and is what must be done because it is right, not what may be done because it is allowable.

437. It is true, that thus to estimate every act, however trivial, as having a moral value from its influence upon our character, implies a clearness of view, as to the operation of such influences, which we can never fully attain to. This condition of mind, in which all acts are good or are bad, and none indifferent, is one which we may approximate to, but can never arrive at. When we have exercised all our sagacity and diligence, in determining what acts are right, and what are wrong; there will still remain a residue, at every period of our lives, which will have the aspect of being indifferent. Nor need we be disturbed that this is so. If, habitually referring things to a moral standard, and exercising such care and thought as a serious conduct of the business of life requires, we keep our eyes open to the good and the bad of the actions which come before us, in order to choose the good and shun the bad; we carry on our moral culture, according to the stage at which we have arrived. But in order to do this, we must, at each step, ask, not what is allowable, but what is right; not what we may do, but what we ought to do. If to these questions we can obtain, on any particular subject, no definite response from our consciences, we may guide our course by the best lights of prudence which we can obtain; always recollecting, however, that our not being able to see that there is one course which we ought to take, rather than another, is an imperfection of vision, which arises from the defect of our intellectual and moral faculties; and which we may hope to see removed, when our minds are further enlightened, in a more advanced stage of our moral progress.

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CHAPTER XVIII.

OF IGNORANCE AND ERROUR.

438. IGNORANCE and Errour are often referred to, among the causes which make Actions excusable. It will be proper to consider how far Actions which are generally wrong, are, by Ignorance and Errour, rendered excusable in the Agent.

We have already spoken of Intellectual Duties; and the existence of such Duties leads to some Maxims which bear upon the question now before us. We have mentioned (336—342) the Duty of Consideration; the Duty of acting according to Rule; and the Duty of acting rationally. We have further spoken of the Duty of our own Intellectual Culture; and also (366) of the Duty of constantly enlightening and instructing our Conscience. These Duties cannot be neglected or omitted, without a transgression of that Duty of Moral Culture, which is our highest and most comprehensive Duty.

439. But Ignorance and Errour may arise from other Causes, besides the neglect of these Intellectual Duties; for example, they may arise from our want of information, which we have not any means of obtaining; or from our receiving false information, which we have no reason to suspect of falsehood. In such cases Ignorance and Errour are unavoidable: or, in the language sometimes used by Moralists, they are invincible Ignorance and invincible Errour. They cannot be avoided or overcome by any obvious exertions of ours. We have performed, it is supposed, the Duty of Inquiry and Consideration (336) which is incumbent upon us, and still we remain in Ignorance or in Errour. On this supposition, the actions which we ignorantly and erroneously perform are blameless. We have no way of avoiding or

VOL. I.

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removing Ignorance or Errour, but by Inquiry and Consideration. If we have done all that is in our power to free our actions from these defects; the defects may be considered as no longer belonging to us. If I purchase a horse, and have a suspicion that he has been stolen from a previous owner, I must inquire for the evidence of such a fact, and weigh it carefully. But if the result of my inquiry and deliberation is, to remove entirely the suspicion, I may blamelessly buy him, though he should afterwards be found to be a stolen horse. And in the same manner, I am blameless, if the circumstances of the sale are such as to banish suspicion; as for example, if he is sold in open market, it may be that this circumstance is, in consequence of the habits of the country, sufficient to remove the necessity of inquiry. In this case, Errour, when it occurs, may be considered as unavoidable; and the erroneous action is still blameless.

440. But it is requisite, to the moral character of the act, that we should direct ourselves by the real inward belief to which we are led, and not merely by any external result. A mere formal inquiry, for the sake of saving appearances, or of complying with the letter of our maxims, cannot make the act moral. Such a pretended conformity to the Duty of Inquiry, is insincere and dishonest.

It will often be difficult for us to determine, whether we have been sufficiently persevering and minute in the Inquiries, which we have made, into the facts which guide our actions; and when we have been deceived, and have thus been led to do what we wished to avoid; as soon as the deceit is discovered, we may perhaps wonder that we did not detect it sooner; and may regret that we did not carry our inquiry further. Thus, when I have bought a horse, and afterwards find him to have been stolen; I may regret that I did not inquire more carefully into the Seller's story.

This regret includes some condemnation of the act which I have committed under the influence of the deceit, and approaches to the character of repentance. And such sentiments of self-condemnation and repentance are well founded, when we have been negligent in our inquiries. It is very difficult to know when we have done all in our power to ascertain the truth of facts; and therefore, difficult to know when we are quite free from the blame of such negligence.

Hence we are led to this Maxim; that Unavoidable Ignorance or Errour removes the blame of the actions which it causes; but that we are to be very careful of not too easily supposing our ignorance to be unavoidable.

441. Of course, as soon as we discover that, through ignorance or errour, we have done a wrong to any one, it is our Duty to remedy the wrong. If we have bought what was stolen from him, we must restore the thing to him; and the like. Any resistance in our minds to this step, is immoral. When our ignorance ends, the excuse which it supplies to us ends. We may avoid blame, in virtue of our Ignorance or Errour, but we may not receive advantage from it. regret our Errour; but if we retain the benefits of it, we shall have to repent of our Fault. There is dishonesty in resisting the consequences of the detection of our errour; as there is dishonesty in willingly abstaining from detecting our

errour.

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442. When Ignorance and Errour are of such a kind that they may be avoided by Inquiry and Consideration, the actions to which they give occasion are not freed from blame by the ignorance and the errour. Yet Ignorance and Errour, even when they are the consequence of a neglect of the Duties of Inquiry and Consideration, may exist for a time, without producing any external action which violates Moral Rules. So long as this is the case, the fault which we have committed is the general Neglect of that

Intellectual Culture which is requisite to our moral progress. But when Ignorance and Errour, thus produced, give rise to special violations of Moral Rules, such transgressions are not excusable on account of the Ignorance and Errour. If a man remain, through Negligence, ignorant, or mistaken, as to the amount of his income, and in consequence, contract debts greater than he can pay, he is not blameless; though Ignorance and Errour are the occasion of the wrong which he does to his creditors. He is culpable for not ascertaining what he could afford to spend, before he incurred his debts. If, with the same ignorance, he had not incurred such debts, he might still be blamed for Negligence in not ascertaining the conditions under which he had to act. But when his Negligence inflicts loss on other persons, it becomes a carelessness of Justice and Honesty embodied in act; and therefore a transgression of a graver kind.

443. Still, there is a difference between Carelessness of Justice and Honesty, and intentional Injustice and Dishonesty. Debts contracted through negligent ignorance of our income, are not so culpable as Debts contracted with fraudulent intentions. In one case, the Duty of Consideration is, for the time, omitted; but it may be resumed. In the other case, the Duty of Justice or of Honesty is intentionally violated; and the Violation must be repented of. In one case, the moral progress is suspended; in the other, it is reversed. And thus, Ignorance and Errour arising from negligence, though they cannot excuse, may palliate our transgressions, by excluding intentional wrong.

444. But besides Ignorance and Errour with regard to the Facts on which the direction of our actions must depend; there may, also, be Ignorance and Errour with regard to the Rules by which the moral character of actions is determined. And it may be made a Question, how far such Ignorance and Errour render actions excusable, which