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this case to show that the interdiction was applied for;

9. That evidence of general and habitual insanity in order to avoid a contract, may be rebutted by showing that the contract or act was made during a lucid interval; but where general insanily, even with some intervals, is shown, the burthen of showing that the particular act in dispute was made during such an interval, is thrown on the party, who supports the validity of the act or contract;

10. That insanity may be alleged and proved to invalidate a testament, although no interdiction have been applied for, nor in that case is it necessary to prove

that the insanity was notorious;

11. The allegation in a testament that the testator was of sound mind, cannot prevent proof of the contrary being given in evidence, even by the witnesses to the will;

12. That, when these rules refer to the time of presenting the petition for interdiction, as a period which is to determine the validity of a contract or other act, such petition is meant as has not been withdrawn or dismissed;

13. That, while the judgment of interdiction is in force, it is conclusive evidence of incapacity; but ihat it may

beanpulled, whenever the insanity ceases, but it can only be annulled by a judgment.

ART. 1782.-A temporary derangement of intellect, whether arising from disease, accident or other cause, also creates an incapacity pending its duration, provided the situation of the party and his incapacity was apparent.

ART. 1783.—The only case, in which slaves can contract on their account, is for their emancipation. They may contract for their masters, when authorized by them.

ART. 1784.-Besides the general incapacity, which persons of certain descriptions are under, there are others

applicable only to certain contracts, either in relation to the parties, such as a huband and wife, tutor and ward, whose contracts with each other are forbidden; or in relation to the subject of the contract, such as purchases, hy the administrator of any part of the estate which is committed to his charge, and the incapacily of the wife, even with the assent of the husband, to alienate her dotal property, or to become securily for his debls. These take place only in the cases specially provided by law, under different titles of this code.

ART. 1785.—The persons who have treated with a minor, the person interdicted, or of insane mind, or with a married woman, cannot plead the nullity of the agreement, if it is sought to be enforced by the party, when the disability shall cease, or by those who legally administer the rights of such person during the disability. Even a contract made with a slave may be enforced by the master, if he chooses to allirm it for his benefit.

ART. 1786.-If the contract be reciprocat, it must not be enforced on one side only; and if the minor, or other incapacitated person, opposes his incapacity against any part of the agreement, the whole of the contract is void,

ART. 1787.-If, in a contract with an incapacitaled person, or in a contract void for want of form, entered into with any one for the benefit of such incapacitated person, any consideration be paid or given, and the contract be afterwards invalidated on account of such incapacity or want of form, the consideration so paid or given must be restored, if it was applied to the necessary use or benefit of the incapacitated person.

ART. 1788.-A person, who, being ignorant of the incapacity of one unable to contract, shall make an agreement with such person, may, immediately after he has discovered the incapacity, call on the party, if the inca pacity has ceased, or on the person having the legal administration of his affairs, if it have not, to confirm or annul the contract; and if it be a contract of such kind, as the administrator might have made, then his assent shall confirm it, or his dissent shall free the contracting party from the obligation on his part. If the assent of a family meeting would have been necessary to authorize the contract, it may be called, on the application of the party, and their decision shall have the same effect in confirming or invalidating the contract, that it would have had on its formation.

ART. 1789.- If a contract, made by a person incapacitated from contracting, shall be confirmed by him after his incapacity shall cease, the rights of third persons acquired before such confirmation are not impaired thereby, even if such rights were acquired with notice of the invalid act.

ART. 1790.-Those who may be interdicted from the enjoyment of their civil rights, in consequence of a conviction for crime, cannot oppose their incapacity against the performance of any contract they may have made, unless it be against some person having power over them during their confinement, nor can any person with whom they contract, plead such incapacity.


Of the Consent necessary to give validity to a Con


SI. Of the Nature of the Assent, and how it is to be

shown. ART. 1791.-When the parties have the legal capacity to form a contract, the next requisite to its validity is their consent. This being a mere operation of the mind, can have no effect, unless it be evinced in some manner that shall cause it to be understood by the other parties to the contract. To prevent error in this essential point, the law establishes, by certain rules adapted to the nature of the contract, what circumstances shall be evii dence of such assent, and how those circumstances shall be proved: these come within the purview of the law of evidence.

ART. 1792.-As there must be two parties at least to every contract, so there must be something proposed by ope, and accepted and agreed to by another, to form the matter of such contract : the will of both parties must unite on the same point.

ART. 1793.-It is a presumption of law that, in every contract, each party has agreed to confer on the other the right of judicially enforcing the performance of the agreement, unless the contrary be expressed, or may be implied.

ART. 1794. – The contract, consisting of a proposition and the consent to it, the agreement is incomplete, until the acceptance of the person to whom it is próposed. If he, who proposes, shonld, before that assent is given, change his intention on the subject, the concurrence of the two wills is wanting, and there is no contract.

ART. 1795. - The party proposing shall be presumed to continue in the intention, which his proposal expressed, if, on receiving the unqualified assent of him to whom the proposition is made, he do not signify the change of his intention.

ART. 1796. — He is bound by his proposition, and the signification of his dissent will be of no avail, if the proposition be made in terms, which evince a design to give the other party the right of concluding the contract by his assent, and if that assent be given within such time as the situation of the parties and the nature of the contract shall prove that it was the intention of the proposer to allow


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ART. 1797. - But when one party proposes, and the other assents, then the obligation is complete, and by virtue of the right each has impliedly given to the other, either of them may call for the aid of the law to enforce il.

ART. 1798. — The acceptance needs not be made by the same act, or in point of time, immediately after the proposition; if made at any time before the person who offers or promises has changed his mind, or may reasonably be presumed to have done so, it is sufficient.

ART. 1799. — The acceptance to form a contract must be in all things conformable to the offer; any condition or limitation contained in the acceptance of that which formed the matter of the olfer, gives him, who makes the offer, the right to withdraw it.

ART.1800.—This takes place, even when more is promised than was demanded, or when less is offered than was required; for example, if a request is made to borrow fifty dollars, and the party answers that he will lend one hundred dollars; or, if the request be to borrow one hundred dollars, and the answer that fifty will be lent, there is no obligation in either case, without a further assent of the borrower to take the one hundred, in the first case, and the fifty in the other: for the proposal to borrow fifty does not necessarily imply an assent to borrow one hundred, nor does the proposal to lend one hundred necessarily imply a desire to lend only fifty. The modification or change of the proposition is, in all respects, considered as a new offer, and the party, making it, is bound by the acceptance in the same manner as if the original proposition had been made by him.

ART. 1801.-When, however, from the circumstances of the case, the offer necessarily implies an assent to the modification of the acceptance, then the obligation is complete, although there be a difference in terms be


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