BOOK I. INTRODUCTION. ELEMENTARY NOTIONS AND DEFINITIONS. CHAPTER I. THE REASON. 1. In the present work I have to speak of the Actions of man, and of those Faculties by which he acts as man. These faculties belong to man in virtue of the Human Nature which is common to all men. They are Human Faculties, and give rise to Human Actions. I and my readers share in this common Human Nature; and hence, instead of saying that man acts thus and thus, or has such and such faculties, I shall often say that we act thus, or that we have such faculties. 2. Man has faculties of Sensation, by which he perceives and observes Things, or objects without him; and faculties of Reflection, by which he is aware of Thoughts, or actions within him. These faculties of Sensation and Reflection are inseparably combined in their operation. We cannot observe external Things without some degree of Thought; nor can we reflect upon our Thoughts, without being influenced in the course of our reflection by the Things which we have observed. 3. Man, thus combining Observation and Reflection, is led to regard external things as grouped and classed, in his thoughts. He contemplates objects under general and VOL. I. B abstract forms; and thus has Conceptions or Notions of them, and applies to them Names. Thus bread, fruit, flesh, are classed together and indicated by the general name of food; food, clothing, tools, arms, are all included in the general name property. Such terms are abstract, as well as general: in calling many different things food, we designate one certain use of the things, abstracting it from the things themselves, and neglecting their other qualities. In like manner, when we call many different things property, we abstract one special view of the things so described, from all various circumstances which may belong to them. 4. When we consider things under these general and abstract aspects, they can be denoted by Names, as we have said. Names indicate a class of things, or relations of things, which have all a single general and abstract aspect. The Conception is that, in our thoughts, which we express or signify by the Name. Man not only contemplates things, or objects, and their relations; but he contemplates also Changes of things and of their relations, or Facts. Thus he observes that the stars move round the pole, or that Brutus stabs Cæsar. Or the absence of change may be a Fact; as, that the pole-star does not move. Facts, as well as things, are described by general and abstract words. Things are described by Substantives ; Facts, by Verbs, or words which assert. 5. When the relations or changes so asserted really exist or occur, the assertions are true. We can, by various processes, of observation and reflection, satisfy ourselves that some assertions are true and some false. We can be certain and sure of such truth and such falsehood. We may convince ourselves and convince others of it; but we may also mistake in such conviction. Man has means of knowing Truth, but is also liable to Errour. |