counts , e.g. , functional and topic - neutral properties as physical ) if physicalism is true . But then she could have known about them when inside the room . For example , I can- not see how ...
Page xx
... discussion and explain the relations between them . 1 The Knowledge Intuition Many arguments in philosophy of mind , and in other areas of philosophy , are based on intuitions that are extremely persistent and widespread , intu- itions ...
... discussion and explain the relations between them . 1 The Knowledge Intuition Many arguments in philosophy of mind , and in other areas of philosophy , are based on intuitions that are extremely persistent and widespread , intu- itions ...
Page xx
... discussion of a question that is related to Russell's but different from it , the question , in philosophy of perception , of what makes a psychological faculty one of sensory percep- tion rather than simply a way of registering ...
... discussion of a question that is related to Russell's but different from it , the question , in philosophy of perception , of what makes a psychological faculty one of sensory percep- tion rather than simply a way of registering ...
Page xx
... discussion between Paul E. Meehl and Herbert Feigl . Here is Feigl : Let us assume that a complete explanation of animal and human behavior can be achieved by reduction to the basic physical laws , and that the structures ( initial and ...
... discussion between Paul E. Meehl and Herbert Feigl . Here is Feigl : Let us assume that a complete explanation of animal and human behavior can be achieved by reduction to the basic physical laws , and that the structures ( initial and ...
Contents
Epiphenomenal Qualia | 39 |
What Mary Didnt Know | 51 |
Does She Learn Anything? | 57 |
Epiphenomenal Qualia? | 59 |
Dennett on the Knowledge Argument | 69 |
The Ability Hypothesis | 75 |
What Experience Teaches | 77 |
Motion Blindness and the Knowledge Argument | 105 |
What Mary Couldnt Know Belief About Phenomenal States | 241 |
Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument | 269 |
Did She Know Everything Physical? | 299 |
Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia | 301 |
Two Conceptions of the Physical | 309 |
Inexpressible Truths and the Allure of the Knowledge Argument | 333 |
So Many Ways of Saying No to Mary | 365 |
Postscripts | 407 |
Knowing What It Is Like The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument | 143 |
The Acquaintance Hypothesis | 161 |
Knowing Qualia A Reply to Jackson with Postscript 1997 | 163 |
Acquaintance with Qualia | 179 |
10 Phenomenal Knowledge | 197 |
Old Facts New Modes | 217 |
Phenomenal States Revised Version | 219 |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
ability hypothesis acquaintance antiphysicalist argue blue Cambridge causal Chalmers chap Churchland claim cognitive color experience color vision Consciousness David Lewis distinct epiphenomenal Epiphenomenal Qualia epistemic intension epistemic possibilities example Frank Jackson Fred imagine introspection Journal of Philosophy knowledge argument Lewis Loar Lycan Marianna Mary gains Mary knows Mary learns Mary's metaphysical Mind mode of presentation motion nature Nemirow Nida-Rümelin nonphysical normally sighted o-physical object overt powers Oxford phenomenal belief phenomenal concepts phenomenal information phenomenal knowledge phenomenal quality phenomenal redness Philosophy of Mind physical facts physical information physical property physical theory physicalism is false physicalist plausible possible worlds posteriori premise priori problem propositional attitudes propositional knowledge propositions qualia question reason recognitional concepts red thing relation release relevant representation Reprinted role sense sky appears sort Stoljar stroboscopic supervenience suppose t-physical taste Vegemite thesis thought tion University Press Vegemite visual experience
Popular passages
Page xx - Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-andwhite books and through lectures relayed on black-and-white television. In this way she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world. She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of "physical...
Page xx - She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of "physical" which includes everything in completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts consequent upon all this, including of course functional roles. If physicalism is true, she knows all there is to know. For to suppose otherwise is to suppose that there is more to know than every physical fact, and that is just what physicalism denies.