The Rebel's DilemmaSince the mid 1960s, theorists have elaborated over two dozen different solutions to the collection action problem. During much of this same period, students of conflict have explored many questions about protest and rebellion. The Rebel's Dilemma examines what happens when one brings the full richness of collective action theories to bear on the many complex problems of collective dissent. ". . . a significant contribution to the understanding of collective behavior, protest, and rebellion." --Choice "The book is interesting and thought-provoking, and its insights extend beyond the narrow subject of rebellion to help illuminate many issues related to organizing groups to undertake collective action." --Public Choice "[Lichbach's] book is monumental and pivotal. . . . [It] consolidates over three decades of research on collective action problems and sets the agenda for future studies of collective dissent and rebellion. . . . [This] book is a major step forward. It will have an enormous impact in the field of conflict studies and belongs on the shelf of anyone even casually interested in dissent, rebellion, and revolution. . . . [This] book is a major step forward. It will have an enormous impact in the field of conflict studies and belongs on the shelf of anyone even casually interested in dissent, rebellion, and revolution." --American Political Science Review "For scholars interested in game-theoretic analyses of politics . . . essential reading." --Manus I. Midlarsky, Journal of Politics "Lichbach has to be praised for providing valuable insight on the logic of collective dissent. . . ." --Political Studies Mark Irving Lichbach is Professor of Political Science, University of Colorado. |
Contents
The Problem Defined | 3 |
12 The Deprived Actor Research Program | 4 |
13 The Collective Action Research Program | 5 |
Applied Students of Collective Dissent | 7 |
Pure Theorists of Collective Action | 11 |
The Approach Adopted | 15 |
The Rebels Dilemma | 16 |
Solutions to the Rebels Dilemma | 19 |
5234 Political Origins | 149 |
524 Autonomy | 155 |
525 Stability | 157 |
526 Concentration | 158 |
Hierarchy | 167 |
612 The Origins of Entrepreneurial Activity | 171 |
613 The Consequences of Entrepreneurial Activity | 175 |
62 Locate Principals or Patrons | 177 |
The Origins of Collective Action | 22 |
The Outcomes of Collective Action | 28 |
25 Appraising Collective Action Theories of Collective Dissent | 30 |
Market | 35 |
31 Increase Benefits | 36 |
32 Lower Costs | 38 |
322 LowCost Collective Dissent | 39 |
323 The Opportunity Costs of Collective Dissent | 42 |
324 The Fixed Costs of Collective Dissent | 45 |
325 Dissidents Minimize Costs | 46 |
326 Entrepreneurs Minimize Costs | 47 |
33 Increase Resources | 48 |
34 Improve the Productivity of Tactics | 50 |
343 Targets | 52 |
344 Tactics | 53 |
Collective Violence and Nonviolence | 54 |
3451 Why Collective Violence Is Used | 55 |
3452 When Collective Violence Is Used | 59 |
35 Reduce the Supply of the Public Good | 62 |
361 The Dissidents Calculus | 64 |
362 Estimating the Probability of Winning | 66 |
3622 The States Weakness | 68 |
363 The Dissident Groups Strategy | 74 |
364 The States Strategy | 78 |
365 The Competition between State and Opposition | 79 |
Military Coups | 80 |
37 Increase the Probability of Making a Difference | 82 |
371 The Dissidents Calculus | 83 |
372 The Dissident Groups Strategy | 84 |
38 Use Incomplete Information | 86 |
382 The Dissident Groups Public Relations Calculus | 88 |
3821 Publicity | 89 |
3822 Illusions | 91 |
3823 Ideology | 92 |
3824 Symbols | 93 |
383 The States Public Relations Calculus | 95 |
39 Increase Risk Taking | 96 |
310 Increase Team Competition between Enemies | 99 |
31012 States | 101 |
31013 Other States | 102 |
3103 The Consequences of Countermobilization | 104 |
311 Restrict Exit | 105 |
312 Change the Type of Public Good | 107 |
3122 Seek Nonrival Public Goods | 108 |
Community | 111 |
Build a Bandwagon | 114 |
4121 The Temporal Diffusion of Collective Dissent | 116 |
4122 The Spatial Diffusion of Collective Dissent | 118 |
Overcome Pecuniary SelfInterest | 120 |
421 Process Orientation | 121 |
422 OtherRegardingness | 124 |
Contract | 129 |
512 TitForTat | 133 |
52 The Social Origins of Social Contracts | 134 |
521 Longevity | 136 |
522 Homogeneity | 138 |
523 Preexisting Organization | 141 |
5231 Formal Organization | 145 |
5232 Informal Organization | 146 |
5233 Social Origins | 148 |
622 Why Patrons Help Dissidents | 178 |
623 Which Patrons Help Dissidents | 180 |
6232 The State as an Ally | 182 |
6233 Nonstate Domestic Actors as Allies | 188 |
6234 External Actors as Allies | 189 |
624 What if Patrons Help Dissidents | 191 |
63 Reorganize | 193 |
Form an Exclusionary Club | 194 |
Shape an Efficacious Group | 197 |
Create a Federal Structure | 200 |
64 Increase Team Competition among Allies | 201 |
641 The Forms of Competition | 202 |
642 The Causes of Competition | 203 |
643 The Courses of Competition | 206 |
644 The Consequences of Competition | 208 |
65 Impose Monitor and Enforce Agreements | 210 |
652 Monitor Defections | 211 |
653 Administer Selective Incentives | 215 |
The Centrality of Selective Incentives | 216 |
Rebels Seek Selective Incentives | 217 |
Politics | 226 |
A NonSolution? | 238 |
654 Administer Selective Disincentives | 241 |
Solutions as Politics The Origins of Collective Action | 247 |
711 Apolitical Production Functions | 248 |
712 Political Games | 251 |
72 The Revolutionary Conflict between States and Dissidents | 253 |
The Rebels Dilemma | 254 |
The States Dilemma | 256 |
723 The Rebels Dilemma and the States Dilemma | 258 |
Solutions as Pathologies The Outcomes of Collective Action | 261 |
82 The Unintended Consequences of Dissident Organization | 263 |
822 The Universality of the Iron Laws | 273 |
823 Overcoming the Iron Laws | 274 |
Evaluating Collective Action Theories of Collective Dissent | 279 |
Predictability | 281 |
921 The Complexity of the Rebels Dilemma | 282 |
9222 Preference Falsification | 284 |
9223 The GrievanceCollective Dissent Linkage | 286 |
923 The Consequences for Evaluating CA Theories | 289 |
Lakatos and Popper | 293 |
931 The Criteria | 294 |
932 The Criteria Applied | 298 |
9321 Market | 299 |
9322 Community | 309 |
9323 Contract | 311 |
9324 Hierarchy | 315 |
933 The Criterias Results | 320 |
94 Summary Evaluation | 323 |
Improving Collective Action Theories of Collective Dissent | 325 |
102 Explore the Macro | 330 |
Groups | 332 |
Politics | 336 |
Domination and Legitimacy | 337 |
A Final Perspective | 339 |
Notes | 345 |
| 453 | |
| 495 | |
| 505 | |
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Common terms and phrases
activities actors approach argues argument become benefits CA problem CA theories chap coalition collective action collective dissent collective violence Communist conflict studies consequences contributions cooperation costs coup create demonstrate dents dissident entrepreneurs dissident groups dissident leaders dissident movements dissident organizations dissident's economic effective elites emphasis in original example expectations facilitates followers goals grievances guerrilla guerrilla warfare Gurr Hence ideology individual institutions interests involved leadership mass ment military mobilization offers Olson opportunity costs organizational participation in collective parties patrons peasant political potential preexisting organizations probability of winning problem produce proposition protest and rebellion Public Bads radical rational Rebel's Dilemma regimes and oppositions rent seeking research program revolution revolutionary riots seek selective incentives self-interest sident social contract social movements society solution sect strategy structure struggle success suggests tactics Tarrow terrorism terrorists theories theorists Tilly tion Tit-For-Tat tive University Press workers Zald