reasonably is such a thing as independent matter, supposed to be of itself, limited to one spot of immense space! For let the universe be supposed finite, though ever so vast, it must yet be conceived but as a minute spot, to the infinite unbounded vacuity that lies without it; and which yet he seems to acknowledge replenished with the Divine Being. Now let a man set himself to consider, and try how easy it will be to his thoughts to conceive one little portion of boundless space, taken up with a mean being, next to nothing, that is of itself there, and cannot but be there, and no where else, imposed upon the infinitely perfect Being; the all-wise and almighty God, who fills up all space unavoidably and from all eternity, so that he could not, if he thought it a cumber, disencumber or rid himself of it; and rather seemed of necessity, than of choice, to have made a world of it, as not knowing else what to do with it; with which imagination also the youth of the world so ill agrees, for why then was it so lately

made?

verse is made: it is already taken up, and pre-engaged therein, and it is limited thereto. Therefore the matter is yet to be created, of which the other worlds are to be made: and it can be so, otherwise no more worlds can be made: and thereupon the great God is, not without blasphemy, said to have gone to the utmost of his power, to have done in this kind all that he can. And this must be said, by this author, in express contradiction to the truth of the thing, to the most common and agreed idea or notion of the Divine Being; and now, most apparently, to himself. And therefore his high rant against Spinosa,b (in this point more orthodox than himself,) That he confounds in his philosophy being and perfection, Pretendant que, ce qui est, et ne renferme aucune negation d'etre, est une perfection, &c.—Pretending that whatsoever is, and includes not in its notion any negation of being, is a perfection, &c. i3 vain, and as much without cause, as what he afterwards says about it is without sense. For he adds, That for his part he finds nothing more false or extravagant; and why (5.) But it further seems very evident, and more fully so? Because then pain and sorrow must be reckoned evidential of the absurdity of this conceit, that if there among perfections, and such real perfections as are worthy were such matter, the world could never have been made of God, or a Being infinitely perfect. And upon this, he of it. For how great alterations must such rude, undi- triumphs over such men, as supplanters of the Deity, ingested, unformed matter have undergone, in forming of stead of defenders of so great a Being, and as having lost such a world as this? But what greater inconsistency can their senses and their reason, &c. But if he had not lost we imagine, than that what exists necessarily, or of itself, his own, and abandoned himself to that fury and rage of should be alterable? What is of itself what it is, must be insolence which he there imputes to his opposers, he might eternally and without change what it is. So absurd, as have been capable of so much calm and sober considerawell as profane, it will be to ascribe to dull and senseless tion, as to have bethought himself, that among creatures, matter, or to any thing else, so peculiar and appropriate an a sense of pain, real grief and sorrow, correspondent to attribute and name as that of the Deity, I am that I am. their present, true causes, import more perfection, than For, hereupon, such matter were not only supposed vainly stupidity, insensibleness, and apathy; and if so, though and to no purpose, being never possible to be the matter pain and grief cannot formally agree to the most perfect of the world, but destructively, and against the very pur-being of God, to whom their causes cannot agree, that the pose that should be served by it. For such matter being life and percipiency do eminently agree to him, by which supposed to occupy the space of the formed world, must he can apprehend an injury, though not a real hurt, (which exclude thence any other matter of which it could be he can therefore only not apprehend, not because the performed; and make it, consequently, impossible there ceptive principle is wanting, but the object,) and by the should ever have been any such world as this, where the power of imparting whereof, he is able to make a creature supposition itself makes it be. This see discoursed more capable of pain and grief, where the objects shall (as they at large, Part I. Chap. 2. may deservedly) occur, and meet the perceptive principle; and that the power of making such a creature, is a greater perfection than an impotency of doing it. Which perfection therefore, he could not, consistently with himself, deny to God, having acknowledged him a Being infinitely perfect, or comprehensive of all perfection. Nor,

(6.) And whereas his great reason for such self-originate, independent matter, viz. the imagined impossibility of creation, or that any thing can be produced out of nothing, (which so far as is needful, we partly have and further shall consider, in its proper place,) doth as much oppose the creation of any spiritual being, as material. If all that hath been said in the former part of this discourse, and by many authors besides, do sufficiently prove there are such spiritual or immaterial beings that are created, or are not of themselves; and that, of the property of thought, which is found belonging to them, matter is not capable, (which I shall think to have been done till I see the contrary evinced,) we must judge him very absurdly to have asserted such self-originate, independent matter. And as he hath asserted it very inconsistently with the truth of the thing; so,

VI. 2. It will appear he hath done it as little consistently with himself. For,

(1.) He acknowledges God to be L'etre infiniment parfait, tout puissant, et le principe de toute perfection-a Being infinitely perfect, almighty, and the principle of all perfection. Now how is he infinitely perfect, if his being include not all perfection? How is he almighty, if he cannot create? How is he the fountain or principle of all perfection, if the perfection of matter (which, as hath been said, though he make it essentially imperfect, must have some perfection belonging to it, since it is not mere nothing) be not eminently comprehended in his being?

Besides that here acknowledging God to be omnipotent, and having denied the necessary, eternal, independent matter, which he imagines to be infinite, but limited and confined to the created universe only; I would hereupon demand of him, Cannot the blessed God, if he please, create many worlds? If he say, No, then how is he omnipotent?-If Yea, of what matter must they be made? Not of his (imagined) necessary, independent matter, for of that really none could: but according to him the present uni

C

(2.) Doth he assert necessary increate matter, consistently with his own reasonings for the possibility of a vacuum, where he takes it for granted, that God can aneantir une petite partie de la matiere, &c.—annihilate some small particle of matter, one stone, for example, or one grain of sand. Which how ridiculously is it supposed, by one who supposes such matter necessarily self-existent! For who sees not that necessity of existence, and impossibility of non-existence, do infer one another, or signify rather the same thing. Therefore, no man, except Spinosa, could be at once more daring and more unhappy than this author. And as it hath thus appeared, that he hath asserted such self-originate, independent matter, very inconsistently both with the truth of the thing and himself; so,

VII. Secondly, It will also appear he hath done it very unnecessarily; and particularly, without that necessity which he pretends of answering Spinosa. For there is no necessity of it so much as pretended, upon any account besides that of the common maxim, that nothing can come out of nothing; the sense whereof must first be inquired before it can be understood, how far it will serve his purpose, or infer the necessity of independent matter. The sense of it must either be this-That a being could never arise out of no-being, of itself, without a pre-existent, creative cause; which is most evidently true, but as evidently not to his purpose: or this-That what once was not, could never be produced into being by a pre-existent, omnipotent Cause: which were to his purpose, but is evidently, and by apparent self-contradiction, untrue.d And what can make it have so much as the least semblance of truth? Either the authority of the maxim, or some plausible reason. For its authority; though that

d of this see at large Dr. Cudworth's Intellectual System.

which he claims to it of the ancient philosophers were little considerable, if ever so truly claimed, we have no ground to think it otherwise claimed than most untruly. Its authority, as he represents it, depends upon a worse authority. He is so modest as to expect it to be believed, upon his bare word, that this was the opinion of all the ancient philosophers before Christ's time; while yet he thinks not fit to tell us his name. But if their reasonings from it be considered, that generations are out of matter, and corruptions are into matter, we have no cause to apprehend they understood it otherwise than that natural agents did neither create nor annihilate any thing. Besides that, there is positive ground enough to conclude, that the more instructed and wiser pagans, long before Christ's time, did believe all things to have sprang from one intelligent, self-subsisting original, matter itself not being excepted. As, with the Egyptians, the inscription of the temple at Sais shows, "I am all that is, or was, or shall be," &c. and with the Grecians, their worshipping God, under the name of Pan: which could mean no other thing, than that they thought the Deity to comprehend eminently or virtually all beings besides, in its creative or productive power. And we have reason to think that pagan philosophers since Christ, such as Hierocles, Jamblichus, Porphyry, Plotinus, &c. who (as others have observed) were manifestly of this sentiment, understood the minds of the more ancient philosophers as well as this Monsieur; nor do they pretend to contradict them herein.

And for the reason of the thing itself, he hath not the least appearance of any on his part, but that, because the finite power of a creature cannot bring a thing out of nothing, therefore omnipotency cannot; which is so far from concluding for him, that (as hath been intimated) it manifestly contradicts itself, and concludes the contrary. For how is that omnipotency, which cannot do every thing that implies not a contradiction? And how is that a contradiction, that what once was not, should afterwards come to be there being no objective impossibility or intrinsic repugnancy in the thing itself to exist, but that it were truly ens possible; (and we are out of doubt concerning matter for instance, or whatsoever else we are sure doth exist, that it could exist;) and supposing also that there be a sufficient, causative power, to make it exist, or produce it into being and what cause can be more sufficient than an omnipotent one, such as our author confesses God to be? Nor doth he deny that there are intelligent spirits, that were not of themselves; only he would have us think them but finer matter, impressed with intellectual power. But what akin is a mind to matter, except his own? And supposing a mind or intellect be stamped upon matter, it is then but added to it, not drawn out of it, as if matter had before contained it. And even thus, since mind or intellect is not nothing, (unless he will say, himself differs by nothing from unthinking clay,) we have something out of nothing. And who can think it more impossible to Omnipotency, to create matter, than a mind?

tion than he intended, so he will attribute less to God.
For he will, at this rate, attribute no more to him, than
hath been generally ascribed to ordinary natural agents;
i.e. to produce into actual being, out of matter, that whereto
there was in it some seminal disposition before.
And here, indeed, is the source of his error, his reducing
infinite power to the measures of finite; an insolent pre-
suming to circumscribe Omnipotency, and making that
simply impossible even to Almightiness itself, which is
only so to created agents. And to this purpose, I find
some reasonings in Sextus Empiricus, who tells us how
the sceptics attempted to prove (besides their disputing
against the other three sorts of causation) that dowparov
an incorporeal thing, cannot be airiov oparos-the cause of
any thing corporeal; arguing (and slightly enough) from
the common methods of subordinate agents, to the opera-
tions of the Supreme Cause. Nor is it apprehensible, how
one can find a medium; or while they make matter in-
dependent, how not to make God dependent.
And when the Monsieur we are concerned with took a
friendly notice of Hermogenes's consent with him upon
this subject, he might as well have been at the pains to
consider somewhat of what Tertullian wrote anainst him,
that hereby, in some respect, God is made inferior and
subject to matter, when without it he could not have made a
world. Materia superior invenitur, quæ illi copiam ope-
randi subministravit, et Deus subjectus materia videtur,
cujus substantiæ eguit; nemo non subjicitur ei cujus eget,
fc.-Every one is subject to what he stands in need of.

CHAPTER III.

The reason of what next follows. Directions to readers not wont to inquire into the grounds of their religion. A summary and plainer proposal unto such, of what hath been said in the former Part, concerning God's existence and conversableness with men. The reasonableness (so much being already evinced) of alleging, and relying upon the testimony of the Holy Scriptures. The expressness of that testimony concerning the unity of the Godhead, the trinity therein. The absolute perfection of the Divine Nature. The infiniteness of God's knowledge, power, goodness, and presence. His propensions towards men, and aptness (supposing there were no obstruction) to human converse. Matters of doubt herein resolved.

I. AND having thus far established and vindicated so principal a ground-work in this important cause,―That what is necessarily, or of itself, is an absolutely perfect Being, distinct from all things else; and a proper Object of religion, or whereto a temple, and all the worship thereof, duly belong, I shall now only suffer myself to be a little further diverted from my intended course, apprehending that their case is also to be considered, who have been less accustomed to this course, of reasoning out to themselves the principles of their religion: unto whom therefore what hath been hitherto attempted may seem, if not obscure in its parts, yet so tiresome in the whole, as not to meet with patience enough to trace the design that hath been driven on, to its issue and period; it being very incident to unexercised and less attentive readers, to lose their thread, and forget the scope of a discourse, and so still have the truth to seek even in the midst of it. And if what hath been hitherto said, prove unsatisfying to any, that justice must be done to the cause itself and to them, as to avow it must rather proceed either from this infirmity in the reader, or from the unskilfulness of the writer to propound things happily and to advantage; than either from the inevidence of the things themselves, or from want of capacity, even in an ordinary understanding. Nor Or if he think matter, as such, to have only seminal doth any undertaking seem more feasible, or less to be reason or intellect in it, antecedently to his supposed di- despaired of, than plainly and satisfyingly to evince, to an vine impress upon it, how will that agree with his making unprejudiced understanding that shall attend, these first it essentiellement imparfait,—essentially imperfect? Or foundations of a religion and a temple, viz. That God is; what means his added capable neanmoins, its being never-and-That he is conversable with men, or is such as is theless capable of all such perfections by the impression of God upon it? Is that capacity something, or nothing? Or what sense is it to make it capable of having those perfections, which it is essential to it not to have? And surely, as he will attribute to matter more perfec

But if he reckon thought, or intellect, is contained in matter, or included in the notion of it, then matter, as such, must be intelligent, and consequently all matter; and this will be absurdity enough, to give him as good a title to the privilege of not being reasoned against, as, from his magisterial way of writing, we may count Spinosa thought himself to have. Nor indeed will it leave any man so much as a conjecture at the reason why he should pretend to differ from him. For who can imagine, why his matter, endued with the attributes of extension and thought, might not do as well as Spinosa's substance?

e Preface.

capable and apt to receive worship from men, and impart blessedness to them. We shall therefore so far interrupt the current of this discourse, as to endeavour this, by giving a brief and plain sum of the more principal things that have been said to this purpose already. And to pre

f Tertull. contra Hermog.

P

pare for it, must desire you that have not been, as yet, | easy steps in a way that is in some part sufficiently beaten, wont to employ your minds this way, to observe the fol- however, that is sufficiently plain, and it is to be hoped lowing directions: you will soon see that matter put out of all doubt. Let First, That you would not give place to discourage-this then be your first step: ment, nor think too meanly of the understanding whereby 1. That somewhat or other there is, that hath been from God hath distinguished you from the inferior creatures. all eternity necessarily and of itself, without dependence There is that mind and spirit in man, which doth compass upon any thing else. If this be not at the first view evimany things of far greater difficulty than it is here to be dent to you, or if it seem too large a step, we will divide employed about; though it can be exercised about nothing it into parts; and consider well what is said for the proof of so great consequence. That apprehensive power that of it, by these degrees. can take in the orderly frame of such notions as are requi- (1.) Somewhat or other must ever have been; for othersite to the exact skill of numbering or of measuring things, wise, how could any thing come to be at all? Do you of navigation, of trade, of managing the common affairs of think it was possible, if ever there was nothing at all in human life; that can lay down to itself such prudent being, of one sort or other, that any thing should have maxims and rules whereby the inconveniences may in come into being? No surely, for which way should it be? great part be avoided which are incident to common con- It could not be made by another, there being no other to versation, and the advantages gained which may serve make it; and it could not make itself, itself being as yet one's own private and secular interests; that understand-nothing. But sure you can easily apprehend, that to make ing which can do all this, would far more easily compre- a thing be, is to do something; and as easily, that what is hend as much as is needful to the certain knowledge of nothing, can do nothing. Therefore, when your eyes tell God's existence, and that he is such as we ought to wor-you that something now is, you may be as sure, as of what ship, and may enjoy, if it apply itself hereto. Do not so despair as not to make an attempt; you know not the strength of your own mind till you have tried it.

Secondly, That you indulge not, or do not suffer yourselves to be insensibly seized by, a mean and sordid sloth. Set your thoughts a-work with vigorous diligence. Give not out before you have well begun. Resolve, since you have a thinking power about you, you will use it to this most necessary purpose; and hold your thoughts to it. See that your minds do not presently tire and flag; that you be rationally peremptory, and soberly obstinate, in this pursuit: yield not to be diverted. Disdain, having minds that can reach up to the great Original and Author of all things, that they should be confined to this dirty earth, or only to things low and mean.

you see with your eyes, that somewhat or other hath ever been. Say with yourself, Somewhat now is, therefore somewhat hath ever been. If you discern not the clearness of this consequence, take the opposite to it: Nothing now is, therefore nothing will ever be; it is as broad as long.

:

(2.) You may next proceed thus, that something or other hath been of itself; that is, without depending upon any thing else, or being beholden to any other thing for its being. Now here pause awhile, and consider what is said to make this plain to you. Either you must acknowledge something hath ever been of itself, or you must say that all things that are, or ever have been, were from another, without any exception. But mark now, if you say that all things that are, or ever have been, without excepting any, were from another, you contradict yourself; for Thirdly, Look on the things that are rationally evident besides all things that are, or ever have been, without exto your understandings, as equally certain with what you cepting any, there is not another from whom they could see with your eyes. Are you not as sure that two and be. Therefore it is impossible that all things without extwo make four (which judgment is the act of your mind) ception should have been from another; whence then it is as that this thing which you look upon is black or white, plain that something must have been of itself, without deor of this or that shape or figure? Do not so debase your pending for its being upon any thing else for it will come own understandings, as to think nothing certain that comes to the same contradiction, if you say all things depend under their judgment. It is true, they are apt enough to upon some other; since there is nothing beyond all things: be deceived in many things, and so is your sense too; but therefore, to say that all things depend, is to say they deif your sense could make you certain of nothing, what pend on nothing, that is, they do not depend. And to would become of justice and government among men? say they have all depended on one another for their being, Who could take an oath before a magistrate? What or made one another, is altogether as absurd; for it will would become of the common actions and affairs of life? make the whole compass or circle of all being to depend How could you eat or drink, or buy or sell, if you could upon nothing, or come at length to this, that some one not certainly distinguish one thing from another? Some made itself, or even (which is more gross) made its own things are so plain as that you can be in no doubt about maker; unless you will rest in some one that made all the them, as that this is bread, not a stone; that a horse, not other, and was itself not made by any of them. If you a sheep; otherwise all the world must stand still, and all do not apprehend this yourself, desire any one that hath a commerce and action cease. And if there were not some better understanding to explain it to you, and you will things sure to your minds, that you may certainly say, in soon see the matter intended by it to be as evident as your some plain cases at least, this is true and that false, this heart can wish. And so this will be out of question with right and that wrong, you would be at as great a loss. you-That somewhat was of itself; which added to what Otherwise, you might be apt to think a part of a thing was proved before, comes to this-That somewhat was greater than the whole, or that the same man might be at ever of itself. And both these thus conjoined, plainly apLondon and at Rome at the same time; and you might pear from what hath been said. For we have seen that be as ready to kill your own father as to do him rever-nothing could possibly make itself, (which would absurdly ence, or to commit robbery upon your rich neighbour as relieve the poor, and judge the one as good an action as the other.

imply, that before, it both was and was not,) and therefore, whatsoever was of itself, must ever have been, or never had beginning of being. So much, then, I suppose you take to be most certain, that something hath ever been of itself. Whereupon you may further add,

Fourthly, As any particular thing is offered to you, for the purpose we are here aiming at, consider it well by itself, before you go further; and think thus, Is this plain (3.) That what was ever of itself, was necessarily. I and certain, yea or no? If at the first sight you think it hope you understand what is meant by being necessarily, not so, observe diligently what is brought for the proof of that is, being so as that it could not possibly but be. You it, and see whether now it be not manifestly certain; and may perceive that some things are so as that it was possiwhen you once find it is, fix it in your mind as a certain-ble they might not have been, as a house, a town, a garty; say, Thus far I am sure. Let not your thoughts run back to this as a doubtful thing any more, or unravel their own work; but make use of it as a certainty, to your further purpose.

II. Being thus prepared, take this brief account of what hath before been discoursed more at large. And,

First, As to this first and great principle,-That there is a God. Be but patient of being led by the hand a few

ment, or whatsoever was made by such makers as might have chosen whether they would have made it, or no. Yea, or whatsoever is any way made to be, having before not been; for what once was not, it is manifest it was then possible for it not to be. But to be necessarily, is to be so as that it could never possibly but have been; that is, what is necessarily, is somewhat of so excellent a nature, as that it could never be out of being. Now what was

authority have they more than other writings, but as they are God's word? Therefore to expect or give assent to them as such, while yet it remains an undecided controversy, whether there be any such one, or no, for whose sake the assent should be given, were to expose our religion, not to prove it. These holy writings were not intended, by their affirmation of it, to inform us of God's existence, which they suppose, and do not prove, as a thing we may otherwise be certain of; but to teach us our duty towards him, and what our expectations may be from him; and do therefore give us a true representation and discovery of his nature, (so far as it was needful for us preparatively first to know it,) and then next, of the present state of things between him and us, that we might be directed how to apply ourselves to him suitably to both the one and the other. It is true, that we can never know that there is a God, without knowing somewhat of his nature, or what a one he is. We cannot so much as inquire whether he be or no, but we must have some notion in our minds of the thing we inquire about; and so much as is necessary to this purpose, may be plainly gathered in the way we have gone hitherto. For if we understand the difference between something and nothing, between being and no being, and find that something is, or that there is some being; and again, if we understand the difference between a thing's being of itself, and being of or from another, and find the former must be the original of the | latter, we cannot but understand ourselves, when we say there is an Original Being. And having some understanding what is meant by power, wisdom, and goodness; withal finding that not only the effects of these, but these very things themselves, are in the world, we cannot but be sure (because these things come not of nothing) that the Original Being is powerful, wise, and good. And now when we have thus found out an Original Being, that is of wisdom, power, and goodness sufficient to be the Author of such a world as this, we at once know both what God is, (sufficiently to distinguish him from all things else,) and are at a certainty that he is.

|tion to receive, with all reverence and gratitude, this revelation, as from God; and to rely upon it, as a sure and sacred light sent down from heaven, to direct us in all our concernments God-ward. For finding our own great need of such additional light, and apprehending it sufficiently agreeable to the divine goodness to afford it, and expecting it to be such, in its scope and design, as we find it is: if we further consider it must have had some author, and perceiving it not easy, with any plausible pretence, to affix it to any other than to God himself: if we consider that it was impossible it could be invented by men, without some design of self-advantage, either in this world or in the other; and how absurd any such expectation must be, either from men here, (the contents thereof being so repugnant to the common inclinations of men, as to oblige those that owned them to the severest sufferings on that account,) or from God hereafter, who could not be expected to reward forgery, falsehood, and the usurpation of his name: if, again, we further observe the positive attestations whereby he hath challenged and owned it as his own, and wherein the divine power hath borne witness to the divine truth contained in it: if the matters of fact on which all depends appear not less certain than that there were men and nations in the world, that we have not seen, and before we were born; if we see it not only improbable, but even next to impossible, that the records of those miraculous attestations should have been forged, and nations imposed upon thereby; and amongst them, many of the wisest of men in those very times when the things recorded were alleged to have been done, and in a matter wherein their eternal hope was concerned; we shall upon the whole see cause to judge, That as it were most absurd to suppose such a revelation given by God, and no sufficient rational evidence withal given that it is from him, (without which it cannot serve its end, and so would signify nothing,) so that there is nothing wanting, in divine estimate itself, to make up such a sufficient, rational evidence; nor in our own, unless we would suppose it necessary that every man should have a Bible reached him down by an When we perceive that he hath given to all breath and immediate hand from heaven, or make some other suppo being and all things; we have sought, and even felt and sition as fond and vain as that; or that we count not that found him out, and found that he is not far from any one sufficient evidence, which ought to satisfy our reason, if it of us, since in him we live and move and have our being; do not gratify our fancy and curiosity too. It is not fit, that he is every where present, in this his creation, as the here, to say more of the divine original of those holy great Sustainer and the Life of the universe; and foras- writings, nor needful; so much being written already, much especially as we are his offspring, (as even the light with so great clearness, on that subject, by many. That of a heathen poet could reach to discover, a sort of intelli- therefore being out of question what you cannot reason out gent, designing, active beings,) that therefore the Godhead yourselves, or apprehend from the reasonings of others, is not like silver, or gold, &c., but of a nature more nearly concerning God's nature, tending to represent him worthy resembling that of our own souls, and the higher excel- of a temple with you, and capable of receiving and relences of the best of his creatures,although eminently con- warding your sincere and spiritual worship, fetch out taining in himself also all the real perfections, virtues, and from that divine volume; for you may be sure, though powers of all the rest. When we understand so much of you cannot search him out unto perfection, he perfectly God, (as we may by the light of our own reason,) we un-understands himself, and is certainly such, as he there derstand enough to give a foundation to religion, and to tells you he is: and he there reveals himself to be such, as let us see he ought to have a temple, and worship; and to whom the temple and worship we here intend, cannot another sort of temple than is made by men's hands, other be doubted (as he hath ordered things) to be both due and worship than can be performed by the hands of men; as grateful. Whatever might be otherwise matter of doubt, is there clearly argued, and inferred by the apostle, upon is, by his express discovery of himself, taken away. those plain grounds. Now when we are arrived thus far, it is seasonable to make use of the further help which we may observe the great, and wise, and good God to have most condescendingly, most aptly, and most mercifully afforded us, for our more distinct understanding of his nature, and our own state; and how we are to behave ourselves towards him thereupon.

IV. Taking notice therefore that there is a written revelation of him extant in the world, that bears his name, and gives itself out to be from him; if now we look into it, observe the import and design of it, compare it with what we before knew of his nature and our own; consider what is most obvious to an easy self-reflection in our own state and case, and how exactly this written revelation agrees and corresponds to those our former notices; taking in withal the many considerations that concur besides, to evidence to us the divine original and authority thereof: we cannot but have much rational inducement and obliga

a If we take notice that in some parts of this volume there are very ancient predictions, of the strongest and most unlikely events, that we see exactly fulfilled in the other parts.

V. If it were still a doubt, after all that hath been formerly said for the reasoning out of these things, whether the Deity be one only, or manifold; whether the world had but one, or had not many makers; and so, whether there be no danger of misapplying our religion, or of mistaking the object of our worship. This word plainly tells us, There is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things. 1 Cor. viii. 6. That he is God, and there is none else. Isa. xiv. 21, 22. And that however there be three that bear witness in heaven, and the stamp of whose name is, in our baptism, distinctly and solemnly put upon us; Matt. xxviii. 1 John v. yet (as in many other instances, that may be in some respect three, which in some other respect is but one) without the unnecessary, punctual declaration, how these are three, and how but one, it expressly tells us, these three are one.

And if it be yet a doubt with us (in which the reasonings of some may be too short to determine and resolve them)

b Dr. Stillingfleet, in his Origines Sacra, Grotius de Verit. Chr. Relig. Hvet Demonstr. Evangel. &c. Mr. Baxter's Reasons of Christian Religion. With many more.