an Unthrift. A willingness to give is Liberality, Generosity, Bountifulness; which are reckoned Virtues. But this disposition may be excessive: the man is then lavish, extravagant.

254. Property conveys Power to the Possessor: but there are also many other Sources of Power. Whoever aims at a larger share of Power than his neighbours possess, is, so far, regardless of Justice. The Desire of Power is Ambition. But the Desire of Power for good ends, and the Desire of the Power which moral excellence gives, may be termed laudable Ambition.

The Disposition which represses our own desires, whether of money, power, victory, or any other object; and contemplates the desires and claims of other persons with equal favour; is Fairness. This is a kind of personal application of Justice, to questions between ourselves and others. Impartiality is more commonly used for the Fairness which decides justly between two other persons.

3. Virtues connected with Truth.

255. We have mentioned (235) some of the names of the Virtues connected with Truth; as Truthfulness, Veracity. These express a conformity of our words to the reality. The conformity of our actions to our Engagements, whether express or implied, is Fidelity, Good Faith. Thus a subject is faithful to the engagement which binds him. to the Sovereign of the State. If, in such a case, Love is added to Fidelity, it becomes Loyalty.

A man who says what he knows to be untrue, is a Liar. He is guilty of Falsehood. A man who says what he thinks, is sincere. Such a man shows himself what he is. A man who conceals some important part of his feelings or thoughts dissembles. When he assumes the appearance of virtues which he really does not possess, he is a Hypocrite. By such means men impose upon others, and deceive them.

Lies and Deceit are often used as means of Fraud; which is an offense against Property, and therefore contrary to Justice as well as Truth. A person who defrauds, circumvents, cheats any one, must be destitute both of Justice and of Truth. Property and Language may both be considered as Universal Contracts, to which the whole human race are parties; Fraud by means of Falsehood violates both these Contracts.

A man free from all fraudulent dispositions is honest; he is a man of Probity. He is not drawn aside, by the desire of gain, to act obliquely, tortuously, in a crooked manner. He is straightforward, and upright. His intentions, words, and actions, form a whole in which there is no inconsistent part. This is Integrity. A deceitful man may have two purposes; one, apparent, simulated, declared; the other secretly held, but dissembled, till it can be acted on. To have two purposes in this way is Duplicity. The truthful person, on the contrary, has Simplicity for a part of his character: he has Singleness of Purpose, Singleness of heart. He is frank and open, showing himself as he really is.

256.

4. Virtues relating to the Bodily Desires.

The gratification of the Appetites or Bodily Desires, to a certain extent, and under certain conditions, is requisite for the continuance of the individual and of the Species, and therefore is not vicious.

These Desires being have, of themselves,

mere attributes of the Body, cannot a moral character. They are to be controlled by moral Rules, and made subservient to moral Affections, and thus, are the materials of Virtues. The Habits of thus controlling the bodily Desires, are the Virtues of Temperance and Chastity. The Demeanour produced by a chaste mind, especially in women, is Modesty.

By the establishment of Family and Social Relations, the

gratification of the bodily wants is connected with the impulses of Affection and the Love of Society. The shelter of the common family roof, and the social meal, as well as the marriage-bed, are the objects of far other feelings than mere bodily desires. The Appetites are thus made subservient to the Affections. They are absorbed by the Affections, and are thus purified. All gratifications of the Appetites, sought as gratifications merely, are impure and vicious.

Among
When

such vices is the Love of the Pleasures of the Table. the Desire of Food is gratified to excess, there is Gluttony, Gulosity. When there is an excessive solicitude about the gratification of the Taste, the man is an Epicure. The Love of Drink involves, not only a bodily Appetite, but a complacency in the mental condition to which certain liquors lead; namely, the condition of Intoxication or Ebriety; a condition in which the Reason loses the power of directing our actions. The Vice of falling into such a condition is Intemperance, Drunkenness.

The other leading bodily Desire, when not morally controlled, is Lust. The control of this within moral limits, is Continence. The vicious indulgence is Lewdness, Lechery. Persons whose guiding springs of action are these bodily desires, are sensual, carnal. A chaste and modest person does not allow his eyes or his imagination to dwell on things which may excite Lust. Such images are obscene, indecent. To suggest such images in speech is Obscenity. All such filthy conversation pollutes the mind. A man who makes

pleasure the object of his actions is a Voluptuary. Such men generally cast off moral restraint, and are hence dissolute, profligate. A woman who thinks lightly of chastity is a Wanton.

When the arts of life are employed to gratify artificial wants and desires, those who give their attention and solicitude to obtain such gratifications are luxurious. Luxury

is often employed to describe the aggregate of such gratifications; but the Solicitude employed on the means of gratification, rather than any special Class of such means, appears to be essential to our conception of Luxury. Things which are Luxuries in one stage of society, become universal Wants, and consequently Necessaries, in another stage. Linen garments, glass windows, tea, were Luxuries a few centuries ago in this country. They are now Necessaries of life.

257. The Disposition by which we accept Law and Rule as the necessary guides of human action, is that which we have termed Order. This Virtue is also, as we have said (235), termed Orderliness, Obedience, and the like. But it is a Virtue to govern carefully, as well as to obey cordially, according to the position we hold in the community.

A virtuous governor must be guided by Justice; but Justice itself must be defined by specific Rules. Laws and Rules must be apprehended by the Intellect, and must be expressed in terms of general conceptions constructed by the Reason. Hence, the Virtues connected with Order especially include operations of the Intellect, and may be termed Intellectual Virtues.

258. The abstract Conceptions of the objects of our mental Desires, as Property, Power, Society, require operations of the Reason for their formation. By the further operation of the like Faculties, we form still more abstract and general conceptions of objects of action, as Good, Wellbeing, Happiness, Expediency, Interest, and the like. Rules of Action, dependent upon such Conceptions, may be conceived and expressed. Various moralists have stated various Rules, thus expressed. Different individuals govern their conduct by one or other of such Rules, more or less clearly

apprehended. One man looks to Interest as his object, another to Happiness, another to Wellbeing, another to the Happiness of Mankind, and so on.

One or other of such objects being assumed as the end of human action, Prudence is the Intellectual Virtue by which we select the right means to this end. A man is prudent, who acts so as to promote his own Interest, if his Interest be assumed to be the proper Object of action: but if we conceive Happiness to be a higher object than Interest, he is prudent, if he disregard mere Interest, and attend only to his Happiness. Prudence supposes the value of the end to be assumed, and refers only to the adaptation of the means. It is the selection of right means for given ends.

259. In the notion of Wisdom, we include, not only, as in Prudence, a right selection of means for an assumed end, but also a right selection of the end. However prudent a man may be in seeking his Interest, he is not wise, if, in doing this, he neglect a truer end of human action. Wisdom is the habit by which we select right means for right ends. We approve and admire Prudence relatively to its end: we approve and admire Wisdom absolutely. We commend the prudent man, as taking the best course for his purpose; but we do not necessarily agree with him in his estimate of his object. We venerate the wise man, as one knowing, better than we do, the true object of action, as well as the means of approaching it. Wisdom is a Cardinal Virtue, like Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity; and with reference to the first, as well as the other four, human Dispositions are good, as they partake of the Cardinal Virtue. Wisdom is the complete Idea of Intellectual Excellence; as Benevolence, Justice, Truth, and Purity, are of Moral Excellence.

260. Prudence is, etymologically speaking, the same word as Providence, that is Foresight. But we do not call a man prudent, except he not only see the bearing of actions