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nostrisque suasionibus componant institutiones: ut liceat vobis prima legum cunabula non ab antiquis fabulis discere, sed ab imperiali splendore appetere et tam aures quam animae vestrae nihil inutile nihilque perperam positum, sed quod in ipsis rerum optinet argumentis accipiant: et quod in priore tempore vix post quadriennium prioribus contingebat, ut tunc constitutiones imperatorias legerent, hoc vos a primordio ingrediamini digni tanto honore tantaque reperti felicitate, ut et initium vobis et finis legum eruditionis a voce 4 principali procedat. Igitur post libros quinquaginta digestorum seu pandectarum, in quos omne ius antiquum collatum est (quos per eundem virum excelsum Tribonianum nec non ceteros viros illustres et facundissimos confecimus), in hos quattuor libros easdem institutiones partiri iussimus, ut sint 5 totius legitimae scientiae prima elementa. Quibus breviter expositum est et quod antea optinebat et quod postea desuetudine inumbratum ab imperiali remedio illuminatum est. 6 Quas ex omnibus antiquorum institutionibus et praecipue ex commentariis Gaii nostri tam institutionum quam rerum cottidianarum aliisque multis commentariis compositas cum tres praedicti viri prudentes nobis optulerunt, et legimus et cognovimus et plenissimum nostrarum constitutionum robur eis accommodavimus.

7 Summa itaque ope et alacri studio has leges nostras accipite et vosmet ipsos sic eruditos ostendite, ut spes vos pulcherrima foveat toto legitimo opere perfecto posse etiam nostram rem publicam in partibus eius vobis credendis gubernare.

Data undecimo kalendas Decembres Constantinopoli domino nostro Iustiniano perpetuo Augusto tertium consule.

DOMINI NOSTRI IUSTINIANI PERPETUO AUGUSTI

INSTITUTIONUM SIVE ELEMENTORUM

COMPOSITORUM PER TRIBONIANUM VIRUM EXCELSUM IURISQUE DOCTISSIMUM MAGISTRUM ET EXQUAESTORE SACRI PALATII ET THEOPHILUM VIRUM MAGNIFICUM IU

RIS PERITUM ET ANTECESSOREM HUIUS ALMAE

URBIS ET DOROTHEUM VIRUM MAGNIFI

CUM QUAESTORIUM IURIS PERITUM ET

ANTECESSOREM BERYTENSIUM

INCLITAE CIVITATIS

LIBER PRIMUS.

I.

DE IUSTITIA ET IURE.

Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique 1 tribuens. Iuris prudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti scientia.

His generaliter cognitis et incipientibus nobis exponere iura 2 populi Romani ita maxime videntur posse tradi commodissime, si primo levi ac simplici, post deinde diligentissima atque exactissima interpretatione singula tradantur. alioquin si statim ab initio rudem adhuc et infirmum animum studiosi multitudine ac varietate rerum oneraverimus, duorum alterum aut desertorem studiorum efficiemus aut cum magno labore

Tit. 1. On these definitions of justice and jurisprudence see General Introduction, p. 53, supr. The first is as old as Simonides (rà ¿peiλóμeva ékáσtą áñtodidóvaι dikaιóv éori, cited in Plato, Rep. i.): for close parallels cf. Cic. de Fin. v. 23, de Off. i. 2, iii. 2.

3

eius, saepe etiam cum diffidentia, quae plerumque iuvenes avertit, serius ad id perducemus, ad quod leniore via ductus sine magno labore et sine ulla diffidentia maturius perduci potuisset.

Iuris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non

§ 3. As a term of Roman law, ius has various significations, viz. (i.) objectively, law; and this with several shades of meaning: (a) the whole body of law, or large divisions of it (e. g. ius quo urbs Roma utitur: ius civile, gentium, honorarium, publicum, privatum; (6) single rules of law (e.g. 'iura condere' Bk. i. 2. 8, 'ius senatus consulti inducere' Dig. 38. 4. 3. 2); (c) law established or recognised by judicial decision. (e. g. 'ius fieri ex sententia iudicis' Dig. 5. 2. 17. I, 'praetor ius reddere dicitur, etiam cum inique decernit' Dig. 1. 1. 11); (d) law as a subject of study, = jurisprudence (e. g. Dig. 1. 1. pr. 'ius est ars boni et aequi,' ib. 1. 22. I 'iuri operam daturus, studiosus iuris.' (ii.) Subjectively, a right conferred by ius in sense (i.): e. g. pr. supr.: so frequently iura praediorum = servitutes, or a collection of such rights; e. g. 'succedere in ius demortui ;' Bk. ii. 20. 11 'legatarii et fidei commissarii non iuris successores sunt;' (iii.) the place in which the praetor sat to administer justice: alia significatione ius dicitur locus, in quo ius redditur: quem locum determinare hoc modo possumus: ubicunque praetor salva maiestate imperii sui salvoque maiorum more ius dicere constituit, is locus recte ius appellatur' Dig. 1. 1. II. In this sense, under the formulary system of procedure, ius was usually employed to denote the court of the praetor, as distinguished from the proceedings before the iudex whom he appointed to hear and decide the case, which were called iudicium e. g. the common expressions in ius vocare, in iure cedere, in iure interrogari, confiteri, etc.; (iv.) judicial proceedings themselves, e. g. 'dies in quibus debent iura differri' Cod. 3. 12. 7; (v.) = potestas, as in the common phrases persona sui iuris, persona alieno iuri subjecta, e. g. Bk. i. 8. pr. ; Gaius i. 48. 49; so Dig. 36. 2. 14. 3 in ius alicuius pervenire;' (vi.) = status: 'emancipari a patre adoptivo, atque ita pristinum ius recuperare ' Dig. 1. 7. 33. (vii.) The jural nature of a person or thing, e. g. 'ius actoris deterius facere' Dig. 2. 9. 1. 1, 'ius fundi deterius factum' Dig. 50. 16. 126, 'domum cum iure suo omni legare' Dig. 33. 10. 8; (viii.) relation, e. g. 'adoptio non ius sanguinis, sed ius cognationis affert' Dig. 1.7. 27, 'nonnunquam ius pro necessitudine accipimus, veluti est ius cognationis vel affinitatis' Dig. 1. 1. 12.

In the expression 'iuris praecepta,' ius seems hardly to bear any of these meanings, for the precept 'honeste vivere' is rather an ethical principle than a rule of positive law; at least men often practise what cannot be termed an honest calling without bringing themselves within reach of the law. Perhaps it is better to regard the three iuris praecepta not as legal rules themselves, but as the basis of a classification of legal rules according to the various departments of the whole duty of man, self-regarding and extra-regarding (Savigny, System i. 409). It

laedere, suum cuique tribuere. Huius studii duae sunt 4 positiones, publicum et privatum. publicum ius est, quod ad statum rei Romanae spectat, privatum, quod ad singulorum utilitatem pertinet. dicendum est igitur de iure privato, quod est tripertitum: collectum est enim ex naturalibus praeceptis aut gentium aut civilibus.

may be, however, that Ulpian, from whom pr. and §§ 1 and 3 of this Title are taken, and in whose 'Regulae,' Bk. i, they stand in close connection, meant § 3 to be an expansion or explanation of pr.; by enouncing, as the first precept of the law, a rule relating to oneself and not to other persons, he intended to say, that although justice is what he defines it to be in pr., it is not yet enough to injure no one, and to give every man his due, in order to save oneself from collision with the law: the law also punishes any unworthy conduct by which one's own personality is degraded.

§ 4. Public law 'in sacris, in sacerdotibus, in magistratibus consistit ' Dig. 1. 1. 1. 2. In the Roman view it comprised two parts: (1) constitutional law in its widest sense, i. e. the law which determines in whom the sovereign power shall reside, how it shall be exercised, and to what checks the persons among whom it may be distributed shall be subject. It thus embraces all administrative law, which indeed under the later Empire formed its largest portion; see the account of Theodosius' Code in the General Introduction, p. 62, supr. Another important portion of it was the ius sacrum, even after Constantine had made Christianity the national religion. (2) Criminal law: privata delicta (torts) were distinguished from publica delicta or crimes: 'publica crimina, quorum delatio omnibus conceditur' Cod. 9. 9. 30. pr., see Bk. iv. 18. 1. inf.

It is of course impossible to draw a perfectly hard and fast line between public and private law, and this was for historical reasons particularly true of Rome (General Introd. p. 16 sq., supr.); many institutions are from one point of view regarded as publici, from another as privati iuris ; thus tutela, though discussed in the Institutes, was a munus publicum, and so in Dig. 28. 1. 3, it is said 'testamenti factio publici iuris est.' Civil procedure, from the prominence with which it is treated in Bk. iv, and also by Gaius, was apparently considered a part of private law; but by many this is regarded as arbitrary and unjustifiable, on the ground that rules of procedure are properly rules determining how the powers of certain officers (magistrates and judges) shall be exercised.

The division of the whole body of law observed within the limits of any given state into public and private, though as old as Aristotle (Rhet. i. 13. 3), and adopted by the modern civilians no less than by the Roman jurists, is severely criticised and rejected by Austin (Jurisprudence, lect. 44), who would make the so-called public law part of the law of persons. This is scientifically correct if we take law of persons, as he does, in a sense very different from that given to it by its originators :

II.

DE IURE NATURALI ET GENTIUM ET CIVILI.

nam

Ius naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit. ius istud non humani generis proprium est, sed omnium animalium, quae in caelo, quae in terra, quae in mari nascuntur. hinc descendit maris atque feminae coniugatio, quam nos matrimonium appellamus, hinc liberorum procreatio et educatio: videmus etenim cetera quoque animalia istius iuris 1 peritia censeri. Ius autem civile vel gentium ita dividitur : omnes populi, qui legibus et moribus reguntur, partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utuntur: nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi ius constituit, id ipsius proprium civitatis est vocaturque ius civile, quasi ius proprium ipsius civitatis: quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes populos peraeque custoditur vocaturque ius gentium, quasi quo iure omnes gentes utuntur. et populus itaque Romanus partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utitur. quae singula qualia sunt, suis

but this seems to be just one of those cases in which strict scientific accuracy may be sacrificed to considerations of convenience.

At the close of this paragraph naturalia praecepta are distinguished from praecepta gentium and praecepta civilia: so in the next Title ius naturale is distinguished from both ius gentium and ius civile. This, however, is (with two exceptions, Bk. i. 2. 2, ib. 5. pr.) the only passage in the Institutes in which ius gentium is opposed to ius naturale, and it leaves no mark on the system: in all other places the two expressions are used as synonymous, and in Bk. ii. 1. 11 they are expressly identified, ‘. . . iure naturali, quod, sicut diximus, appellatur ius gentium.' The explanation of the seeming anomaly is that in Tit. 1. 4, and Tit. 2. pr. Justinian is quoting verbatim from the Institutes of Ulpian, who is the only leading jurist who makes anything of the distinction, while Tit. 2. pr. is taken from Gaius. For the history and meaning of the terms see General Introd. p. 27 sq., supr.

Tit. II. The idea of ius naturale as distinct from ius gentium is derived from notions of a prehistoric epoch in which men were, in point of social development, hardly distinguishable from other animals. Savigny (Syst. i. p. 415) attempts to justify Ulpian's attribution of a jural character to natural instincts by drawing a distinction between the matter and the form in every legal relation. The matter here is the sexual relation, or the relation between parent and offspring, the form is given to it, among men, by positive law; and what Ulpian ascribes to