Truth and Errour are concerned about many General Relations of objects, which belong to them in the view in which we apprehend them. For example, we apprehend objects as existing in Space and Time; as being One or Many; Like or Unlike; as moving, and affecting each other's motions; and many other relations.

We can, in thought, separate these General Relations from the objects and facts. Such general relations are Space, Time, Number, Resemblance, Cause and Effect, and the like. These general relations thus separated may be termed Ideas; but the term Idea is often used more loosely, to designate all abstract objects of thought.

6. Objects and facts being regulated by these Ideas, we can, by the nature of our Ideas themselves, as for example the Ideas of Space, Time, Number, and the like, connect one fact with another by necessary consequence. Thus, we observe the fact that the stars move uniformly about the pole; we observe also their distances from each other. We can connect, with these facts, the times and places of their rising and setting, by a necessary process of thought. Such a process of thought is reasoning. We can reason, so that from the north polar distance of the star, and the latitude of the place of observation, we can deduce the interval of time between the star's rising and setting.

7. When we thus reason concerning things existing under these general relations of Space, Time, Number, and the like, we proceed upon, and necessarily assume, certain grounds, or Fundamental Principles, respecting these relations. And these Principles, the origin and basis of our reasoning, may be separately asserted, as Axioms. Such Principles are the Axioms of Geometry.

8. By observation of the external world according to the general relations of Space, Time, Number, Resemblance, Cause and Effect, and the like, we become acquainted

L

with it, so as to trace its course in some degree. We apprehend facts, or objects, as conforming to a general Rule or Law. Thus, the Stars in general conform to the Law, that they revolve uniformly about the pole. The Planets conform to certain other Laws, which were discovered by the Chaldean and Greek astronomers. Such Laws are Laws of Nature.

When we discover such a constancy and sequence in events, we believe some to be the consequences of the others. We are then led forwards to future, as well as backwards to past events. We believe that some events will certainly happen, that others are probable. We believe it certain that the sun will rise to-morrow, and probable that he will shine.

9. We can, in our thoughts, separate Laws of Nature from the Facts which conform to them. When we do this, the Law is represented by the Ideas and Conceptions which it involves. Thus the Law of a Planet's motion round the Sun, as to space, is represented by the conception of an Ellipse, the Sun being in its Focus. Laws so abstracted from Facts are Theories.

10. The operations by which we frame and deal with Ideas and Conceptions, and all other acts of thought, are ascribed to the mind; they are mental operations and acts.

The mental operations which have been noticed; namely, to conceive objects in a general and abstract manner (3); to apply names to them (4); to reason (6); to apprehend first principles of reasoning (7); to conceive general rules (9); to apprehend facts as conformable to general Rules (8); are functions belonging to man, exclusively of all other animals. They are ascribed to a faculty specially human, the Reason.

The substantive Reason, thus used, has a wider sense than the verb to reason. The Reason is not only the faculty

by which we reason from fundamental principles, when we have anyhow attained or assumed these; it is also the faculty by which we apprehend fundamental principles. By our Reason, we not only reason from the axioms of Geometry, but also see the truth of the axioms.

The special substantive, a reason, denotes a step in reasoning.

11. Of the processes which have been mentioned as belonging to the Reason, some are also ascribed to the Understanding, but not all. The Reason and the Understanding have not been steadily distinguished by English writers. The most simple way to use the substantive Understanding in a definite sense, is to make it correspond, in its extent, with the verb understand. To understand anything, is to apprehend it according to certain assumed ideas and rules; we do not include, in the meaning of the word, an examination of the ground of the ideas and rules, by reference to which we understand the thing. We understand a Language, when we apprehend what is said, according to the established vocabulary and grammar of the language; without inquiring how the words came to have their meaning, or what is the ground of the grammatical rules. We understand the sense, without reasoning about the etymology and syntax. Again, we understand a Machine when we perceive how its parts will work upon one another according to the known laws of mechanics, without inquiring what is the ground of these laws.

Reasoning may be requisite to understanding. We may have to reason about the syntax, in order to understand the sense we may have to reason upon mechanical principles, in order to understand the machine. But understanding leaves still room for reasoning: we may understand the elliptical theory of Mars's motions, and may still require a reason for the theory. Also we may understand what is not

conformable to Reason; as when we understand a man's arguments, and think them unfounded in Reason.

We understand a thing, as we have said, when we apprehend it according to certain assumed ideas and rules. We reason, in order to deduce such rules from first principles, or from one another. But the rules and principles, which must be expressed when we reason, may be only implied when we understand. We may understand the sense of a speech, without thinking of rules of grammar. We may understand the working of a machine, without thinking of propositions in the sciences of geometry and mechanics.

The Reason is employed both in understanding and in reasoning; but the Principles which are explicitly asserted in reasoning, are only implicitly applied in understanding. The Reason includes, as we have said, both the Faculty of seeing First Principles, and the Reasoning Faculty by which we obtain other Principles. The Understanding is the Faculty of applying Principles however obtained.

The Reason, of which we here speak, is the Speculative Reason. We shall hereafter have to speak of the Practical Reason also.

12. The term Intellect is derived from a verb (intelligo) which signifies to understand: but the term itself is usually so applied as to imply a Faculty which recognizes Principles explicitly as well as implicitly; and abstract as well as applied; and therefore agrees with the Reason rather than the Understanding; and the same extent of signification belongs to the adjective intellectual.

13. Man not only can contemplate external things; he can also act upon them and with them. He can gather the fruits of the earth, and make bread.

He can take

such things to himself, as his property, or give them to another man, as a reward.

The word Action may be applied, in the most general

manner, to all exercise of the external or internal faculties of man. But we do not always so use the word.

internal thought,

We also often

We often distinguish external action from though thought is also a kind of activity. distinguish actions from words, as when we say man's actions contradict his words. Yet in a more general sense, we include a man's words in his actions. We say that a man's actions correspond with his words, when he performs what he has promised; though the performance itself should be words; as when he has promised to plead a cause.

14. We direct our thoughts to an action which we are about to perform: we intend to do it: we make it our aim: we place it before us, and act with purpose (propositum): we design it, or mark it out beforehand (designo).

15. Will, or Volition, is the last step of intention, the first step of action. It is the internal act which leads to external acts.

An action that proceeds from my will or volition is my act. But if it do not proceed from my will, it is not my act, though my limbs may be employed in it; as for instance, if my hand, moved by another man whose strength overmasters mine, strikes a blow. In such a case, I am not a Free Agent. Human Actions suppose the Freedom of the Agent. In order to act, a man must be so circumstanced that his volitions take effect on his limbs and organs, according to the usual constitution of man.

The Will is stimulated to action by certain Springs of Action, of which we shall afterwards speak.

16. Among the Springs of Action, are Rules or Laws. There are Laws of Human Action, as well as Laws of Nature (8). But while the Laws of Nature are assertions only, as; Mars revolves in an ellipse; a solar eclipse will take place at the new moon; the Laws of human action are commands: as, Steal not; or, Thou shalt not