xxxii. 7.

Eth. vi.

may indue men extraordinarily with understanding as it pleaseth him but let no man presuming thereupon neglect the instructions, or despise the ordinances of his elders, sith Deat. He, whose gift wisdom is, hath said, "Ask thy father, and he will shew thee; thine ancients, and they shall tell thee." It is therefore the voice, both of God and Nature, not of learning only, that especially in matters of action and policy, Arist. "The sentences and judgments of men experienced, aged cap. 11. and wise, yea, though they speak without any proof or demonstration, are no less to be hearkened unto, than as being demonstrations in themselves; because such men's long observation is as an eye, wherewith they presently and plainly behold those principles which sway over all actions.” Whereby we are taught both the cause wherefore wise men's judgments should be credited, and the mean how to use their judgments to the increase of our own wisdom. That which sheweth them to be wise, is the gathering of principles out of their own particular experiments. And the framing of our particular experiments, according to the rule of their principles, shall make us such as they are. If, therefore, even at the first, so great accompt should be made of wise men's counsels touching things that are publicly done; as time shall add thereunto continuance and approbation of succeeding ages, their credit and authority must needs be greater. They which do nothing but that which men of accompt did before them, are, although they do amiss, yet the less faulty, because they are not the authors of harm and doing well, their actions are freed from prejudice and novelty. To the best and wisest while they live, the world is continually a froward opposite, a curious observer of their defects and imperfections; their virtues it afterwards as much admireth.* And for this cause many times that which most deserveth approbation, would hardly be able to find favour, if they which propose it were not content to profess themselves therein scholars and followers of the Ancient. For the world will not endure to hear that we are wiser than any have been which went before. In which consideration there is cause why we should be slow and unwilling to change, without very urgent necessity, the

* Πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ ποδῶν φθόνος οὐδεὶς φύεται. Philo. Πᾶσα δυσμένεια τῷ βίῳ τούτῳ συναποτίθεται. Synes. Τὸ ἐκ ποδῶν οὔτ ̓ ἀντιπίπτει καὶ τετίμηται ἀφθόνως. Greg. Naz. ἐν Στιχ.

ancient Ordinances, Rites, and long approved Customs, of our venerable predecessors. The love of things ancient doth argue stayedness; but levity and want of experience maketh apt unto innovations.* That which wisdom did first begin, and hath been with good men long continued, challengeth allowance of them that succeed, although it plead for itself nothing. That which is new,t if it promise not much, doth fear condemnation before trial; till trial, no man doth acquit or trust it, what good soever it pretend and promise. So that in this kind, there are few things known to be good, till such time as they grow to be ancient. The vain pretence of those glorious names, where they could not be with any truth, neither in reason ought to have been so much alleged, hath wrought such a prejudice against them in the minds of the common sort, as if they had utterly no force at all; whereas (especially for these observances which concern our present question) antiquity, custom, and consent in the Church of God, making with that which Law doth establish, are themselves most sufficient reasons to uphold the same, unless some notable public inconvenience enforce the contrary. For a small thing in the eye of Law is as nothing. We are therefore bold to make our second petition this, That in things, the fitness whereof is not of itself apparent, nor easy to be made sufficiently manifest unto all, yet the judgment of antiquity concurring with that which is received, may induce them to think it not unfit, who are not able to allege any known weighty inconvenience which it hath, or to take any strong exception against.||

· Ὅσοι δι ̓ εὐστάθειαν τρόπων τὸ τῆς ἀρχαιότητος σεμνὸν τοῦ καινοπρεποῦς προετίμησαν καὶ ἀπαραποίητον τῶν πατέρων διεφύλαξαν τὴν παράδοσιν κατά τε χώραν καὶ πόλιν, ταύτῃ κέχρηνται τῇ φωνῇ. Basil. de Spirit. Sanct. cap. vii.

+[Suetonius, in Vit. Nero. cap. 16, calls the Christians, "a sort of men of a new and magical superstition." On this, Dr. Lardner, edit. 4to. Vol. III. p. 619, remarks that "in the word new,' undoubtedly there is a sting: for, as Tacitus says of the Jews, 'Whatever might be the origin of their religion, it has the advantage of Antiquity! Hi ritus, quoque modo inducti, antiquitate defenduntur.'-Hist. lib. v. cap. 5."]

"Consuetudo

["Antiquity without Truth, is a cypher without a figure." Lord BACON. sine veritate est vetustas erroris: Custom without Truth, is a mouldy error."-CYPRIAN.] § Ὁ μὲν μικρὸν τοῦ εὖ παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται. Arist. Ethic. lib. 2. c. 9. “ Modici nulla fere ratio haberi solet." Tiraquel. de jud. in reb. exig. cap. 10.

["The mortallest enemy unto knowledge, and that which hath done the greatest execution upon Truth, hath been a peremptory adhesion unto Authority; and, more especially, the establishing of our belief upon the dictates of Antiquity. For (as every capacity may observe) most men of ages present, so superstitiously do look on ages past, that the authorities of the one exceed the reasons of the other.... Nor is only a resolved prostration unto Antiquity a powerful enemy unto knowledge, but any confident adherence unto Authority,

The

third

sition.

T. C.

lib. iii. p. 181.

8. All things cannot be of ancient continuance, which are propo- expedient and needful for the ordering of spiritual affairs: but the Church, being a body which dieth not, hath always power, as occasion requireth, no less to ordain that which never was, than to ratify what hath been before. To prescribe the Order of doing in all things, is a peculiar prerogative which Wisdom hath,* as Queen or sovereign Commandress over other virtues. This in every several man's actions of common life appertaineth unto Moral; in public and politic secular affairs, unto Civil wisdom. In like manner, to devise any certain Form for the outward administration of public duties in the service of God, or things belonging thereunto, and to find out the most convenient for that use, is a point of wisdom Ecclesiastical. It is not for a man, which doth know or should know what Order is, and what peaceable government requireth, to ask, "Why we should hang our judgment upon the Church's sleeve;" and " Why in matters of Order, more than in matters of Doctrine." The Church hath authority to establish that for an Order at one time, which at another time it may abolish, and in both may do well. But that which in Doctrine the Church doth now deliver rightly as a truth, no man will say that it may hereafter recall, and as rightly avouch the contrary. Laws touching matter of Order are changeable by the power of the Church; Articles concerning Doctrine, not so. We read often in the writings of catholic and holy men, touching matters of Doctrine, This we believe, This we hold, This the Prophets and Evangelists have declared, This the Apostles have delivered, This Martyrs have sealed with their blood, and confessed in the midst of torments; To this we cleave, as to the anchor of our souls; Against this, though an Angel from Heaven should preach unto us, we would not believe. But did we ever in any of them read, touching matters of mere comeliness, order, and decency, neither commanded nor prohibited by any Prophet, any Evangelist, any Apostle, Although the Church wherein we live do ordain them to be kept, Although they be never so generally observed, Though all the Churches in the world should command

or resignation of our judgments upon the testimony of age or author whatsoever."-Pseudodoxia Epidemeca, or Enquiries into many received Tenets, and commonly preserved Truths; &c. By T. BROWN, M. D. 1659. Fo. Book I. chap. vi. p. 15, and chap. vii. p. 18.] * Ἡ μὲν φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ποιητέα ὅρους αὐτοῖς τιθεῖσα. Philo. p. 35.

iv. 9.

mael

Patr.

them, Though Angels from Heaven should require our subjection thereunto, I would hold him accursed that doth obey? Be it in matter of the one kind or of the other, what Scripture doth plainly deliver, to that the first place both of credit and obedience is due; the next whereunto is, whatsoever any man can necessarily conclude by force of Reason; after these, the voice of the Church succeedeth. That which the Church by her Ecclesiastical authority shall probably think and define to be true or good, must in congruity of Reason over-rule all other inferior judgments whatsoever. To them which ask, why we thus hang our judgment on the Church's sleeve, I answer with Solomon, because "two are Eccles. better than one." "Yea simply (saith Basil) and universally, whether it be in works of Nature, or of voluntary choice and counsel, I see not any thing done as it should be, if it be wrought by an agent singling itself from consorts."* The Jews have a sentence of good advice, "Take not R. Isupon thee to be a judge alone; there is no sole judge but in cap. one only; say not to others, Receive my sentence, when their authority is above thine." The bare consent of the whole Church should itself in these things stop their mouths, who living under it, dare presume to bark against it. "There Cassian. is (saith Cassianus) no place of audience left for them, by whom obedience is not yielded to that which all have agreed c. 6. upon." Might we not think it more than wonderful, that Nature should in all communities appoint a predominant judgment to sway and over-rule in so many things; or that God himself should allow so much authority and power unto every poor family for the ordering of all which are in it; and the City of the living God, which is his Church, be able neither to command, nor yet to forbid any thing which the meanest shall in that respect, and for her sole authority's sake, be bound to obey? We cannot hide or dissemble that evil, the grievous inconvenience whereof we feel. Our dislike of them, by whom too much heretofore hath been attributed unto the Church, is grown to an error on the contrary hand; so that now from the Church of God too much is derogated. By which removal of one extremity with another, the world, seeking to procure a remedy, hath purchased a mere exchange of the evil which before was felt. Suppose we, that the sacred Word of God can at

de Incarn.

lib. i.

Basil. Ep. 68. d. 8. c. Quæ contra. "Turpis est omnis pars universo suo non congruens."

The

fourth propo sition.

their hands receive due honour, by whose incitement the holy Ordinances of the Church endure every where open contempt? No; it is not possible they should observe as they ought the one, who from the other withdraw unnecessarily their own or their brethren's obedience. Surely the Church of God in this business is neither of capacity, I trust, so weak; nor so unstrength'ned, I know, with authority from above; but that her Laws may exact obedience at the hands of her own children, and injoin gainsayers silence, giving them roundly to understand, That where our duty is submission, weak oppositions betoken pride. We therefore crave, thirdly, to have it granted, That where neither the evidence of any Law divine, nor the strength of any invincible argument otherwise found out by the light of Reason, nor any notable public inconvenience doth make against that which our own Laws Ecclesiastical have, although but newly instituted, for the ordering of these affairs,—the very authority of the Church itself, at the least in such cases, may give so much credit to her own Laws, as to make their sentence touching fitness and conveniency, weightier than any bare or naked conceit to the contrary; especially in them, who can owe no less than child-like obedience to her that hath more than motherly power.

9. There are ancient Ordinances (Laws which on all sides are allowed to be just and good, yea, Divine and Apostolic Constitutions) which the Church, it may be, doth not always keep, nor always justly deserve blame in that respect. For in evils that cannot be removed without the manifest danger of greater to succeed in their rooms, wisdom, of necessity, must give place to necessity. All it can do in those cases is, to devise how that which must be endured may be mitigated, and the inconveniences thereof countervailed as near as may be; that when the best things are not possible, the best may be made of those that are. Nature, than which there is nothing more constant, nothing more uniform in all her ways, doth notwithstanding stay her hand, yea, and change her course, when that which God by creation did command, he doth at any time Numb. by necessity countermand. It hath therefore pleased himself sometime to unloose the very tongues even of dumb creatures, and to teach them to plead this in their own defence, lest the cruelty of man should persist to afflict them for not

xxii. 28.