236. These five terms, in their Subjective Sense, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order, are Dispositions conformable to the Supreme Law of Human Action: they are therefore Virtues (226). And inasmuch as they are the leading points to which we have been led, by our analysis of human springs of action, and human obligations, we may term them Cardinal Virtues; although they are different from the list of Cardinal Virtues as usually given, Temperance, Fortitude, Justice, and Wisdom. This latter list is too unphilosophical a division to be employed with any advantage in Morality. But the Virtues which have names in common language, are all conceived as Virtues, in consequence of partaking of one or more of our five Cardinal Virtues, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order; and we may arrange the Virtues in general according to their affinity with these five.

The five Cardinal Virtues may be variously combined with the Springs of Human Action; but yet each of these Virtues has its more peculiar sphere of operation in our nature. Benevolence is mainly concerned in guiding and governing the Affections; Justice, in controlling and correcting our Mental Desires; Truth, in directing the Mutual Understanding of men; Purity, in regulating the Bodily Desires. Order engages the Reason in the consideration of Rules and Laws, by which Virtue and its opposite are defined.

237. The opposite of Virtue, or the want of it, is Vice and the language of all nations supplies us with a long list of Virtues, arising from the combination of the Cardinal Virtues with the various springs and conditions of human action, and of the antagonist Vices. These names of Virtues and Vices are Abstract Terms, and have Adjectives connected with them, by which the varieties of human character and disposition are familiarly designated. The limits of

Virtue and Vice, however, are far from being manifest and obvious. It is often very difficult to say where Virtue ends, and where Vice begins. To define such limits, when it is possible, must be our business, when we come to treat of Questions of Duty. But it is necessary for us to employ the names of Virtues and Vices in a general and usual sense, before we thus attempt to define their limits. The names of Virtues and Vices are the Vocabulary of Morality; and of this Vocabulary, we shall give a brief account; arranging the Terms, as we have said, according to their affinity with the Five Cardinal Virtues.

238. of Love.

CHAPTER III.

VIRTUES AND VICES.

1. Virtues of the Affections.

BENEVOLENCE is the Virtue of the Affection

This Affection is variously modified, according to the persons to whom it is directed, and the accompanying circumstances. Thus there is Conjugal Love, the Love of Husband and Wife; Parental (Paternal and Maternal) Love; Filial Love; Fraternal Love, and other kinds of Family Affection; Friendship, the Love by which Friends are especially drawn to each other; our Love of our FellowCitizens; of our Fellow-Countrymen; finally, the Love which we bear to the whole Human Race and to every member of it. All these Kinds of Love are Springs of Action, and Sources of Emotion, which it is the business of Morality, not to resist and destroy, but to govern and direct. When these natural Affections are directed to their proper objects, and regulated by Reason, they are virtuous Affections. Those in whom they are wanting are blamed as without

natural affection. They are all included in the general term, Benevolent Affections. They are spoken of figuratively as the Heart. A man's heart is hard, or cold, when these affections are feeble and dull in him; he is warmhearted, when they are strong; and openhearted, when they are readily bestowed on those around him.

239. Benevolent Affections are called kindly affections, for they knit us to our Kind, the Human Race. Hence kind, the adjective, describes the disposition of a person full of such affections. A man is estranged from his friends, when those affections cease; he is unkind, when the opposite prevail; he is unsocial, when he shuns the occasions of kindly intercourse with companions.

Love, is the

When a benevolent affection turns our attention upon its object in a tranquil manner, it is Regard. affection in a more marked form. It is Tenderness, when it implies a sensitive and vigilant solicitude for the good of its object; Fondness, when it absorbs the thought, so that Reason is disregarded. When this is the case, the affection is no longer a Virtue: still less is it so, when Love becomes doting, overweening, passionate.

Love towards a person, growing out of good received from him, is Gratitude. A grateful person expresses his emotions in Words, which are Thanks; but he is also desirous of doing Acts of gratitude; of returning Good for Good. Gratitude is a natural and virtuous Affection; but the Acts which it prompts must be limited by Rules of Duty. A man who does what is wrong in return for benefits received, makes his Benefactor the director of his actions, instead of directing them himself, as Morality requires. Hence he is said to sell himself; and to be venal.

240. The manifestations of the benevolent affections, in their influence upon the habitual external Behaviour, have various names. Such affections, regarding a particular per

VOL. I.

L

son, and not necessarily leading to action, are Good-will. When they produce a current of cheerful thoughts, they are Good-humour. When benevolent feelings lead a man to comply readily with the wishes of others, or to seek to give them pleasure, we have Good-nature. When this Disposition is shown on the part of a superior, we term him gracious and benign. When a person's Good-nature makes it easy to address him, he is affable. If, in his behaviour, he avoid all that may give offense to others, he is courteous. This Disposition is conceived to have generated in the inhabitants of cities, Habits of behaviour which are termed Urbanity and Civility. The opposite of these is Rudeness.

241. Good-humour may often be disturbed by the Provocations which offenses and outrages occasion; but there are virtuous Dispositions which support our benevolence under such provocations. Such dispositions are Gentleness, Mildness, Meekness. Under the influence of these, we repress or avoid the resentment and anger, which offenses against us, and insults offered to us, tend to produce; we preserve benevolence, tranquillity, and good-humour in our minds; and manifest such a disposition in our behaviour. With these dispositions, if men act wrongly or foolishly, we are tolerant and indulgent; if they offend us, we pardon and forgive them. We are ready to do this; we are placable. To be intolerant, unforgiving, implacable, is a vicious Disposition.

242. The Benevolent Affections are also modified by a regard to the circumstances of the object. We naturally share in the emotions which we witness in man: we have a Fellow-feeling, a Sympathy with them. When this Disposition leads us to feel pain at the sight of pain, it is Compassion; we commiserate the object. strongly confirmed by Piety, came to be

This feeling, being

called Pity. Such

a Disposition, as it prompts us to abstain from adding to the pain felt, is Mercy, or Clemency; as it prompts us to remove the pain or want which we see, it is Charity. But this word has also a wider sense, in which it describes Benevolence, as it makes us abstain from judging unfavourably of other men. All these are virtuous Affections, and lead to the performance of Duties of Benevolence.

243. Admiration can hardly be called a benevolent affection towards its object; for we admire what does not draw our Love; as when we admire a great geometer. But if we admire a man as a good man, we also love him (91). Esteem is the benevolent affection which we entertain towards that of which we approve. Persons whom we esteem, but to whom we are not drawn by love, we respect. When, with such a Disposition, we look at them as our Superiors, we reverence them; in a higher degree, this Affection is Veneration; when combined with Fear, it is Awe. Reverence assumes, in its object, Authority and Power, combined with Justice and Goodness.

244. The irascible Affections are, for the most part, opposed to the virtue of Benevolence; and therefore are to be repressed and controlled. Yet these Affections also have their moral office, and give rise to Virtues. They act as a Defense against harm and wrong; and hence, in their various modifications, they may be termed Defensive Affections. As opposed to harm, inflicted or threatened, they are Resentment; as directed against wrong, they are Indignation (56). And these Emotions may be blameless or praiseworthy; as when we feel natural and proper Resentment, or just Indignation. Such Sentiments are an important and necessary part of Virtue; not of Benevolence, strictly speaking, but of Justice. Without Indignation against cruelty, fraud, falsehood, foulness, disorder, the Virtues have not their full force in the mind.