be a most faithful expositor of his [its] own meaning. Thus whilst the Church for that trust reposed in her, dealeth faithfully in these points, we are not afraid to acknowledge, that we so esteem of the Scriptures, as rightly we are led by the authority of God's Church. Those that are of that judgment, that they dare give credit without witness, though we follow not their example in overmuch credulity, yet we blame not their judgments in that kind. Touching therefore the Authority of the Church and the Scriptures, though we grant (as you say), that the Church is truly distinguished by the Scriptures; that the Scriptures (which is a strange phrase) "warrant the trial of God's word;"* and that it was ever believed for the Word's sake; yet without fear of "underpropping" any "popish principle" (as you term it) we say, that we are taught to receive it, from the authority of the Church; we see her judgment; we hear her voice; and in humility subscribe unto all this; ever acknowledging the Scriptures to direct the Church, and yet the Church to afford (as she is bound) her true testimony to the Scripture. For the verse of Menander, Aratus, or Epimenides,‡ was, and had been ever but the saying of poets; had not the Church assured us, that it was uttered since, by an instrument of the Holy Ghost. ARTICLE V. OF FREE WILL. In searching out the nature of Human Reason, whilst we reach into the depth of that excellency which man had by creation; we must needs confess, that by sin he hath lost much who now is unable to comprehend all that he should; but we dare not affirm that he hath lost all, who, even in this blindness, is able to see something; and, in this weakness, strong enough, without the light of supernatural justifying grace, to tread out those paths of moral virtues which have not only great use in human society, but are also not altogether of a nature oppositely different from man's salvation. And therefore, the natural way to find out Laws by Reason, guideth, as it were by a direct path, the Will unto that which is good, which naturally having a freedom in herself, "is apt to take, or refuse, any particular object whatsoever being presented unto it."§ Which though we affirm, yet we neither say that Reason can guide the Will unto all that is good (for though every good that concerneth us hath evidence enough for itself, yet reason is not diligent to search it out); nor we say not, that the Will doth take or refuse any particular object; but is apt rather, noting the nature whereby it hath that power, than shewing the ability whereby it hath that strength. For though sin hath given * [See Vol. I. p. 158.] + Acts xvii. 28. Tit. i. 12. § Vol. I. p. 90. (as the schoolmen observe) four wounds unto our nature; "Ignorance, Malice, Concupiscence, and Infirmity;" the first, in the understanding; the second, in the will; the third, in our desiring appetite; the last, in the irascible; yet the Will is free from necessity and coaction; though not from misery and infirmity. For (as St. Bernard saith) there is a threefold freedom; from necessity, from sin, from misery : the first, of nature; the second, of grace; the third, of glory.* In the first, from the bondage of coaction, the Will is free in it [its] own nature, and hath power over itself. In the second, the Will is not free, but freed from the bondage of sin. And in the third, it is freed from the servitude of corruption. Now that freedom, by which the Will of man is named free, is the first only: and therefore we dare say, that the wicked, who have not the two last (being captives to sin in this life, and to misery in the life to come), yet for all this, want not the freedom of Will. Now this freedom of nature, as Aristotle noteth, is two-fold; that which is opposite to a simple coaction, and that to which not only a coaction, but a necessity is opposite. The first is of those things, which cannot by any means but be willed of us, and yet freely and voluntarily are willed; as to be happy, which none can choose but will, though most do fail in the means: the second, when we can either will, or not will; as to walk, speak, sit, or such like. Now because nothing is the proper, or the chief object of the Will, but that which either is, or seems to be, good, as all learned men affirm; therefore in our Wills, there is this usual error, That our understandings are deceived by the inferior appetite of the flesh, which maketh that seem good, in the particular proposition, which it pronounceth to be evil, in the general.§ And therefore, being by nature to will good, willeth that which is directly opposite; because reason growing idle, in the sloth of an inferior appetite, wanteth diligence to search it out. Few men but think drunkenness in general to be evil; which notwithstanding themselves do embrace, because in particular they think it good. This being the difference in all sin, that then it seemeth to be none, when it is-this sin. Thus, the conclusion, by the rules of Logic, being from the particular (wherein reason corrupted hath failed), the Will hath reason enough to follow that; and therefore saith St. Austin, “ man using amiss the freedom of this Will, hath both lost it and himself;" || not in respect of "De gratia et libro arbitrio, &c." P. LOMB. Sent. lib. ii. dist. 25. Libera sed liberata. Rom. vi. 7. Ibid. iii. + Aristot. Ethic. lib. iii. cap. 4, 5. 1 Cor. vii, 36. Clem. Alexan. in Strom. Aug. Confess. lib. ii. cap. 6. Boeth. de Con. lib. iv. Damasc. de Fide, lib. ii. cap. 22. Arist. Eth. lib. i. cap. 1. Senec. de Ben. lib. iv. cap. 7. "In hypothesi bonum, in thesi malum." Aug. in Ench. cap. 30. the natural liberty from coaction, but in respect of the liberty which is from sin, as Aquinas answereth.* St. Ambrose (or whosoever was the author of that book of The calling of the Gentiles) saith, That in man there is a threefold Will; Sensitive, Animal, Spiritual; the two first, he holdeth to be free; the last, to be the work of the Holy Ghost. For as one noteth, "There is in man an understanding of earthly things, and of heavenly :-earthly things, as of a policy, governing of families, arts, liberal and mechanical, and such like, which pertain not directly to God, to his kingdom, to the righteousness of it, to eternal happiness; heavenly, as the knowledge of the Divine Will, and framing our lives according to it. Of the first, we say, That because man is a sociable creature, and naturally inclineth to all that concern the preservation of that; there are left in him certain universal impressions, wherein, in all ages, wise men have conspired for the making of good Laws." Which in my opinion is not much less, than that which you reprehend, being affirmed by Mr. Hooker. But the understanding of heavenly things, we confess, by the corruption of original sin, wholly to be taken from us. For natural things are corrupted, and supernatural taken away. For we think not as some of the ancient Fathers did, especially the Greeks (who were loath to dissent too much from the Philosophers), That man was corrupted only in his sensual part, and that he hath Reason sound, and his Will also for the most part. For saith St. Austin, "Adam had that he might if he would; but not to will that he could."§ And therefore, in supernatural things (which are the works of piety, pleasing and acceptable to God), (of which is understood all that you allege out of the Tenth Article of the Church of England) we say, "The Will of man hath not obtained grace by freedom, but freedom by grace: "|| yet for all this, neither doth the Will want in his [its] own nature a potential freedom in all things, nor an actual powerful freedom in some things;¶ for the blow that sin gave, made not an equal disability to all actions; seeing all actions are not in equal distance from man's nature. For the thoughts and the actions of man, we know are of three kinds; natural, moral, supernatural; now there are many truths theorical, and mechanical, contained in natural and human arts, which by man may be compre * Part I. quest. 83. art. 2. + Calv. Inst. lib. ii. cap. 2. sect. 13. "Inspersum est universis semen aliquod ordinis politici." [Ib. in fin.] 66 Naturalia corrupta; supernaturalia ablata.” § De Corrept. et gratia, ad Valent. cap. 2. || "Humana voluntas non libertate gratiam, sed gratia consequitur libertatem." AUG. ubi supra. T "Cum vult non potest, quia quando potuit noluit: ideo per malum velle perdidit bonum posse." AUG. hended, only by the light of nature: for though some divines are of opinion that no moral truth can be known of the understanding of man, in the state of nature corrupt, without the special help of God ;* others contrary (as Albertus, Bonaventure, Scotus, Aquinas and divers others) yet all agree in this, That a man can know a moral truth in general, without any special grace; but that good that directly belongeth to eternal life he cannot. Now what, I pray you, doth our Church say less when it saith, That "without the grace of God (which is by Christ) preventing us, that we will, and working together while we will; we are nothing at all able to do the works of piety which are pleasing and acceptable to God?" Or, what in your opinion doth Mr. Hooker say more, when he saith That "there is in the Will of man naturally that freedom, whereby it is apt " (not able) "to take or refuse any particular object whatsoever, being presented to it?" or when he saith, "there is not that good which concerneth us, but it hath enough for evidence in itself if Reason were diligent to search it out:" the fault of man's error in election, arising out of the sloth of reason, not out of the nature of the good. And this sloth being nothing else but that heavy burthen wherewith we are laden by our first corruption. And therefore, in mine opinion, the accusation is directly false, whereby you would make him to say contrary to his words that "Reason by diligence is able to find out any good concerning us." For he that saith that there is virtue enough in the pool to heal, if a man had power enough to put himself in; doth not affirm that man hath strength enough to do it; but that the pool had virtue, if he were able to do it. But doubtless "we are dead in our sins, and trespasses; "+ 66 we are not sufficient of ourselves to think any thing; "§ and yet, as Seneca saith, It is the gift of God that we live, for that he hath done without us; but it is an act of our own (not simply, but of ourselves helped) that we live well."|| "For many other things may unwillingly be done by us, but the act of believing, as it must be done in us, so it must be done willingly, and with us. And, therefore, saith St. Austin, there are three things necessary that supernatural mysteries may be perceived by us; first, a divine revelation from the Scriptures; a persuasion of that truth by miracles, or some other means; and last of all, the rule of the Will.¶ For, saith he, "a man may enter into the Church unwillingly; he may receive the sacrament unwillingly; but no man can believe but willingly." Now there is no difference betwixt the will, and the freewill (both being the rational power of desiring), but that the one * Calv. Instit. lib. i. cap. 2. et lib. ii. cap. 2. Grego. Arimi. in Sent. 2. dist. 26. quest. 1. art. 1. Gaspar. Cassalius, de Quadripartita justitia, lib. i. cap. 32. † John v. 7. Ephes. ii. 5. § 2 Cor. iii. 5. "Deorum munus est quod vivimus, nostrum quod sancte vivimus." SENEC. respecteth the end, and then it is called Will: the other respecteth the means, and then it is called Free-will. So the same power of understanding, as it respecteth the first principles, is called Understanding; as it respecteth the conclusion which is gathered by a discourse, from the principles, it is called Reason. Now this Reason concerning things doubtful, hath naturally in itself, a way to both opposites; but leaneth to that for the most part whereunto either appetite, ignorance, or grace sway it. So that though freely and without constraint, it follow naturally the wisdom of the flesh; yet without a supernatural grace," the wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God: for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be.* This being duly weighed with understanding, and considered of with a charitable humility, such as the cause requireth, every man may see (notwithstanding your accusation) that our Church in this neither differeth from the truth, nor Master Hooker at all from our Church. ARTICLE VI. OF FAITH AND WORKS. WHERE charity hath not power enough to guide reason, there malice, out of ignorance, is able to make conclusions against sense. For the eyes being blinded, which, naturally, are to perform the best offices of seeing; the colours that are discerned otherwise, are little better than the false errors of a troubled fancy. For "where the light is darkness, how great must that darkness be?"+ To attain, by a supernatural power, to that felicity, which is an act of the greatest mercy, as infinite numbers fail in the thing; so there are not a few, which utterly mistake the means. And whilst all that are Christians, acknowledge it to be a grace; eager contentions are stirred up, Whether it be imputed, or inherent, in us? And seeing in this act of justification, by the consent of all, man doth receive from God what he hath, the question is, What virtue must be in that hand, to enable weakness to receive such strength: and, how that faith must be accompanied, that is able to clothe our souls with the righteousness of another's merit? Here we have adversaries, whom peradventure we mistake, as they mistake us; making (as in other points) a misconstruction, to be the ground of a great difference; and the strongest opposition, to arise from hence; that neither part is willing to understand each other. Here, if we should but discover the least means of reconcilement, some hasty spirits would not stick to accuse us as more than partial; and that treacherously we sought to betray the cause. In that we purpose to set down what Truth warranteth in this behalf, it is rather to free him from suspicion whom + Matt. vi. 23. * Rom. viii. 7. |