Locke on Essence and IdentityI first became interested in the relationship between Locke's anti essentialism and his theory of identity in a first-year graduate course on metaphysics taught at Syracuse University by Jose Benardete. I had until then approached Locke as a "safe", commonsense philosopher, whose metaphysical agenda-constrained as it was by his concept empiricism was largely geared towards upholding a scientifically enlightened, broadly Christian worldview. I am greatly indebted to Professor Benardete for disabusing me of this understanding of Locke's work. Benardete's Locke was not the Locke that I had been exposed to as an undergraduate, not the Locke that I had found in Copleston's History of Philosophy. Rather, he was a profoundly creative and audacious metaphysician, who was justly perceived to be a tremendously dangerous philosopher by his more traditional contemporarie s. And as much I had admired Copleston's Locke, I have become positively enthralled with Benardete's. The topics of identity and essentialism have become mainstays of contemporary metaphysics, and it is no understatement to say that Locke's contribution to modem debates on these matters is enormous. My early interest in Locke's work on essentialism and identity-through-time was motivated by two factors. First, although there are a number of obvious and significant conceptual connections between these topics, Locke's own theorizing about identity seems not to have been informed by his critique of essentialism or vice versa. |
Contents
The psychological origin of this concept | 1 |
LOCKES CRITIQUE OF ESSENTIALISM | 25 |
Lockes epistemological and semantic arguments against real kinds | 33 |
Lockes appeal to monsters and changelings | 44 |
LOCKE ON KINDS AND PARTICULARS | 53 |
W S N L K 82 | 62 |
LOCKE ON THE PERSISTENCE OF ORGANISMS AND PERSONS | 101 |
OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES | 147 |
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Common terms and phrases
account of persistence anti-essentialism argue atoms bodies claim committed compatible conditions for particular consciousness constituent masses constitute contends corporeal substances corpuscularian counterpart theory Descartes diachronically compounded dimensional dyadic relations equally legitimate Essay essential properties example four-dimensional objects four-dimensional ontology hence Hume immaterial substance Inwagen ISBN J. L. Mackie John Locke Keith Lehrer Leibniz Locke takes Locke's ontology Lockean organisms mass of matter masses of atoms metaphysical natural kinds Newton nominal essence organisms and persons p₁ at t₁ particular objects partly composed passage perduring persist by enduring persistence conditions person-stages personal identity Peter van Inwagen Philosophy possible worlds principle of individuation real essences realism region of space relative identity thesis single sort sortal concepts spatial and temporal species statements substance theory successively existing masses suggests suppose t₂ Tabby temporal boundaries temporal extent temporally extended object theory of identity thing unsorted particulars Uzgalis wholly composed writes