in the scale of intellectual greatness, is but as a ministering spirit, subordinate and subservient."

On this it may be remarked, how totally unconscious of his own deficiency any man must be, who can fancy himself competent to pronounce that some one attribute of the Deity is higher in the scale of intellectual greatness than all other Divine attributes. Who appointed or authorized him to judge in such matters? What can he know of intellectual greatness beyond some obscure notions of human intellect, which at its highest perfection is but intellectual littleness in the comparison? Does he fancy that he can hold the balance in which Omnipotence and Omniscience are to be weighed against Benevolence? What can he know of the principle of benevolence beyond that of human benevolence, which, as the word implies, is a willingness to do good as far as the benevolent man knows how and has power to do; but can any man know what is good to be done throughout all combinations of matter, from simple chemical substances, to the complexities of organized bodies for all created beings; from the microscopic animalculæ, to the whales and the elephants; from the inhabitants of this little planet, to those of the fixed stars? Can such a limited faculty as human benevolence bear a parity with any supposable operation of infinite knowledge and infinite wisdom, which, pervading all space, created and prescribed laws for the maintenance of such a system?

The objector may say, he can imagine the principle of Divine Benevolence. Granted. Let him so exercise his imagination; and if in so doing he excites his mind to more reverence and gratitude to the Author of his being, it will be well; but let him stop there, and not presume, on the strength of his imagination, to judge his Creator, and pronounce on the ascendancy of one attribute of that Creator over other attributes. Rather let him say with the Psalmist,

"Such knowledge is too wonderful for me;

It is high, I cannot attain unto it."

Let him abstain from finding fault with those of his fellow-men who, having acquired more knowledge and wisdom than he possesses, can better imagine than he is able to do, how the principles of Divine Wisdom and of Divine Goodness are at all times concurrent in operation-"not benevolence exclusively," not wisdom exclusively; nothing like an absolute pre-eminence of benevolence.

It is supposed at p. 31, that the views there exposed are substantially those of Combe; but the whole context of Combe's work (as well as his expression, "not benevolence exclusively") shews that he maintains that the principle of benevolence in the human mind ought to be directed by human wisdom.

The picture drawn at p. 31 cannot be realized, except by a wise exercise of human benevolence: an absolute pre-eminence of benevo lence would produce very contrary results. If the existing laws, institutions and usages of any community were to be altered and regulated by a senate, a tribunal and an administration composed of men selected from amongst others on account of very great benevolence, without due regard to their faculties of perception and reflection, their laws, institutions and usages would go backwards, and become worse than they are, instead of better.

Men of common sense understand this practically; for we hear them say continually, Mr. Such-a-one is a worthy, good man, and truly benevolent, but we find by experience he is not fit for public affairs, either as a legislator, or a judge, or a minister.

The most able astronomers, with the most perfect instruments yet constructed, have been unable to decide that any one of the fixed stars is nearer to us than any of the others. Mathematicians, who proceed upon exact principles, cannot shew that any one infinite quantity is greater than any other infinite quantity; for to estimate proportion between infinitudes is beyond our limited powers of comparison; and so of all the infinite attributes of Deity.

"To him, no high, no low, no great, no small;

He fills, he bounds, connects, and equals all."

If the greatest of human minds acknowledge such limited powers, is it for smatterers in moral philosophy to say that infinite benevolence is greater than infinite power and infinite knowledge and infinite wisdom put together?

It might be anticipated that in such minds, when analyzed phrenologically, self-esteem, benevolence and veneration would be found in excess, attended with a deficiency of causality and comparison. A redundancy of self-esteem must have concurred with benevolence and veneration in exalting the idea of one single attribute of Deity into the notion of an all-comprehending agency; when but for a defect of causality the mind would have been advertised that many more principles than that of benevolence have been operative; but how many more, causality would have been unable to determine. It must have been a notable deficiency, or else a morbid action of comparison, that could have deluded the mind into an attempt to judge of the comparative ascendancy of one infinite attribute of the Deity over all others.

It is stated at p. 29, that stepping aside from the inquiry and turning to another branch of the subject, will not do. "We can form no conception of any great and efficient scheme of government, which is not based upon some ruling and pervading principle, into which all its details are resolvable, and by which alone its problems are to be tried."

Here, defect of causality is strongly evinced; for a very moderate exercise of that faculty would have led to the conclusion, that the multiplicity of effects which we see in the physical and moral world, must have had for their cause not one principle alone, but many; too many and too great for comprehension by our limited powers of intellect.

It may be expected that the inquiry to find out the presumed one ruling and pervading principle of Divine Government, and that one attribute of the Deity which is universally inclusive, will end as the old search after the universal panacea, or the elixir of life, or the philosopher's stone, has ended, and as the search after the one thing needful in religious faith is destined to end. The inquirers after such chimeras will all come to be classed together, amongst men with some one fanciful notion or idea, too predominant in their minds to allow their different faculties free operation.

es Say, first of God above, or Man below,
What can we reason, but from what we know?
Of Man, what see we but his station here,
From which to reason, or to which refer?

Through worlds unnumber'd though the God be known,
'Tis ours to trace him only in our own.

He who through vast immensity can pierce,
See worlds on worlds compose one universe,
Observe how system into system runs,
What other planets circle other suns,
What varied beings people every star,

May tell why Heav'n has made us as we are.
But of this frame, the bearings and the ties,
The strong conexions, nice dependencies,
Gradations just, has thy pervading soul

Looked through? Or can a part contain the whole?"

The unconsciousness of the extreme presumption of pretending to judge the Divine Being, is a vulgar error; and the exercise of that unconscious presumption, a pernicious habit. The charge against Combe is, in effect, that he has avoided the vulgar error, that he has not presumed to tell us on what principle the Almighty proceeded in creating the world; and in that view, if any part of Combe's work deserves the eulogium passed upon it at p. 28, it is the opening of his first chapter, in the following words:

'In natural science, three subjects of inquiry may be distinguished: 1st, What exists? 2ndly, What is the purpose or design of what exists? And, 3rdly, Why was what exists designed for such uses as it evidently subserves?

"It is a matter of fact, for instance, that arctic regions and the torrid zone exist; that a certain kind of moss is abundant in Lapland in winter,—— that the rein-deer feeds on it, and enjoys health and vigour in situations where most other animals would die; that camels exist in Africa,-that they have broad hooves, and stomachs fitted to retain water for a considerable time, and that they flourish amid arid tracts of sand, where the rein-deer would hardly live for a day. All this falls under the inquiry, What exists? "In contemplating these facts, the understanding is naturally led to infer that one object of the Lapland moss is to feed the rein-deer, and that one purpose of the deer is to assist man; and that broad feet have been given to the camel to allow it to walk on sand, and a retentive stomach to fit it for arid places, in which water is found only at wide intervals. These conclusions result from inquiries into the uses and purposes of what exists; and such inquiries constitute a legitimate exercise of the human intellect.

"But, 3rdly, we may ask, Why were the physical elements of nature created such as they are? Why were summer, winter, spring and autumn introduced? Why were animals formed of organized matter? Why were trackless wastes of snow and burning sand called into existence? These are inquiries why what exists was made such as it is, or into the will of the Deity in creation.

"Now, man's perceptive faculties are adequate to the first inquiry, and his reflective faculties to the second; but it may well be doubted whether he has powers suited to the third. My investigations are confined to the first and second; I do not discuss the third."

This is an excellent lesson for all would-be philosophers; it is at the commencement of Combe's work; and as they advance through it they will find the whole in keeping with the commencement, and that it is a book full of observed facts as to what the moral and physical

world is, with just inferences that its parts are adapted and related one to another in a systematic manner, forming a vast whole, which is governed by invariable laws.

"All are but parts of one stupendous whole,

Whose body Nature is, and God the soul."

The dogmatism of the passage at pp. 29 and 30, may be preserved, although its sense is altered, by changing the word Benevolent into any other which may, for the moment, better suit the imagination (not the judgment, for that faculty is unavailable for the purpose).

What will C. say to having his favourite dogma read thus? It is the very essence of the principle of Wisdom to be universally inclusive; to exercise an all-comprehending agency, to which every other attribute, however high in the scale of intellectual greatness, is but as a ministering spirit, subordinate and subservient. Surely, C. will not say that this is false; and yet it silently renders the principle of Benevolence subordinate to the all-comprehending agency. Or, let him read his dogma with the word Justice in place of Benevolence, and what will he then have to say to it?

If he says his notion of Benevolence, as exercising an all-comprehending agency, includes that of Wisdom and Justice, he will only be shewing that his mind is confused with a phantom of an agency comprehending several principles, and, instead of distinct ideas, is occupied with mere half-formed notions. In the human mind, Benevolence is certainly very distinct from Wisdom and Justice; for many very benevolent men are not remarkable for wisdom, and not always for justice. Although, on the other hand, amongst the wisest of men, the majority have in all ages been remarkable both for benevolence and justice.

In like manner, let C. go through the most complete statement he can find or make out of the natural attributes and moral perfections of the Almighty-Knowledge, Wisdom, Power, Truth, Equity, Goodness, with others—and, substituting each one of these in turn (but only one at a time) for the word Benevolence, how will his dogma appear to him?

The following statement of the attributes of God was drawn up by Dr. Jeremiah Hunt, the friend of Lardner and Benson, a divine of great good sense and piety; he died in 1744, in the 67th year of his age.

As he is infinite and we are finite, he must therefore be INCOMPREHENSIBLE.

+ Dr. Hunt overlooked the Omnipresence altogether. It ought to have been inserted at the commencement, 'An Omnipresent" or "All-pervading Spirit:" Dr.

Hunt's words were only, "A Spirit."

Will not such a course of trial and error shew him that he is wrong in choosing any one attribute, or in excluding any other attribute, that he knows of; and that he ought to insert the most complete series that he can make out and then add, "with other unknown attributes and perfections which are beyond our comprehension;" which amendment being made, his dogma about other attributes being subordinate will become a contradiction of terms.

And will he not find out at last, that Combe was right as far as Combe has gone, which is only so far as to say that he does not maintain the principle of benevolence exclusively, implying that some do maintain the principle of benevolence exclusively; but Combe has not excluded benevolence, for he is not one of those to whom the poet said,

Presumptuous man! the reason wouldst thou find,

Why formed so weak, so little, and so blind?
First, if thou canst, the harder reason guess,
Why formed no weaker, blinder, and no less?
Of systems possible, it is confest

That Wisdom Infinite must form the best.

Cease, then, nor Order imperfection name;
Our proper bliss depends on what we blame.
All nature is but art unknown to thee;

All chance, direction which thou canst not see;
All discord, harmony not understood;

All partial evil, universal good;

And, spite of Pride, in erring Reason's spite,

One truth is clear-WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT."

At p. 31, an absolute pre-eminence of benevolence is contended for, but it is not clear whether Divine benevolence or human benevolence is meant; for what follows obviously refers to human benevolence, and is vividly and ably depicted; nevertheless, it is omitted to be stated that human benevolence requires the guidance of the largest share of human wisdom that can be attained, in order to realize the representation there made; for human benevolence, as a mere willingness or desire to do good, without knowledge how to effect good and power to execute it, is more likely to do harm than good, as experience in all ages has proved.

What is wanted is, that men should cultivate knowledge by observation, then attain wisdom by reflecting on their knowledge, and then exercise all the power which they derive from knowledge and wisdom, on the principle of benevolence. In such case, where is the absolute pre-eminence of benevolence? But mere good men are prone to exalt the moral virtues they possess from nature, and to underrate the intellectual qualities of knowledge and wisdom which they feel they do not possess, and which none can attain except by great and long-continued exertion.

(To be concluded in the next No.)