gan,1 Indiana,2 Illinois, Missouri, Mississippi, Iowa, Wis

to pay a certain sum, an action can be maintained against the boat for this. Boyd v. Steamboat Falcon, 1 Handy, 362. In Lewis v. Schooner Cleveland, 12 Ohio, 341, the statute was held to apply to the recovery of seamen's wages. See also, gen erally, Wayne v. Steamboat Gen. Pike, 16 Ohio, 421; Steamboat Albatross v. Wayne, 16 Ohio, 513; Schooner Argyle v. Worthington, 17 Ohio, 460.

1 The first statute in Michigan, relative to this subject, was passed in 1839 (Sess. L. 1839, p. 70). This was repealed in 1846, (R. S. ch. 122.). Under the statute of 1839, it is held that there is no lien until the vessel is attached. Robinson v. Steamboat Red Jacket, 1 Mich. 171; Moses v. Steamboat Missouri, 1 Mich. 507. In declaring upon a bond executed under § 13, ch. 122, R. S., it is not necessary to aver that the plaintiff made the application in writing in the manner and form required by sections two and three of said chapter. Nor is it necessary to aver that the vessel released upon the execution of the bond was, at the time of its seizure, within the jurisdiction of the court. Truesdale v. Hazzard, 2 Mich. 344. See also, Ward v. Willson, 3 Mich. 1. Where a vessel was attached at the instance of a creditor, and notice to creditors to produce their claims published three months, and before any order of sale, the owner of the vessel procured her discharge by giving the bond provided by statute, it was held that creditors, who failed to file their demands with the proper officer within three months after the first publication of notice, lost the benefit of the lien given them by statute. Watkins v. Atkinson, 2 Mich. 151.

2 Indiana Stat. 1838. Under this statute it has been held, that, where there are several liens on a boat, and the boat is sold on a judgment in a suit under the statute for one of the claims, the purchaser takes the boat discharged of the rest. Steamboat Rover v. Stiles, 5 Blackf. 483. See also Southwick v. Packet Boat Clyde, 6 Blackf.

148.

* Rev. Stat. 1845, p. 71, ed. 1856, p. 107. It has been held, that, to enable the owner or consignee of a vessel to take an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace, he must make himself a party defendant to the suit before the justice. Sch. Constitution v. Woodworth, 1 Scam. 511. The master cannot proceed against the vessel in rem for his wages. Chauncey v. Jackson, 4 Gilman, 435. And in Germain . Steam Tug Indiana, 11 Ill. 535, it was decided that the lien attaches the moment the liability is incurred, but it cannot be asserted to the prejudice of creditors or purchasers, unless the remedy be pursued within three months; but a party is not bound to enforce his lien till that period has elapsed, and when once acquired it remains in force, unaffected by any proceeding to enforce subsequent liens. And the sale of a vessel under a judgment on an attachment obtained by a seaman or material man does not divest any liens of a superior degree, nor any antecedent liens of the same degree. An attachment will not lie for towing a canal boat. Merriman v. Canal Boat Col. Butts, 15 Ill. 585.

4 Missouri R. C. 1845. The action must be commenced within six months after the action has accrued, and in the county where the boat may be found at the time. If the boat does not come within the jurisdiction till after that time, the lien will be gone.

5 Acts of 1840, 1841, Hutch. Dig. 288, art. 6; id. 290, art. 8. See Steamboat General Worth v. Hopkins, 30 Miss. 703.

6 Rev. Stat. 101; Code, ch. 120. See Steamboat Kentucky v. Brooks, 1 Greene, 398; Ham v. Steamboat Hamburg, 2 Clarke, 460; West v. Barge Lady Franklin, 2 Clarke, 522.

consin,1 California.2 But in these States, it seems that actions

Williamson v. Steamboat Missouri, 17 Mo. 374. Process cannot issue until a bond is filed. Steamboat Archer v. Goldstein, 13 Mo. 24. The attachment is dissolved by giving a bond, and after this the court cannot order the boat to be sold. St. Louis Perpet. Ins. Co. v. Ford, 11 Mo. 295. On an open running account, the lien continues for six months from date of last item. Carson v. Steamboat Daniel Hillman, 16 Mo. 256. But where the articles are furnished under a special contract, and delivered on different days, the lien attaches upon the delivery of the first. In computing the time within which the suit should be commenced, the day on which the delivery is completed should be excluded. Steamboat Mary Blane v. Beehler, 12 Mo. 477. It is provided by statute, that when a constable attaches goods or property he shall take possession, if they are accessible, and if not, he shall declare to the party in possession that he attaches the same in his hands, and summon such person as garnishee. It has been held, that the return of a constable on a warrant against a steamboat that he executed it by going on board the boat, and by reading the same to the clerk, finding the sheriff in charge, is sufficient to give the justice issuing the warrant jurisdiction to hear and determine the case against the boat. Steamboat Eureka v. Noel, 14 Mo. 513; Parkinson v. Steamboat Robert Fulton, 15 Mo. 258. A boat cannot be sold under an execution issued by a justice of the peace. Markham v. Dozier, 12 Mo. 288. In a suit against a boat before a justice, a judgment by default against the boat being rendered, and a motion to set aside the same being overruled, an appeal will lie. Hore v. Steamboat Belle of Attakapas, 11 Mo. 107. One of several part-owners can sue, under the statute, in the name of the boat. Steamboat Beardstown v. Goodrich, 16 Mo. 153. But he must give notice to all the others of his intention to sue, twenty days before the commencement of the action. Langstaff v. Rock, 13 Mo. 579. Whether a part-owner be mortgagee, or his right be absolute, he cannot acquire a lien on the boat for services rendered while he was owner. Nor can he sue the other part-owners without giving them the notice required by law, and he must show affirmatively that he gave them such notice. Steamboat Raritan v. McCloy, 10 Mo. 534. The St. Louis Court of Common Pleas has jurisdiction of actions of trespass against boats. Holloway v. Steamboat Western Belle, 11 Mo. 147. Under the statute an interpleader cannot be entertained. Garrison v. McAllister, 13 Mo. 579. The statute provides that the demand must be for services rendered on board the boat. It is sufficient if the demand be for services rendered as fireman, Jones v. Steamboat Morrisett, 21 Mo. 142, or as deck-hand, Williams v. Steamboat Morrisett, 21 Mo. 144. An action will lie against the boat by name for the non-performance of a contract made by her master, upon a trip up the river, for the transportation of freight upon the return trip. Taylor v. Steamboat Robert Campbell, 20 Mo. 254. A boat is not responsible for a breach of a contract of affreightment made by a person in possession as tres*passer. Steamboat Madison v. Wells, 14 Mo. 360; Bates v. Steamboat Madison, 18 Mo. 99. But persons furnishing supplies are not bound to inquire whether the master or agent who has the actual possession of a vessel is legally entitled to such possession, in order to secure a lien. Steamboat Lehigh v. Knox, 12 Mo. 508. There is no lien upon a steamboat for the use of a private wharf boat. Bersie v. The Steamboat Shenan

1 Wisconsin, Rev. Stat. 116. See Rand v. The Barge, 4 Chand. 68.

2 Laws of California, First Sess. p. 189, ch. 75, § 2; Compiled Laws of 1853, p. 576, ch. 6, § 318.

of this sort will not be sustained under their statutes, if the cause of action arose out of the States.1

doah, 21 Mo. 18. The statute divides debts into four classes. Each class is to be preferred according to its number, the highest number being the last class. But a judicial sale of a boat under the State law to satisfy a lien of one class, conveys to the purchaser a title free from the liens of every other class, superior or inferior. Steamboat Raritan v. Smith, 10 Mo. 527. So, of a sale under a similar law of another State. Finney v. Steamboat Fayette, 10 Mo. 612. But a sale in another State, which has no such law, does not divest the lien. Steamboat Sea-Bird v. Beehler, 12 Mo. 569. An action does not lie against a boat for damages sustained by a deck hand in being forced on shore by the master in breach of the contract of hiring. Blass v. Steamboat Robert Campbell, 16 Mo. 266. If the affidavit to a complaint against a boat is made by the plaintiff's agent, it must show his means of knowing the truth of the particulars specified in the complaint. Bridgeford v. Steamboat Elk, 6 Mo. 356; Hamilton v. Steamboat Ironton, 19 Mo. 523. And it must appear from the demand filed that the claim gives a lien. Luft v. Steamboat Envoy, 19 Mo. 476. The return of the officer to the writ must state that he seized the boat, but it need not state that he retains it in his custody. Blaisdel v. Steamboat Wm. Pope, 19 Mo. 157. Where a boat is seized and a bond given under the 9th section of the act, the lien is discharged, and the party cannot, after the boat has been sold, present his demand for allowance against the proceeds. Auvray v. Steamboat Pawnee, 19 Mo. 537. Unless the boat is bonded within five days after seizure, it is the duty of the officer to apply for an order of sale, and he has no authority to hold her without bond, subject to final process in the suit. Blaisdell v. Steam Ferry Boat Wm. Pope, 19 Mo. 538. For other decisions under the statute, based upon general rules, see Ready v. Steamboat Highland Mary, 17 Mo. 461, 20 Mo. 264; Whitmore v. Steamboat Caroline, 20 Mo. 513; Chouteau v. Steamboat St. Anthony, 16 Mo. 216, 20 Mo. 519; Dean v. Ritter, 18 Mo. 182; Porter v. Steamboat New England, 17 Mo. 290; Darby v. Steamboat Inda, 9 Mo. 645; Barge Resort v. Brooke, 10 Mo. 531; Jarbee v. Steamboat Daniel Hillman, 19 Mo. 141; Renshaw v. Steamboat Pawnee, 19 Mo. 532; Ritter v. Steamboat Jamestown, 23 Mo.

348.

1 Ohio

Steamboat Champion v. Jantzen, 16 Ohio, 91; Goodsill v. Brig St. Louis, 16 Ohio, 178; Missouri- Steamboat Raritan v. Pollard, 10 Mo. 583; Steamboat Time v. Parmlee, 10 Mo. 586; Noble v. Steamboat St. Anthony, 12 Mo. 261 ; Twitchell v. Steamboat Missouri, 12 Mo. 412; Fisk v. Steamboat Forest City, 18 Mo. 587; James v. Steamboat Pawnee, 19 Mo. 517. In Swearington v. Steamboat Lynx, 13 Mo. 519, it was held that the Mississippi River, from the northern to the southern boundary of the State of Missouri, is one of the waters of the State referred to in the statute, and that the Missouri courts have jurisdiction over a tort committed on the river, though it be on the Illinois side. In Illinois, the statute has no extraterritorial jurisdiction. Frink v. King, 3 Scam. 144. So in Michigan. Bidwell v. Whitaker, 1 Mich. 469; Turner v. Lewis, 2 Mich. 350. And in Iowa, Steamboat Kentucky v. Brooks, 1 Greene, 398. The law is the same in Kentucky. Strother v. Lovejoy, 8 B. Mon. 135. In Ohio, in 1848, a supplementary act was passed, declaring that a wrong construction had been placed upon the statute by the court, and declaring that the courts should have jurisdiction in suits then pending as well as in future suits, notwithstanding the boat was out of the jurisdiction of the State at the time the tort was committed or the supplies furnished. The court, however, in a subsequent case, held that this act, so far as it provided for cases then pending, was unconstitutional and void, VOL. I. 10

It should be added, as a general remark, that part-owners of a ship are bound to deal fairly by each other, and that each, in the exercise of his own powers, must respect the rights of all the rest. This would flow from the principles of justice and morality; but it would seem that public policy comes in aid of these principles, in relation to a property, of which the proper use and management are so important to the public. Hence, in one interesting case, where some part-owners in a valuable ship sold their shares by an indenture between them and the purchaser, which contained covenants, that, in the opinion of the court, tended to control the appointment of persons to be employed in the management and navigation of the ship, it was held that such a contract violated the rights of the other owners, and also principles of public policy; and that the deed of transfer was therefore void.1

because those cases arose under a statute, which it was the province of the court, and not of the legislature, to interpret. The Sch. Aurora Borealis v. Dobbie, 17 Ohio, 125. For a learned exposition of the various provisions and objects of the statutes of the different States upon this subject, see Merrick v. Avery, 14 Arkans. 370.

1 Card v. Hope, 2 B. & C. 661.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE LIABILITIES OF OWNERS GENERALLY.

An owner of a ship, in possession of her, and having both the legal and equitable title, is liable for all supplies furnished and all repairs made to her, and all work and service rendered for her benefit, by order of the master, and in general, for all the contracts made by him for the benefit of the vessel; because, from the necessity of the case, the master is invested with a very wide authority to do and provide whatever is requisite for his ship. An owner who should resist any claim of this kind would probably be held to prove not only that the supplies or the work rendered was of no use or benefit to the ship or to him, but that it was so obviously useless that the furnisher could not have supposed the master authorized to obtain it. Cases of this kind often occur; but those which depend upon the question, how far and when a quasi owner is liable in the same way as an actual owner, or in the stead of the actual owner, are more numerous and important.2

1 See ante, p. 87, note 1, and post, chapter on Powers and Duties of Master.

2 Under what circumstances, and in what cases, the charterer will be considered to be the owner pro hac vice, we shall consider in our chapter on charter-parties. The question in every case is, whose agent is the party ordering repairs. If of the general owners, they are liable; but if not, the charterer alone can be looked to. Thus in Frazer v. Marsh, 13 East, 238, the repairs were ordered by the captain, who was also the charterer. It was held, that the general owner was not liable. Le Blanc, J., says: "An owner would have the appointment of the captain; but the defendant had no right to appoint the captain under the charter-party." And in Reeve v. Davis, 1 A. & E. 312, where a steam vessel was let by charter-party, the registered owners agreeing to keep the engine in order, but the charterer was to pay for all other repairs, it was held, that repairs ordered by the charterer, who was also the captain, except those necessary for the engines, could not be charged to the general owner, although the person making the repairs was unacquainted with the special agreement between the parties. Lord Denman, C. J., says: "The question is, Who were the contracting parties? The mere circumstance of ownership may be sufficient to create a liability where the vessel has been left under the control of a party who has given orders, if no intervening ownership has been created. But if a ship is let out to hire, I do not see how