had certainly pressed it to their service in this warfare, and not have endured, rather, the molestation of continual checks and rebukes from it. Nor need we yet to let our minds hang in suspense, or be in a dubious expectation, that possibly some or other great wit may arise, that shall perform some great thing in this matter, and discover the groundlessness and folly of religion, by plain and undeniable reasons that have not as yet been thought on; but betake ourselves to a stricter and closer consideration of our own grounds, which if we can once find to be certainly true, we may be sure they are of eternal truth, and no possible contrivance or device can ever make them false. VI. Having therefore seen what common consent may contribute to the establishing of them jointly; we may now apply ourselves to consider and search into each of them (so far as they are capable of a distinct consideration) severally and apart. Having still his mark in our eye, our own confirmation and excitation in reference to what is the proper work and business of a temple, religion and conversation with God: how little soever any endeavour in this kind may be apt to signify with the otherwise-minded. VII. And, first, for the existence of God; that we may regularly and with evidence make it out to ourselves, that he is, or doth exist, and may withal see what the belief of his existence will contribute towards the evincing of the reasonableness of erecting a temple to him. It is requisite that we first settle a true notion of him in our minds; or be at an agreement with ourselves, what it is that we mean, or would have to be signified by the name of God: otherwise we know not what we seek, nor when we have found him. that unless some very plain and ungainsayable demonstra- them to. By all which we have a sufficient measure of the persons from whom any opposition unto religion can be expected, and how much their authority, their example, or their scorn, ought to signify with us. And that a more valuable opposition can never be made, our experience, both that hitherto it hath not been, and that it would have been if it could, might render us tolerably secure. For surely it may well be supposed, that in a world so many ages lost in wickedness, all imaginable trials would have been made to disburthen it of religion; and somewhat that had been specious at least, to that purpose, had been hit upon, if the matter had been any ways possible. And the more wicked the world hath been, so directly contrary and so continually assaulted a principle, not yet vanquished, appears the more plainly invincible. And that the assaults have been from the lusts of men, rather than their reason, shows the more evidently, that their reason hath only wanted a ground to work upon, which if it could have been found, their lusts Du Pless. same subject and title. Calvin Instit. Episcopius his Instit. Theol who has written nervously on this subject; with many more: but espe cially Dr. Stillingfleet, in his Orig. Sacr. And though we must beforehand professedly avow, that we take him to be such a one as we can never comprehend in our thoughts; that this knowledge is too excellent for us, or he is more excellent than that we can perfectly know him; yet it will be sufficient to guide us in our search after his existence, if we can give such a description, or assign such certain characters of his being, as will severally or together distinguish him from all things else. For then we shall be able to call him by his own name, and say, This is God; whatever his being may contain more, or whatsoever other properties may belong to it, beyond what we can as yet compass in our present thoughts of him. VIII. And such an account we shall have of what we are inquiring after, if we have the conception in our minds of an eternal, uncaused, independent, necessary Being, that hath active power, life, wisdom, goodness, and whatsoever other supposable excellency, in the highest perfection Such a being we would with common consent express by the name of God. Even they that would profess to deny or doubt of his existence, yet must acknowledge this to be the notion of that which they deny or doubt of. Or if they should say this is not it, or (which is all one) that they do not deny or doubt of the existence of such a Being as this; they on the other hand that would argue for his existence, may conclude the cause is yielded them; this being that which they designed to contend for. It must indeed be acknowledged, that some things belonging to the notion of God might have been more expressly named. But it was not necessary they should, being sufficiently included here, as will afterwards appear: nor perhaps so convenient; some things, the express mention whereof is omitted, being such as more captious persons might be apt at first to startle at; who yet may possibly, as they are insinuated under other expressions, become by degrees more inclinable to receive them afterwards. And however if this be not a full and adequate notion, (as who can ever tell when we have an express, distinct, particular notion of God, which we are sure is adequate and full?) it may however suffice, that it is a true one, as far as it goes, and such as cannot be mistaken for the notion of any thing else. And it will be more especially sufficient to our present purpose, if enough be comprehended in it to recommend him to us as a fit and worthy object of religion; and whereto a temple ought to be designed: as it will appear there is, when also we shall have added | not. And so, since you find that something now is, that what is intended, concerning his conversableness with there was a time when any thing of being did begin to men; the ground whereof is also in great part included in be, that is, that till that time, there was nothing; but now, this account of him; so that the consideration of it can- at that time, somewhat first began to be. For what can not be wholly severed from that of his existence; as hath be plainer than that, if all being sometime was not, and been intimated above. That is, that if such a Being ex- now some being is, every thing of being had a beginning? ist, unto which this notion belongs, it will sufficiently ap- And thence it would follow that some being, that is, the pear, he is such as that he can converse with men, though first that ever began to be, did of itself start up out of it doth not thence certainly follow that he will. For it nothing, or made itself to be, when before nothing was. were a rash and bold adventure, to say he could not be But now, do you not plainly see that it is altogether God, if he did not condescend to such terms of reconci- impossible any thing should do so; that is, when it was liation and converse with apostate creatures. Whereof, as yet nothing, and when nothing at all as yet was, that therefore, more is to be said, than the mere manifesting it should make itself, or come into being of itself? For his existence, in its own place. surely making itself is doing something. But can that And as to this, we shall endeavour to proceed gradual-which is nothing do any thing? Unto all doing there ly, and in the most familiar and intelligible way we can. must be some doer. Wherefore a thing must be, before I am not unapprehensive that I might here indeed, fol- it can do any thing; and therefore it would follow that lowing great examples, have proceeded in another method it was before it was; or was and was not, was something than that which I now choose. And because we can have and nothing, at the same time. Yea, and it was diverse no true, appropriate, or distinguishing idea or conception from itself. For a cause must be a distinct thing from of Deity, which doth not include necessity of existence in that which is caused by it. Wherefore it is most appait, have gone that shorter way, immediately to have con- rent that some being hath ever been, or did never begin to cluded the existence of God, from his idea itself. And I be. Whence further, see not, but treading those wary steps which the incompa- X. It is also evident, 2. that some being was unrable Dr. Cudworth (in his Intell. System) hath done, that caused, or was ever of itself without any cause. argument admits, in spite of cavil, of being managed, what never was from another had never any cause, since with demonstrative evidence. Yet since some most per- nothing could be its own cause. And somewhat, as tinaciously insist that it is at the bottom but a mere so- appears from what hath been said, never was from anphism; therefore (without detracting any thing from the other. Or it may be plainly argued thus; that either force of it as it stands in that excellent work, and the some being was uncaused, or all being was caused. But writings of some other noted authors) I have chosen to go if all being were caused, then some one, at least, was this other way, as plainer and less liable to exception, the cause of itself: which hath been already shown imthough further about. And beginning lower, to evince possible. Therefore the expression commonly used confrom the certain present existence of things not existing cerning the first Being, that it was of itself, is only to be necessarily, or of themselves, their manifest dependence taken negatively, that is, that it was not of another, not on what doth exist necessarily or of itself; and how ma-positively, as if it did sometime make itself. Or, what nifestly impossible it was that any thing should exist now, there is positive, signified by that form of speech, is only or hereafter to all eternity, if somewhat had not existed to be taken thus, that it was a being of that nature, as necessarily and of itself, from all eternity. And I trust, that it was impossible it should ever not have been. Not not only this will appear with competent evidence in the that it did ever of itself step out of not being into being: sequel of this discourse, but also that this necessary self- of which more hereafter. existent Being, is God, a Being absolutely perfect, such to whom the rest of his idea must belong; and to whom religion or the honour of a temple is due. And because that was the point at which this discourse principally aims, and wherein it finally terminates, not merely the discovering of atheism, but irreligion; from an apprehension that as to use and practice, it was all one to acknowledge no God at all, as only such a one to whom no temple or religion could belong: it was therefore besides my purpose, to consider the several forms or schemes of atheism, that have been devised in any age, as that excellent person hath done; and enough for my purpose, to refute the Epicurean atheism, or theism, (it is indifferent which you call it,) because that sect-master, while he was liberal in granting there were deities, yet was so impious as to deny worship to any, accounting they were such, as between whom and man there could be no conversation; on their part by providence, or on man's by religion. Therefore, if we shall have made it evident in the issue, that God is, and is conversable with men, both the Epicurean atheism vanishes from off the stage, and with it all atheism besides, and irreligion. IX. We therefore begin with God's existence. For the evincing whereof we may, 1. Be most assured, that there hath been somewhat or other from all eternity, or that looking backward, somewhat of real being must be confessed eternal. Let such as have not been used to think of any thing more than what they could see with their eyes, and to whom reasoning only seems difficult, because they have not tried what they can do in it, but use their thoughts a little, and by moving them a few easy steps, they will soon find themselves as sure of this, as that they see, or hear, or understand, or are any thing. For being sure that something now is, (that you see, for instance, or are something,) you must then acknowledge, that certainly either something always was, and hath ever been, or been from all eternity; or else you must say, that sometime, nothing was; or that all being once was For XI. And now it is hence further evident, 3. that some being is independent upon any other, that is, whereas it already appears that some being did never depend on any other, as a productive cause; or was not beholden to any other, that it might come into being. It is thereupon equally evident that it is simply independent, or cannot be beholden to any for its continued being. For what did never need a productive cause, doth as little need a sustaining or conserving cause. And to make this more plain, either some being is independent, or all being is dependent. But there is nothing without the compass of all being, whereon it may depend. Wherefore to say, that all being doth depend, is to say it depends on nothing, that is, that it depends not. For to depend on nothing, is not to depend. It is therefore a manifest contradiction, to say that all being doth depend: against which it is no relief to say, that all beings do circularly depend on one another. For so, however, the whole circle or sphere of being should depend on nothing, or one at last depend on itself; which negatively taken, as before, is true, and the thing we contend for; that one, the common support of all the rest, depends not on any thing without itself. Whence also it is plainly consequent, XII.That,4.such a being is necessary, or doth necessarily exist; that is, that it is of such a nature as that it could not or cannot but be. For what is in being neither by its own choice, or any other's, is necessarily. But what was not made by itself (which hath been shown impossible that any thing should) nor by any other, (as it hath been proved something was not,) it is manifest, it neither depended on its own choice, nor any other's, that it is. And therefore its existence is not owing to choice at all, but to the ne cessity of its own nature. Wherefore it is always by a simple, absolute, natural necessity; being of such a nature, to which it is altogether repugnant, and impossible ever not to have been, or ever to cease from being. And now having gone thus far, and being assured that hitherto we feel the ground firm under us; that is, having gained a full certainty that there is an eternal, uncaused, independent. necessary Being, and therefore actually and everlasting existing; we may advance one step further, and with équal assurance add, XIII. 5. That this eternal, independent, uncaused, necessary Being, is self-active, that is, (which is at present meant,) not such as acts upon itself, but that hath the power of acting upon other things, in and of itself, without deriving it from any other. Or at least that there is such a Being as is eternal, uncaused, &c. having the power of action in and of itself. For either such a Being as hath been already evinced is of itself active, or unactive, or either hath the power of action of itself, or not. If we will say the latter, let it be considered what we say, and to what purpose we say it. First, we are to weigh what it is we affirm, when we speak of an eternal, uncaused, independent, necessary Being, that is of itself totally unactive, or destitute of any active power. If we will say there is some such thing, we will confess, when we have called it something, it is a very silly, despicable, idle something, and a something (if we look upon it alone) as good as nothing. For there is but little odds between being nothing, and being able to do nothing. We will again confess, eternity, self-origination, independency, necessity of existence, to be very great and | highly dignifying attributes; and that import a most inconceivable excellency. For what higher glory can we ascribe to any being, than to acknowledge it to have been from eternity of itself, without being beholden to any other, and to be such as that it can be, and cannot but be in the same state, self-subsisting, and self-sufficient to all eternity? And what inconceivable myriads of little senseless deities must we upon that supposition admit! (as would appear if it were fit to trouble the reader with an explication of the nature and true notion of matter, which the being now supposed, must be found to be!) but what can our reason either direct or endure, that we should so incongruously misplace so magnificent attributes as these, and ascribe the prime glory of the most excellent Being, unto that which is next to nothing? What might further be said to demonstrate the impossibility of a self-subsisting and self-original, unactive Being, will be here unseasonable and pre-occupying. But if any in the mean time will be so sullen as to say such a thing, Let it, secondly, be considered to what purpose they say it. Is it to exclude a necessary self-active being? But it can signify nothing to that purpose. For such a being they will be forced to acknowledge, let them do what they can (besides putting out their own eyes) notwithstanding. For why will they acknowledge any necessary being at all, that was ever of itself? Is it not because they cannot, otherwise, for their hearts tell how it was ever possible that any thing at all could come into being? But finding that something is, they are compelled to acknowledge that something hath ever been, necessarily and of itself. No other account We will acknowledge an impropriety in this word, and its conjugate, self-originate, sometimes hereafter used which yet is recompensed by their conveniency; as they may perhaps find who shall make trial how to express the sense intended by them in other words. And they are used without suspicion, that it can be thought they are meant to signify as if ever God gave original to himself; but in the negative sense, that he never received it from any other; yea, and that he is, what is more than equivalent to his being, self-caused; namely, a Being of himself so excellent as not to teed or be capable to admit any cause. Vid. c. 4. Sect. 3. And with the expectation of the same allowance which hath been given to avraιrtos, or other like words. We also take it for granted, (which it may suffice to hint here once for all,) that when we use here the word self-subsistent, it will be understood we intend by it, (without logical or metaphysical nicety,) not the mere exclusion of dependence on a subject, but on a cause. And whether by the way this will not afford us (though that be none of our present business) plain evidence that there can be no such thing as becessary, alterable matter, may be examined by such as think fit to give themselves the diversion. For let it be considered, if every part and particle that makes up the matter of this universe were itself a necessary being, and of itself from all eternity, it must have not only its simple being, but its being such or such, of itself necessarily; or rather every thing of it, or any way belonging to it, must be its very simple being itself. For whence should it receive any accession to itself, when it is sup posed equally independent upon its fellows, as any of them upon it? Suppose then only their various intercurrent motion among themselves, requiate to prepare them to, and unite them in, the composition of particular bodies, and no other change of any other individual particle needful thereto, but only of their figure, place, and situation, till they shall come aptly to be disposed in the now attempted composition. How is even this change possible? For suppose one of these particles from eternity of such or such a figure, as triangular, booked, &c. how can it lose any thing from self, or suffer any alteration of its figure which essentially and necessarily belonged to it from eternity? That to which it is necessary to be such it is impossible to it not to be such. Or suppose no alteration of figure (which Epicurus admits not) were necessary; but of situation and motion till it become conveniently situate. Even this change also will be simply impossible. Because you can frame no imagination of the existence of this could be given how other things came to be. But what! doth it signify any thing towards the giving an account of, the original of all other things, to suppose only an eternal, self-subsisting, unactive being? Did that cause other things to be? Will not their own breath choke them it they attempt to utter the self-contradicting words, an unactive cause (i. e. efficient or author) of any thing. And do they not see they are as far from their mark; or do no more towards the assigning the original of all other things, by supposing an eternal, unactive being only, than if they supposed none at all. That which can do nothing, can no more be the productive cause of another, than that which is nothing. Wherefore by the same reason that hath constrained us to acknowledge an eternal, uncaused, inde pendent, necessary being, we are also unavoidably led to acknowledge this being to be self-active, or such as hath the power of action in and of itself; or that there is certainly such a being, that is the cause of all the things which our sense tells us are, besides, existent in the world. XIV. For what else is left us to say or think? Will we think fit to say, that all things we behold, were, as they are, necessarily existent from all eternity? That were to speak against our own eyes, which continually behold the rise and fall of living things, of whatsoever sort or kind, that can come under their notice. And it were to speak against the thing itself, that we say, and to say and unsay the same thing in the same breath. For all the things we behold are in some respect or other (internal or external) continually changing, and therefore could never long be beheld as they are. And to say then, they have been continually changing from eternity, and yet have been necessarily, is unintelligible, and flat nonsense. For what is necessarily, is always the same; and what is in this or that posture necessarily, (that is, by an intrinsic, simple, and absolute necessity, which must be here meant,) must be ever so. Wherefore to suppose the world in this or that state necessarily; and yet that such a state is changeable, is an impossible and self-contradicting supposition. And to say any thing is changing from eternity, signifies it is always undergoing a change which is never past over, that is, that it is eternally unchanged, and is ever the same. For the least imaginable degree of change is some change. What is in any the least respect changed, is not in every respect the same. Suppose then any thing in this present state or posture, and that it is eternally changing in it; either a new state and posture is acquired, or not. If it be, the former was temporary, and hath an end; and therefore the just and adequate measure of it was not eternity, which hath no end; much less of the change of it, or the transition from the one state to the other. But if no new state or posture be acquired, (which any the least gradual alteration would make,) then it is eternally unchanged in any the least degree." Therefore eternal changing is a manifest contradiction. or that particle, but you must suppose it in some or other ubi, or point of space, and if it be necessarily, it is here necessarily; for what is simply no where is nothing. But if it be here necessarily, (that is, in this or that point of space, for in some or other it must be, and it cannot be here and there at once,) it must be here eternally, and can never not be here. Therefore we can have no notion of necessarily alterable or moveable matter, which is not inconsistent and repugnant to itself. Therefore also motion must proceed from an immoveable mover, as hath been (though upon another ground) concluded of old. But how action ad extra stands with the immutability of the Deity, must be fetched from the consideration of other perfections belonging thereto. Of which metaphysicians and schoolmen may be consulted, discoursing at large. See Suarez, Ledesma de divina perfectione, with many more, at leisure. Whatsoever difficulty we may apprehend in this case, or if we cannot so easily conceive how an eternal mind foreseeing perfectly all futurity, together with an eternal efficacious determination of will concerning the existence of such and such things to such an instant or point of time, can suffice to their production without a super-added efflux of power at that instant which would seem to infer somewhat of mutation: yet as the former of these cannot be de monstrated insufficient, (nor shall we ever reckon ourselves pinched in this matter till we see that plainly and fully done,) so they are very obstinately blind that cannot see upon the addition of the latter the vast difference of these two cases: viz. the facile silent egress of a sufficient power, in pursuance to a calm, complacential, eternal purpose; for the production of this creation, by which the agent acts not upon itself, but upon its own creature made by its own action; and the eternal, blind, ungoverned action of matter upon itself, by which it is perpetually changing itself, while yet it is supposed necessarily what it was before. And how much more easily conceivable that is, than this; how also liberty of action consists with necessity of existence, divers have shown: to which purpose somewhat not inconsiderable may be seen, Ficin. lib. 2. cap. 12. de immortal. &c. But in this there can be little pretence to imagine a difficulty. For our own being, though not simply, yet as to us is necessary, i. e. it is imposed upon us : for we come not into being by our own choice; and yet are conscious to ourselves of no prejudice hereby to our liberty of acting. Yea, and not only doth the former consist with this latter, but is inferred by it. Of which see Giddcuf de libert. Dei, & creat. But if it be said, though eternity be not the measure of one change, it may be of infinite changes, endlessly succeeding one another; even this also will be found contradictious and impossible. For, (not to trouble the reader with the more intricate controversy of the possibility or impossibility of infinite or eternal succession, about which they who have a mind may consult others,1) if this signify any thing to the present purpose, it must mean the infinite or eternal changes of a necessary being. And how these very terms do clash with one another, methinks any sound mind might apprehend at the first mention of them; and how manifestly repugnant the things are, may be collected from what hath been said; and especially from what was thought more fit to be annexed in the margin. But now since we find that the present state of things is changeable,and actually changing, and that what is changeable is not necessarily, and of itself; and since it is evident that there is some necessary being; (otherwise nothing could ever have been, and that without action nothing could be from it ;) since also all change imports somewhat of passion, and all passion supposes action, and all action active power, and active power an original seat or subject, that is self-active, or that hath the power of action in and of itself; (for there could be no derivation of it from that which hath it not, and no first derivation, but from that which hath it originally of itself; and a first derivation there must be, since all things that are, or ever have been, furnished with it, and not of themselves, must either mediately or immediately have derived it from that which had it of itself;) it is therefore manifest that there is a necessary, self-active Being, the Cause and Author of this perpetually variable state and frame of things. And hence, XV. 6. Since we can frame no notion of life which self-active power doth not, at least, comprehend, (as upon trial we shall find that we cannot,) it is consequent, that this Being is also originally vital, and the root of all vitality, such as hath life in or of itself, and from whence it is propagated to every other living thing." taken to be of itself altogether unactive, must be stated the only cause and fountain of all the action and motion that is now to be found in the whole universe: which is a conceit, wild and absurd enough; not only as it opposes the common judgment of such as have with the greatest diligence inquired into things of this nature, but as being in itself manifestly impossible to be true; as would easily appear, if it were needful to press further Dr. More's reasonings to this purpose; which he hath done sufficiently for himself. And also that otherwise all the great and undeniable changes which continually happen in it must proceed from its own constant and eternal action upon itself, while it is yet feigned to be a necessary being; with the notion whereof they are notoriously inconsistent. Which there fore we taking to be most clear, may now the more securely proceed to what follow. CHAPTER III. Wisdom asserted to belong to this Being. The production of this world by a mighty agent destitute of wisdom impossible. On consideration of, 1. What would be adverse to this production. 2. What would be wanting; some effects to which a designing cause will, on all hands, be confessed necessary, having manifest characters of skill and design upon them. Absurd here to accept the works of nature; wherein at least equal characters of wisdom and design are to be seen, as in any the most confessed pieces of art, instanced in the frame and motion of heavenly bodies. A mean, unphilo sophical temper, to be more taken with novelties, than common things of greater importance. Further instance, in the composition of the bodies of animals. Two contrary causes of men's not acknowledging the wisdom of their Maker herein. Progress is made from the consideration of the parts and frame, to the powers and functions, of terrestrial creatures. Growth, nutrition, propagation of kind. Spontaneous motion, sensation. The pretence considered, that the bodies of animals are machines. 1. How improbable it is. 2. How little to the purpose. The powers of the human soul. It appears, notwithstanding them, it had a cause; by them, a wise and intelligent cause. It is not matter. That not capable of reason. They not here reflected on who think reasonable souls made of refined matter, by the Creator. Not being matter, nor arising from thence, it must have a cause that is intelligent. Goodness belonging to this Being. And so as we plainly see that this sensible world did I. We therefore add, that this Being is wise and insometime begin to be, it is also evident that it took its beginning from a Being essentially vital and active, that telligent, as well as powerful; upon the very view of this had itself no beginning. Nor can we make a difficulty world, it will appear so vast power was guided by equal to conclude, that this Being (which now we have shown wisdom in the framing of it. Though this is wont to be is active, and all action implies some power) is, the principal labour in evincing the existence of a Deity, XVI. 7. Of vast and mighty power, (we will not say namely, the proving that this universe owes its rise to a infinite, lest we should step too far at once; not mind-wise and designing cause; (as may be seen in Cicero's ing now to discuss whether creation require infinite excellent performance in this kind, and in divers later power,) when we consider and contemplate the vastness writers ;) yet the placing so much of their endeavour of the work performed by it. Unto which (if we were this hath been chosen for the great medium to prove that herein, seems in great part to have proceeded hence, that to make our estimate by nothing else) we must, at least, it had a cause diverse from itself. But if that once be judge this power to be proportionable. For when our done a shorter way, and it fully appear that this world eyes behold an effect exceeding the power of any cause is not itself a necessary being, having the power of all which they can behold, our mind must step in and supply the action and motion to be found in it, of itself; the defect of our feebler sense; so as to make a judgment that there is a cause we see not, equal to this effect. As (which already seems plain enough;) and it do most when we behold a great and magnificent fabric, and en- evidently thence also appear to have had a cause foreign tering in we see not the master, or any living thing, fore the more carelessly consider this subject; yet no place to, or distinct from, itself; though we shall not there(which was Cicero's observation in reference to this present purpose,) besides mice and weasels, we will not of doubt seems to remain, but that this was an intelligent think that mice or weasels built it. Nor need we in a cause, and that this world was the product of wisdom and matter so obvious, insist further. But only when our se-nation can be more grossly absurd, than to suppose this counsel, and not of mere power alone. For what imagiverer reason hath made us confess, our further contem- orderly frame of things to have been the result of so plation should make us admire, a power which is at once both so apparent and so stupendous. mighty power, not accompanied or guided by wisdom and counsel that is, (as the case must now unavoidably be understood,) that there is some being necessarily existent, of an essentially active nature, of inconceivably vast COROLLARY. And now, from what hath been hitherto and mighty power and vigour, destitute of all underdiscoursed, it seems a plain and necessary consecta- standing and knowledge, and consequently of any selfry, that this world had a cause diverse from the mat-moderating principle, but acting always by the necessity ter whereof it is composed. of its own nature, and therefore to its very uttermost, that raised up all the alterable matter of the universe (to For otherwise matter that hath been more generally whose nature it is plainly repugnant to be of itself, or exist t Parker Tentam. Physico-Theol. Derodon. Philos. cont. Dr. More's Enchirid. Metaphys. u Which will also prove it to be a Spirit; unto which order of beings essential vitality, or that life be essential to them, seems as distinguishing a property between it and a body, as any other we can fasten upon; that is, that though a body may be truly said to live, yet it lives by a life that is accidental, and separable from it, so as that it may cease to live, and yet be a body still; whereas a spirit lives by its own essence; so that it can no more cease to live than to be. And as where that essence is borrowed and derived only, as it is a necessarily) out of nothing; and by the utmost exertion of| And that such an increase could not, upon the supposithat ungoverned power, put all the parts and particles of tion we are now opposing, but have been, is most evident, that matter into a wild hurry of impetuous motion, by For, not to insist that nothing of impressed motion is ever which they have been compacted and digested into partí-lost, but only imparted to other things, (which they that cular beings, in that variety and order which we now be- suppose it, do not therefore suppose, as if they thought, hold. And surely to give this account of the world's being once impressed, it could continue of itself, but that original, is, as Cicero speaks, not to consider, but to cast there is a constant, equal supply from the first mover,) we lots what to say; and were as mad a supposition, "as if will admit that there is a continual decrease, or loss, but one should suppose the one-and-twenty letters, formed (as never to the degree of its continual increase. For we see the same author elsewhere speaks) in great numbers, of when we throw a stone out of our hand, whatever of the gold, or what you please else, and cast of any careless impressed force it do impart to the air, through which it fashion together, and that of these loosely shaken out upon makes its way, or not being received, vanishes of itself, it the ground, Ennius's Annals should result, so as to be dis- yet retains a part a considerable time, that carries it all the tinctly legible as now we see them." Nay, it were the length of its journey, and all does not vanish and die away supposition of a thing a thousand-fold more manifestly on the sudden. Therefore, when we here consider the impossible. continual, momently renewal of the same force, always II. For before we consider the gross absurdity of such necessarily going forth from the same mighty Agent, withsupposed production, that is, that a thing should be brought out any moderation or restraint; every following impetus to pass by so mere a casualty, that so evidently requires an doth so immediately overtake the former, that whatever exquisitely-formed and continued design, even though there we can suppose lost, is yet so abundantly over-supplied, were nothing positively to resist or hinder it, let it be con- that, upon the whole, it cannot fail to be ever growing, sidered what there will be that cannot but most certainly and to have grown to that all-destroying excess before hinder any such production. To this purpose we are to mentioned. Whence, therefore, that famed restorer and consider, that it is a vast power which so generally moves improver of some principles of the ancient philosophy, the diffused matter of the universe. hath seen a necessity to acknowledge it, as a manifest thing, Hereof make an estimate, by considering what is requi-"That God himself is the universal and primary cause of site to the continual whirling about of such huge bulks as all the motions that are in the world, who in the beginning this whole massy globe of earth; (according to some;) or, created matter, together with motion and rest; and doth which is much more strange, the sun, (according to others,) now, by his ordinary concourse only, continue so much of with that inconceivably swift motion which this supposi- motion and rest in it, as he first put into it.-For (saith he) tion makes necessary, together with the other planets, and we understand it as a perfection in God, not only that he the innumerable heavenly bodies besides, that are subject is unchangeable in himself, but that he works after a most to the laws of a continual motion. Adding hereto how constant and unchangeable manner. So that, excepting mighty a power it is which must be sufficient to all the those changes which either evident experience or divine productions, motions, and actions, of all other things. revelation renders certain, and which we know or believe to be without change in the Creator, we ought to suppose none in his works, lest thereby any inconstancy should be argued in himself." Whereupon he grounds the laws and rules concerning motion, which he afterwards lays down, whereof we referred to one, a little above. Again, consider that all this motion, and motive power, must have some source and fountain diverse from the dull and sluggish matter moved thereby, unto which it already hath appeared impossible it should originally and essentially belong. Next, that the mighty, active Being, which hath been proved necessarily existent, and whereto it must first belong, if we suppose it destitute of the self-moderating principle of wisdom and counsel, cannot but be always exerting its motive power, invariably and to the same degree: that is, to its very utmost, and can never cease or fail to do so. For its act knows no limit but that of its power; (if this can have any;) and its power is essential to it, and its essence is necessary. Further, that the motion impressed upon the matter of the universe must hereupon necessarily have received a continual increase, ever since it came into being. That supposing this motive power to have been exerted from eternity, it must have been increased long ago to an infinite excess. That hence the coalition of the particles of matter for the forming of any thing had been altogether impossible. For let us suppose this exerted, motive power to have been, any instant, but barely sufficient for such a formation, because that could not be despatched in an instant, it would by its continual, momently increase, be grown so over-sufficient, as, in the next instant, to dissipate the particles, but now beginning to unite. At least, it would be most apparent, that if ever such a frame of things as we now behold could have been produced, that motive power, increased to so infinite an excess, must have shattered the whole frame in pieces, many an age ago; or rather, never have permitted that such a thing, as we call an age, could possibly have been. Our experience gives us not to observe any so destructive or remarkable changes in the course of nature: and this (as was long ago foretold) is the great argument of the atheistical scoffers in these latter days, that things are as they were from the beginning of the creation to this day. But let it be soberly weighed, how it is possible the general consistency, which we observe things are at throughout the universe, and their steady, orderly posture, can stand with this momently increase of motion. a D. Cartes Princip. Philosoph. part 2. It is therefore evident, that as without the supposition of a self-active Being there could be no such thing as motion; so without the supposition of an intelligent Being, (that is, that the same Being be both self-active and intelligent,) there could be no regular motion; such as is absolutely necessary to the forming and continuing of any the compacted, bodily substances, which our eyes behold every day: yea, or of any whatsoever, suppose we their figures, or shapes, to be as rude, deformed, and useless, as we can imagine; much less, such as the exquisite compositions, and the exact order of things, in the universe, do evidently require and discover. III. And if there were no such thing carried in this supposition, as is positively adverse to what is supposed, so as most certainly to hinder it, (as we see plainly there is,) yet the mere want of what is necessary to such a production, is enough to render it impossible, and the supposition of it absurd. For it is not only absurd to suppose a production which somewhat shall certainly resist and hinder, but which wants a cause to effect it; and it is not less absurd, to suppose it affected by a manifestly insufficient and unproportionable cause, than by none at all. For as nothing can be produced without a cause, so no cause can work above or beyond its own capacity and natural aptitude. Whatsoever therefore is ascribed to any cause, above and beyond its ability, all that surplusage is ascribed to no cause at all: and so an effect, in that part at least, were supposed without a cause. And if then it follow when an effect is produced, that it had a cause; why doth it not equally follow, when an effect is produced, having manifest characters of wisdom and design upon it, that it had a wise and designing cause? If it be said, there be some fortuitous or casual (at least undesigned) productions, that look like the effects of wisdom and contrivance, but indeed are not, as the birds so orderly and seasonably making their nests, the bees their comb, and the spider its web, which are capable of no design: that exception needs to be well proved before it be admitted; and that it be plainly demonstrated, both that these creatures are not capable of design, and that there is not a universal, designing cause, |