issue, which was joined, and verdict rendered for the plaintiff, and judgment was entered up against A. and B., both. Afterwards, the court, on motion of the plaintiff, and after notice to the attorney of A., who had left the state, permitted an amendment of the record, and entered up judgment against A. alone. In a suit, in this state, against A., on the amended judgment, it was held, that the original judgment was erroneously entered up against B., and could have no binding efficacy, in the courts of this state; and that, as amended, it was entitled, under the constitution and laws of the U. S., to "full faith and credit." Hall v. Williams, x. 278.

7. A judgment, in the courts of Massachusetts, on a scire facias on a trustee, in a suit commenced there, where the service of the scire facias was, by leaving a copy thereof, at the last and usual place of abode of such trustee, in that state, though he had previously removed to another state, is conclusive on the defendant, and not open to examination, in the courts of this state, where it is sought to be enforced. Adams v. Rowe, xi. 89.

8. An action of debt will lie, as well on a decree of a court of chancery of another state, for the payment of money only, as on a judgment of court, where proceedings are according to the course of the common law. McKim v. Odom, XII. 94.

9. A foreign judgment is, prima facie, evidence of the debt sought to be recovered. Jordan v. Robinson, xv. 167.

See ACTIONS, &c. III. 2.

JURISDICTION.

As to equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Judicial Court, See EQUITY, I

1. The original jurisdiction of the C. C. P. over the action of replevin of goods, of the value of more than four pounds, given by stat. 1789, c. 26, is not affected by stat. 1807, c. 123, enlarging the jurisdiction of justices of the peace. Small v. Swain, 1. 133.

2. The jurisdiction of the C. C. P. in replevin is regulated by the real value of the goods, not by such price, as the plaintiff may choose to affix to them; and if an excessive value be alleged, in the writ, for the purpose of giving jurisdiction, the defendant may avail himself of it, in abatement. Small v. Swain, 1. 133.

3. The stat. 1783, c. 42, and 1797, c. 21, cannot be understood to give justices of the peace jurisdiction, in actions of replevin. Small v. Swain, 1. 133.

4. The C. C. P. has no jurisdiction of an offence created by statute, unless it is expressly made cognizable in that court. State v. Parcher, II. 321.

5. If an issue of fact be joined, in the S. J. C., on a petition for partition, and tried without consent of parties, in a county other than that, in which the lands lie, yet the judgment will not be void for want of jurisdiction; but will be good, till avoided by writ of error. Sewall v. Ridlon, v. 458.

6. The stat. 1829, c. 443, giving to justices of the peace jurisdiction of actions of replevin of goods, not exceeding $20, in value, does not, by impli cation, take away jurisdiction previously existing in the C. C. P. Ridlon v. Emery, vi. 261.

7. One, summoned as trustee, in a process of foreign attachment, is a de

fendant, within the meaning of stat. 1827, c. 359, so as to give jurisdiction to a magistrate, in the county where such trustee, or where the principal defendant lives. Boynton v. Fly, xII. 17.

8. By stat. 1823, c. 233, additional to the act establishing the C. C. P., and stat. 1836, c. 196, to alter and define the criminal jurisdiction of the judicial courts, the C. C. P., now the district court, has general criminal jurisdiction of all crimes and offences whatever, with certain exceptions, mentioned in those statutes, of which the S. J. C. has exclusive jurisdiction. State v. Stinson, xvii. 154.

9. The C. C. P., succeeded by the district court, has criminal jurisdiction of offences arising under the laws relating to innholders, retailers, and common victualers. State v. Stinson, xvII. 154.

10. If a justice of the peace proceeds to render judgment in a suit, and issue execution after his jurisdiction has ceased, he is liable to an action of trespass, for an arrest made by virtue of such execution. Spencer v. Perry, XVII. 413.

11. The jurisdiction and power of justices of the peace, in civil actions, are derived exclusively from statute provisions. Martin v. Fales, xvIII. 23.

12. Where a writ has been made returnable before a justice of the peace, and duly served, the justice has no power to act upon it, or to continue and postpone the cause to another day, until the time arrives, appointed in the writ. Martin v. Fales, xv111. 23. Spencer v. Perry, xvii. 413.

13. No presumption is to be made in favor of inferior tribunals; and therefore, the jurisdiction of the justices, who undertake to administer the oath to a poor debtor, should appear on the face of the proceedings; and their certificate is not conclusive, upon the point of jurisdiction; but it would be competent for the plaintiff to prove they had not jurisdiction. Granite Bank v. Treat, XVIII. 340.

14. In an action upon a recognizance, to prosecute an appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace, it should appear, from the record, that the justice, who rendered the judgment, from which the appeal was taken, had jurisdiction of the cause; and also, that the recognizance was entered into before the same justice, who rendered the judgment, otherwise, the recognizance has no validity. Nothing is to be presumed in favor of the jurisdiction. of inferior magistrates; it not being general, but confined, and limited by par ticular statutes. Green v. Haskell, xxiv. 180.

See ABATEMENT, II. (a) 9. (b) 2, 3. III. (a) 4. (b) 10.
ACTIONS, &c. III. 1, 4, 6.

AMENDMENT, I. 1.

ARBITRATION, I. 6.

BASTARDY, I. 13.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, 5, 8, 9.

DIVORCE, 8, 10, 11, 14, 16.

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, I. (a) 3, 5. (c) 4.

JURY.

1. If the sheriff returns a talesman, in a cause, in which his deputy is a party, it is a good ground of challenge to the juror, but will not support a motion to set aside the verdict. Walker v. Green, 11. 215.

2. Where a venire facias, directed the constable, to cause a juror to be drawn, not more than twenty, nor less than six days before the sitting of the court; and he made return, that the juror was drawn, "as above directed," but without date; the return was held sufficient. State v. Fellows, v. 333.

3. So, where the language of the return was, we have appointed J. C. a juror, &c. for it shall be intended, the language of the town, of which the constable was an inhabitant. State v. Fellows, v. 333.

4. So, where the person, drawn as a juror, was the constable himself, who served the venire facias, and made the return. State v. Fellows, v. 333.

5. So, where the constable styled himself, "Constable of the town," without saying, what town; the venire facias being directed to the constable of the town of M. State v. Fellows, v. 333.

6. It is no good cause of challenge, that a juror has been called, as a wit ness for the state, on a former trial of the same indictment, to testify against the general character of the prisoner. State v. Fellows, v. 333.

7. A defendant has no right, in any case, upon the coming in of the trav erse jury, to have them polled, and each one separately interrogated, as to his assent to the verdict. State v. Fellows, v. 333.

8. An objection to a juror, because he is related to a party interested in a cause, must be made, by way of challenge. After verdict, it comes too late. McLellan v. Crofton, vi. 307.

9. Jurors are not permitted, by their testimony, to disclose their deliberations and proceedings, while consulting together, in their private room; but the rule does not extend to their conduct, at other times and places. Studley v. Hall, xx11. 198.

10. Where one of the jurors, to whom a cause was committed, had entertained personal hostility towards the party, against whom the verdict was returned, and had, previously, on hearing but a part of the evidence, on a former trial of the same action, expressed an opinion in favor of the other party, and, on being interrogated, at the commencement of the present trial, had declared himself to be impartial; and had, during this trial, been drinking with the party, in whose favor the verdict was returned, on his invitation, and at his expense; the verdict was set aside, and a new trial granted. Studley v. Hall, xxII. 198.

11. Where, during a trial, the jury were dismissed, from Saturday night till Monday morning, and the party prevailing conveyed a juror, living on the same road, home, in his wagon, several miles, on Saturday evening, and no conversation relative to the cause took place, it was held, that though the con duct was indiscreet and incorrect, and, if persisted in, after a knowledge of its impropriety, would afford sufficient cause for a new trial, yet, in this case, the verdict might stand. Hilton v. Southwick, xvII. 303.

12. A juror, who has been implicated, in reference to a verdict, which he may have given, is admissible to remove the ground of objection. Sawyer v. Hopkins, xx11. 268.

13. Where a juror says, after the evidence was closed, that he has made up his mind in the case, and that all he wanted was the judge's charge, and that it did not make any odds, what the counsel said, without saying, in whose favor he has made up his mind, it is not such misconduct as would induce the court to grant a new trial. McAllister v. Sibley, xxv. 474.

14. In criminal cases, the law, as well as the fact, is involved in the issue, to be decided by the jury. State v. Snow, XVIII. 346.

15. A justice of a town court is not, by holding that office, rendered incom

petent to serve as a juror in the S. J. Court, or district Court. Page v. Lewis, XXVI. 360.

1. The statutes, 1783, c. 42, and 1797, c. 21, cannot be understood, to give justices of the peace jurisdiction in actions of replevin. Small v. Swain, 1. 133.

2. One, summoned as trustee, in a process of foreign attachment, is a defendant, within the meaning of stat. 1827, c. 359, so as to give jurisdiction to a justice, in the county where the trustee lives, though the plaintiff and the principal defendant live in another county. Boynton v. Fly, x11. 17.

3. The stat. 1834, c. 101, gives power to a justice of the peace, to continue a cause, to be tried by another justice, before whom the writ was made returnable, only on the return day of the writ. Spencer v. Perry, xvII. 413.

4. The jurisdiction and power of justices of the peace, in civil actions, are derived exclusively from statute. Martin v. Fales, xvi. 23.

5. No presumption is to be made in favor of the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace. Dodge v. Kellock, xIII. 136.

(b)

Where title to real estate is in question.

1. In trespass, quare clausum, before a justice of the peace, if the defendant plead a title to the soil and freehold, this plea, without any replication from the plaintiff, puts an end to the magistrate's jurisdiction over the cause; except, that he must take the recognizance of the party, for its prosecution in the C. C. P., where the pleadings are to be closed. Low v. Ross, III.

256.

2. Since the stat. 1831, c. 514, abolishing special pleading, the general issue, with a brief statement of soil and freehold, in an action of trespass, quare clausum, brought before a justice, is sufficient to bar any further proceedings before him, except the taking a recognizance to prosecute the plea,

at the C. C. P.; this statute having virtually repealed so much of stat. 1821, c. 76, 10, as requires, that the title should be specially pleaded. Hodg don v. Foster, ix. 113.

3. Local actions may be brought before a justice of the peace, in the county where the defendant lives, though the cause of action accrued from an injury done to real estate within a different county. Morton v. Chase, xv. 188.

(c) In criminal matters.

1. A justice of the peace has no authority to take the recognizance of a prisoner, while in the custody of the officer under a mittimus issued by another justice, for want of sureties for his appearance at court, and before com mitment to prison. State v. Berry, viii. 179.

2. A justice of the peace has no power to secure and detain articles liable to be detained, under stat. 1821, c. 171, against hawkers, &c. until after a complaint made under oath. Campbell v. Thompson, xvi. 117.

3. By the Revised Statutes, a justice of the peace has the same power to examine persons brought before him, on complaint and warrant, and bind them over to appear at a higher court, where the offence charged may be prosecuted by indictment, or by action of debt, as where it can be prosecuted by indictment only. Osborn v. Sargent, xxIII. 527.

4. A justice of the peace has no jurisdiction or power to try, and finally decide upon, the guilt or innocence of persons accused of having committed a riot; and has no legal authority to administer an oath to a witness, on a trial where he assumes such jurisdiction. State v. Furlong, xxvI. 69.

See BASTARDY, I. 13, 14.

COMPLAINT, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.

II. MINISTERIAL ACTS.

1. In issuing a warrant, under stat. 1821, c. 122, § 18, for the removal of a pauper out of the State, who has no settlement therein, the magistrate performs only a ministerial act, no adjudication upon the question of settlement being required. State v. Knowles, vi. 71.

2. Therefore, such warrant may lawfully be issued by a magistrate, who is an inhabitant of the town, in which the pauper resides, and which is to be thereby discharged from the expense of relieving him. State v. Knowles, VIII. 71.

3. In making up and completing his records, a justice of the peace acts ministerially, and not judicially, and, consequently, he may do it when not in commission. Matthews v. Houghton, x1. 377.

See AMENDMENT, IV. 4.

III. IN GENERAL.

1. Where one has preferred articles of the peace against another, for which he has been arrested, and examination had; if, before the magistrate shall have adjudged that he shall procure sureties of the peace, the accused has quieted and allayed the fears of the complainant, who thereupon wishes to withdraw the prosecution, the magistrate may properly permit it; the process having been instituted for the personal benefit of the complainant, though in Crowell v. Gleason, x. 325.

the name of the state.

2. The stat. 21 James I., c. 12, requiring actions against magistrates, for