101. These, which may be called Jural Sentiments, are the germs of Moral Sentiments, of a larger and deeper import. The Sentiment of Indignation against Wrongs, when expanded and unfolded by habitual thought, leads us to the condemnation of all dispositions which tend to produce Wrongs. All such dispositions are disapproved of, as immoral. In like manner, the Sentiment of Rights, when extended and unfolded by the thoughts of what is due to others, as well as to ourselves, produces a Sentiment of Obligation, and hence a Sentiment of Duty, or, as it is often termed, a Sense of Duty. And this Sense of Duty, and Condemnation of immoral Dispositions, are important parts of our Moral Sentiments. 102. Man, recognizing Moral Rules as the necessary conditions of his being (66), and recognizing Punishment as a necessary means of giving reality to such Rules, (83), recognizes himself as liable to Punishment for transgression of Moral Rules. Even before he learns what the consequences to himself of transgression will be, he knows that he is exposed to those consequences, whatever they may be. He must answer for his actions, when the demand is made by real authority; he is responsible. If his actions are condemned, the results of the condemnation fall upon him. On the other hand, if his actions are approved, the results of the approval belong to him. He deserves these results whatever they may be. And thus he has a Sense of Responsibility and a Sentiment of the Merit and Demerit of Actions. When man has distinguished actions in general, according to their Moral Character, as good or bad; and has assigned to them Merit or Demerit; he must, in order to apply these distinctions, judge of particular actions, and determine to which moral class they belong. His judgments, both in the adoption of Moral Rules, and in the application of them to particular actions, must be formed by 103. the use of his Reason. By the use of his Reason, dealing with all the elements of the human constitution within him, and the world without him, he is led to Convictions, both as to Rules and as to Facts; both as to what has been done, and by whom, and what is its Merit or Demerit. 104. The Moral Sentiments are further unfolded and expanded by action, habit and thought. And this process is the Moral Cultivation or Moral Education of Man. This Cultivation and Education depend upon various conditions, and are promoted or extended by various causes. Among these, we may notice the influence of one man upon another, in affecting his Moral Sentiments, or the application of them to actions. We have already spoken of the influence exercised by the parents upon the child, in educing his moral nature (47). But in many other ways, as well as in this, men exercise an influence in modifying each other's Moral Sentiments and Convictions. Men may, by speaking, by writing, by all the modes of the intercourse of life, direct the course of other men's thoughts; and thus affect their judgment of what is right and what is wrong, and their feelings with regard to actions and persons. And the exercise of such influence, by one man upon another, is an important kind of Action; and one for which the Agent is responsible, as well as for any actions which directly affect his primary Rights. Rights are, as we have said, in every particular case, determined by actual Law and History. Before proceeding with Morality, we shall take some examples of such actual determinations. BOOK II. JUS OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. CHAPTER I. RIGHTS IN GENERAL. 105. We have seen (94) that Rights are defined by Positive Laws; but we have seen also, that according to the Conception of Rights (78), they are to be conformable to the Supreme Rule of human action. The Law assigns to each person his Rights; but the Law also aims at giving to each person what it is right he should have. That which is legally fixed, is also intended to be morally right. Jus has for its object to conform to the idea of Justice. Hence it appears as if Law must depend upon Morality; whereas we have previously stated (90) that we must treat of Rights before we treat of Duties. We must explain this apparent inconsistency. Law must be considered, in the first place, as positively and peremptorily fixed; it judges everything according to its own legal Rules and Definitions. But these Rules and Definitions may change from time to time; and in the course of the moral cultivation and education of man, of which we have spoken (104), do change. Men change their Rules, with the view of making them more nearly conformable to the Supreme Rule of human action. They endeavour to determine Rights more rightly; to make Laws more just. And |