filio variabatur, nostra processit decisio, qua permissum est ad exemplum filiae furiosi filium quoque posse et sine patris

from the wife or some one on her behalf towards defraying the expenses of the married state, ad matrimonii onera ferenda.' The obligation to provide a dos was imposed on the father or paternal grandfather partly by the lex Papia Poppaea, partly by imperial constitutions, and this whether the daughter or granddaughter was in power or not, Cod. 5. 11. 7. The mother was under no such obligation until after an enactment of Diocletian and Maximian, and then only under exceptional circumstances, Cod. 5. 12. 14. This led to a difference of terminology: 'dos aut profectitia dicitur, id est, quam pater mulieris dedit, aut adventitia, id est ea, quae a quovis alio data est' Ulpian, reg. 6. 1-3: dos receptitia was a kind of adventitia, being a dos given by some third person other than a male ascendant on the express condition that it should be restored to him (dotis receptio) at the termination of the marriage. There could be no dos unless the wedlock were lawful, 'neque enim dos sine matrimonio esse potest; ubicunque igitur matrimonii nomen non est, nec dos est' Dig. 23. 3. 3, 'ibi dos esse debet, ubi onera matrimonii sunt' ib. 56. 1. If the husband were a filiusfamilias, the dos went to his pater, on whom the onera matrimonii fell. Anything could serve as dos whereby the property of the husband (or of his pater) was augmented -ownership, iura in re (e. g. usufruct), rights in personam, or release of a debt.

The modes of constituting a dos were three in number: dos aut datur, aut dicitur, aut promittitur. Dotem dicere potest mulier, quae nuptura est, et debitor mulieris, si iussu eius dicat, institutus, parens mulieris virilis sexus, per virilem sexum cognatione iunctus, velut pater, avus paternus: dare, promittere dotem omnes possunt' Ulpian, reg. 6. 1 and 2; cf. note on Bk. iii. 15. pr. inf. The general rule was that the dos existed, as such, only during the continuance of the marriage, and at its termination must be restored to the woman or other person from whom it proceeded, Dig. 24. 3. 2; but this might be modified by special agreement, e. g. so as to give the husband a life interest. The latter became owner of the dotal property, and so entitled to its absolute management: 'si res in dotem dentur, puto, in bonis mariti fieri' Dig. 23. 3. 7. 3; in other passages, however, the wife's reversion is recognised as strictly qualifying the husband's ownership: e. g. 'quamvis in bonis mariti dos sit, mulieris tamen est' Dig. loc. cit. 74.

It was considered a matter of public interest to secure the return of the dos at the termination of the marriage, as a provision for the wife, or in case she married a second time: 'rei publicae interest, mulieres dotes salvas habere, propter quas nubere possunt' Dig. 23. 3. 56. 1. The husband often guaranteed this by stipulatio, but apart from this there was an action for recovery (dotis exactio, § 12 inf.) called actio rei uxoriae, which was bonae fidei in character: for Justinian's changes in this matter see Bk. iv. 6. 29 inf. The wife was also a privileged creditor in case of the husband's insolvency, and the provisions of the lex Iulia

1

interventu matrimonium sibi copulare secundum datum ex constitutione modum.

Ergo non omnes nobis uxores ducere licet: nam quarundam nuptiis abstinendum est. inter eas enim personas, quae parentum liberorumve locum inter se optinent, nuptiae contrahi non possunt, veluti inter patrem et filiam vel avum et neptem vel matrem et filium vel aviam et nepotem et usque ad infinitum et si tales personae inter se coierint, nefarias atque incestas nuptias contraxisse dicuntur. et haec adeo ital sunt, ut, quamvis per adoptionem parentum liberorumve loco sibi esse coeperint, non possint inter se matrimonio iungi in tantum, ut etiam dissoluta adoptione idem iuris maneat: itaque eam, quae tibi per adoptionem filia aut neptis esse coeperit, non poteris uxorem ducere, quamvis can emancipaveris.

2 Inter eas quoque personas, quae ex transverso gradu cognationis iunguntur, est quaedam similis observatio, sed non tanta. sane enim inter fratrem sororemque nuptiae prohibitae sunt, sive ab eodem patre eademque matre nati fuerint, sive ex alterutro eorum. sed si qua per adoptionem soror tibi esse coeperit, quamdiu quidem constat adoptio, sane inter te et eam nuptiae consistere non possunt: cum vero per emancipationem adoptio dissoluta sit, poteris eam uxorem ducere: sed et si tu emancipatus fueris, nihil est impedimento nuptiis. et ideo constat, si quis generum adoptare velit, debere eum ante filiam suam emancipare: et si quis velit nurum adoptare, 3 debere eum ante filium emancipare. Fratris vel sororis filiam.

de fundo dotali, with Justinian's amendments (Bk. ii. 8. pr. inf.), were directed to the same purpose. For this whole subject see Sir H. Maine's chapter on the history of the settled property of married women, in the Early History of Institutions; and for the counterpart of dos, the donatio ante or propter nuptias, Bk. ii. 7. 3, and notes, inf.

§ 1. This and the following sections contain the rules of Roman law prohibiting certain marriages on the ground of kinship between the parties. It will be observed that adoptive was as effectual as natural relationship to bar such unions; and the same incapacity resulted in Justinian's time (Cod. 5. 4. 26) from 'cognatio spiritualis,' the relation of godparent and godchild, and to a still larger degree under the Canon Law; see some remarks of Sir H. Maine, Early History of Institutions p. 240 sq.

§ 3. Gaius (1.62; cf. Tac. Ann. 12. 5. 7, Suetonius, Claud. 26) says that

uxorem ducere non licet. sed nec neptem fratris vel sororis ducere quis potest, quamvis quarto gradu sint. cuius enim filiam uxorem ducere non licet, eius neque neptem permittitur. eius vero mulieris, quam pater tuus adoptavit, filiam non videris impediri uxorem ducere, quia neque naturali neque civili iure tibi coniungitur. Duorum autem fratrum 4 vel sororum liberi vel fratris et sororis iungi possunt. Item 5 amitam licet adoptivam uxorem ducere non licet, item materteram, quia parentum loco habentur.

qua ratione verum est magnam quoque amitam et materteram magnam prohiberi uxorem ducere. Adfinitatis quoque veneratione 6 quarundam nuptiis abstinere necesse est. ut ecce privignam aut nurum uxorem ducere non licet, quia utraeque filiae loco sunt. quod scilicet ita accipi debeat, si fuit nurus aut privigna: nam si adhuc nurus est, id est si adhuc nupta. est filio tuo, alia ratione uxorem eam ducere non possis, quia eadem duobus nupta esse non potest: item si adhuc privigna tua est, id est si mater eius tibi nupta est, idco eam uxorem ducere non poteris, quia duas uxores eodem tempore habere non licet. Socrum quoque et novercam prohibitum est uxorem 7 ducere, quia matris loco sunt. quod et ipsum dissoluta demum adfinitate procedit: alioquin si adhuc noverca est, id est si adhuc patri tuo nupta est, communi iure impeditur tibi nubere, quia eadem duobus nupta esse non potest: item si adhuc socrus est, id est si adhuc filia eius tibi nupta est, ideo impediuntur nuptiae, quia duas uxores habere non possis. Mariti tamen filius ex alia uxore et uxoris filia ex alio marito 8 vel contra matrimonium recte contrahunt, licet habeant fratrem

marriage between a man and his brother's daughter was legalised by Claudius, who married Agrippina under his own rule, though it was always unlawful to marry a niece by a sister. Constantine restored the ancient law, and branded marriage with a brother's daughter with the name of incest, Cod. Theod. 1. 2.

§ 4. Marriage between first cousins, which originally was unknown, gradually came to be permitted, Livy 42. 34, Tac. Ann. 12. 6, and after being prohibited by Theodosius I, was again made lawful by Arcadius and Honorius, Cod. 5. 4. 19.

§ 7. Marriage with a deceased wife's sister was forbidden by Constantine (Cod. Theod. 1. 2), and by Valentinian, Theodosius, and Arcadius, Cod. 5. 5. 5.

9 sororemve ex matrimonio postea contracto natos. Si uxor tua post divortium ex alio filiam procreaverit, haec non est quidem privigna tua: sed Iulianus huiusmodi nuptiis abstinere debere ait: nam nec sponsam filii nurum esse nec patris sponsam novercam esse, rectius tamen et iure facturos eos, qui 10 huiusmodi nuptiis se abstinuerint. Illud certum est serviles quoque cognationes impedimento esse nuptiis, si forte pater 11 et filia aut frater et soror manumissi fuerint. Sunt et aliae personae, quae propter diversas rationes nuptias contrahere prohibentur, quas in libris digestorum seu pandectarum ex veteri iure collectarum enumerari permisimus.

12

Si adversus ea quae diximus aliqui coierint, nec vir nec uxor nec nuptiae nec matrimonium nec dos intellegitur. itaque ii, qui ex eo coitu nascuntur, in potestate patris non sunt, sed tales sunt, quantum ad patriam potestatem pertinet, quales sunt ii, quos mater vulgo concepit. nam nec hi patrem habere intelleguntur, cum is etiam incertus est: unde solent filii spurii appellari, vel a Graeca voce quasi σñoрáòŋν concepti vel quasi sine patre filii. sequitur ergo, ut et dissoluto tali coitu nec dotis exactioni locus sit. qui autem prohibitas nuptias coeunt, et alias poenas patiuntur, quae sacris constitutionibus continentur.

§ 10. Slaves were incapable of marriage (sensu legali) of any kind, but a permanent connection between two slaves, or a slave and a free person, was called contubernium, Paul. sent. rec. 2. 19. 6. Here the natural relation of father and child was to some extent recognised: e.g. as iusta causa manumissionis under the lex Aelia Sentia, Gaius i. 19. Accordingly, when slaves had become free, and thus capable of intermarriage, they were held to be within the rules as to prohibited degrees. § 12. Children born of a connection which was not a legal marriage, either because it was prohibited by some positive rule, or because there was no maritalis affectio, were deemed, as a rule, to have no father: 'vulgo concepti dicuntur, qui patrem demonstrare non possunt, vel qui possunt quidem, sed eum habent quem habere non licet, qui et spurii appellantur aрà την σторáν' Dig. 1. 5. 23. Such a connection when it amounted to stuprum, adulterium, or incestus, was visited with severe penalties by the lex Iulia de adulteriis (Bk. iv. 18. 4 inf.); stuprum committit, qui liberam mulierem, consuetudinis causa, non matrimonii, continet, excepta videlicet concubina' Dig. 48. 5. 34. 1. From this it will be understood that concubinatus, a permanent connection without affectio maritalis, was a relation tolerated by law the Romans say of it, 'per leges nomen assumpsit' Dig. 25. 3. I; i. e. it has received by statute a

Aliquando autem evenit, ut liberi, qui statim ut nati sunt 13 in potestate parentum non fiant, postea tamen redigantur in potestatem. qualis est is, qui, dum naturalis fuerat, postea curiae datus potestati patris subicitur. nec non is, qui a muliere libera procreatus, cuius matrimonium minime legibus interdictum fuerat, sed ad quam pater consuetudinem habuerat, postea ex nostra constitutione dotalibus instrumentis compositis in potestate patris efficitur: quod et aliis, si ex eodem matrimonio fuerint procreati, similiter nostra constitutio praebuit.

legal significance. In many respects it was assimilated to marriage : thus Ulpian says (Dig. 32. 49. 4) 'parvi autem refert, uxori an concubinae quis leget, quae eius causa emta parata sunt: sane enim, nisi dignitate, nihil interest.' But the position was thought a degrading one to the woman; no honesta femina could become a concubine without an express 'testatio,' Dig. 25. 7. 1. I; otherwise the relation was regarded as stuprum. A man could have but one concubine at a time, and concubinatus was incompatible with marriage: 'eo tempore quo quis uxorem habet, concubinam habere non potest: concubina igitur ab uxore solo dilectu separatur' Paul. sent. rec. 2. 20. The connection was terminated by insanity of either party, except between patronus and liberta. The paternity of the children was recognised to a considerable extent they were capable of legitimation, section 13 inf., entitled to maintenance, and even possessed rights of succession on the father's intestacy. By the later emperors concubinatus was discouraged. Constantine denied children who were born of it any benefit under their father's will, and prohibited it altogether among high imperial officials; but it was not made generally unlawful until the ninth century, by Leo Philosophus. If a dos were given in a marriage which violated the rules as to prohibited degrees, it escheated, when the marriage terminated, to the Treasury, Dig. 23. 2. 38. 1, ib. 52; Cod. 5. 5. 4.

§ 13. In the time of Gaius children who were not in potestas at birth, owing to the nuptiae not being iustae, could sometimes be afterwards subjected to it by causae probatio, by which Latins and peregrini, with their consorts, obtained the civitas: their matrimonium thereby became legitimum, and even the children already born were subjected, by a process analogous to that of postliminium, to the resulting potestas. Among such causae were the birth of a child to a Latin father (Gaius i. 66), and justifiable mistake (ib. 67); see generally, Gaius i. 29–32, 66–75. In Justinian's time, natural children could be subjected to potestas by legitimation, and this in three ways, two of which are mentioned in the text: (1) by oblatio curiae: i. e. the father made the son a decurio, or married the daughter to a decurio, in a provincial town. The decuriones formed a kind of town council, or body, which had to bear the burden of the magistracies (honores) and other municipal expenses (munera);