the signers lived. The declaration, in addition to general damages, averred that the plaintiff was thereby deprived of getting such license.

The defense rested on the privileged character of the publication, and also averred, by way of justification, that Wieman was a habitual blasphemer and profane person, and an open violator of the Sabbath by hunting, sports and in other ways.

On the trial there was no testimony tending to prove that these papers were got up for any purpose or used for any purpose except to be laid before the superintendent of schools to prevent his granting-a license to Wieman. It also appeared that the papers were drawn by counsel as expressing properly the result of the charges of the parties, which were detailed to him in full, and related mainly to the bad language and Sabbath-breaking acts of plaintiff, and that they were informed the papers were shaped as they should be for that purpose. It appeared further that in laying the papers before the superintendent they explained to him fully that their objections were the same before referred to and no other, and were accompanied with manifestations of an entire absence of personal ill will.

There was evidence of his general good character in other repects. There was also evidence of his habitual use of profane and bad language before his scholars as well as elsewhere, and of such open and conspicuous Sabbath-breaking as offended his neighbors. There was some dispute concerning one or two acts, but none upon the general result.

The court below held the communication was privileged unless both false and expressly malicious. It was also held that a man who habitually violated his duty by profanity and Sabbath-breaking, was of bad moral character.

If this had been a libel pubished generally, and without reference to any particular purpose, it is very probable that its meaning might be regarded as covering a kind of conduct different from that proved against plaintiff here, and that, by reason of the difference, a justification might not be complete that went no further. Language does not always and

in all places convey the same impression, and a person is hable for the meaning that is most natural and is actually, by his own fault, fairly accepted under the circumstances.

But, on the other hand, where the meaning intended to be conveyed, and actually understood, is shown, there can be no responsibility incurred for any other. In the present case the writings were understood by the superintendent precisely as they were meant to be. It was his duty by law to give no license to any one unless such as "he shall deem qualified in respect to moral character, learning, and ability to instruct and govern a school." Laws 1875, p. 36. We do not think any superintendent would need vindication for being dissatisfied with the moral character of a teacher who has the faults complained of by these parties who opposed the licensing of plaintiff. A superintendent who should subject young chil dren to such influences, would be very censurable.

In the present case the communication was fully privileged. It was made by persons interested in the school, to the person qualified to receive and act on the petition, for. an honest purpose, and with an honest belief in the justice of their action. In such cases no action can be maintained even if the complaint is untrue, if not maliciously made. Foster v. Scripps 39 Mich. 376, Dickeson v. Hilliard L. R. 9 Exch. 79; Harrison v. Bush 5 El. & Bl. 344.

There is no error in the proceedings and the judgment must be affirmed with costs.

The other Justices concurred.

WILLIAM PRESTON V. THE PEOPLE.

Autrefois convict-Sufficiency of plea in justice's court.

A plea of former conviction, in a justice's court, need not be in writing. A justice enters what he understands to be the substance of a plea in his docket, and if none but a plainly untenable objection has been taken to it, a court of review will presume that it was otherwise sufficient.

Where the prosecution, in a criminal proceeding before a justice, does not demur or otherwise object to a special plea, for either form or substance, the justice should not reject it on grounds which the prosecution seems disposed to waive.

A plea of former conviction to a charge of assault and battery is not legally inconsistent with a showing that the conviction was under a village by-law for disorderly conduct.

Error to Wexford. Submitted Jan. 21. Decided Jan. 28.

ASSAULT AND BATTERY. Respondent brings error. Reversed and prisoner discharged.

Sawyer & Bishop for plaintiff in error.

Attorney-General Jacob J. Van Riper for the people. Plea of former conviction before a justice must conform to the rules in a court of record and set forth the former warrant and conviction, aver defendant's identity and that of the offense, and if the former judgment was by a justice, must state his jurisdiction, etc.: Com. v. Goddard 13 Mass. 457; Tiff. Cr. L. 401; Briggs v. Milburn 40 Mich. 512.

COOLEY, J. Plaintiff in error was arrested and brought before a justice of the peace on a charge of assault and battery. On the charge being read to him he pleaded orally not guilty and a former conviction in bar. The justice disregarded the plea of a former conviction because it was not in writing and sworn to, and proceeded to try, convict and sentence the party on the issue presented by the other plea. This conviction has been affirmed in the circuit court.

It is not claimed by the Attorney-General that the justice was right in holding the special plea in bar to be of no force. because not in writing, but it is urged that the plea itself was a nullity because of want of substance. It specified no pros-ecution, no court, no time or place, but merely in general terms set up a former conviction. But in answer to this it is sufficient to say that in case of an oral plea the justice merely enters what he deems to be its substance on the docket; and when no objection is taken to it but one that is manifestly untenable, we must suppose it was in other respects sufficient.

Besides, it does not appear that the prosecution objected to the special plea, either for form or substance, by demurrer or otherwise; and the justice should not have volunteered an objection which the prosecution, apparently, were disposed to waive.

It is said, however, that it sufficiently appears from the record that the supposed former conviction was a conviction of disorderly conduct under a village by-law; and that such a conviction could constitute no bar. It is true there is an affidavit appearing in the record in which plaintiff in error affirms that he has been so convicted of disorderly conduct, and that the cause for which he was convicted "is and was the same identical transaction and cause" for which he was then under arrest; but this is not legally inconsistent with his plea. He may have been convicted under the general statute and under village ordinance also.

The judgment must be reversed, and the plaintiff in error discharged from his recognizance.

The other Justices concurred.

45 488 75 549 45 488 110 576

JOHN A. LAMB V. THOMAS STORY.

Negotiability-Evidence explaining indorsement.

The negotiability of a promissory note, made payable "on or before two years from date," is destroyed by a memorandum attached thereto providing that if paid within one year there shall be no interest.

In an action between original parties upon an instrument that is not negotiable, it is competent for the defendant to show the circumstances under which he had indorsed it to the plaintiff, if the evidence does not vary any positive legal agreement made by him.

Where a vendor of a chattel takes a note for the purchase price, in which he reserves the right to retake the chattel on default and retain what has been paid or collect the note, his assignment of the note by indorsement does not of itself assign this right, and in an action brought against him on the note by the indorsee, he can show all the facts connected with the indorsement to fix and determine its character and extent.

Error to St. Clair. Submitted Jan. 21. Decided Jan. 28.

ASSUMPSIT. Defendant brings error. Reversed.

Wright & McCall and A. E. Chadwick for plaintiff in A memorandum attacted to a note and altering its terms is material: Wait v. Pomeroy 20 Mich. 425.

error.

Elliott E. Stevenson and O'Brien J. Atkinson, for defendant in error, claimed that the instrument in suit was a promissory note: Beardslee v. Horton 3 Mich. 560; Smith v. Kendall 9 Mich. 241; Wright v. Irwin 33 Mich. 33; Knight v. Jones 21 Mich. 161; Fairchild v. O. C. & R. R. Co. 15 N. Y. 337; Cota v. Buck 7 Met. 588; Ilodges v. Shuler 22 N. Y. 114; Preston v. Whitney 23 Mich. 264; Newton Wagon Co. v. Dier Neb.; Stewart v. First Nat. Bank 40 Mich. 348; if a note is so drawn as to show how much will be due at maturity, it is certain enough: Houghton v. Morrison 29 Ill. 244; Nickerson v. Sheldon 33 Ill. 372.

MARSTON, C. J. An instrument, a copy of which appears herewith,* was by Lamb traded off to Story for a horse. *$150.00.

COLUMBUS, July 18th, 1877. On or before two years after date, we promise to pay to John A. Lamb or order the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars value received, with ten per cent. interest and current rate of exchange or express charges. This note is given for the purchase of the instrument mentioned below, which instrument is to remain the property of John A. Lamb, until the note is paid in full. It being optional with John A. Lamb upon default of payment to take possession of said instrument or to collect the note by process of law. And in case he shall take such instrument said John A. Lamb shall not be liable to refund any moneys heretofore paid by the purchaser thereof. And said instrument shall not be removed from the township of Columbus without the consent of the said John A. Lamb. DANIEL HICKEY. SARAH HICKEY.

Style 16, No. 52704 organ.

Payable at Wales, Michigan.

P. O. Address, Memphis, Michigan.

If this note is paid within one year no interest to be paid.

August 2d. 1877.

[Endorsed on back]

Received on the within note $25.

Pay to Thomas Story.

JOHN A. LAMB.