Page images
PDF
EPUB

per explaining of the laws, which they are called upon to administer. A lawyer of any note or in good practice, may reasonably hope to realise some six or eight thousand dollars per annum, and which presents much stronger motives to his exertion, than he could possibly ever feel in the prospect, or possession of a seat on the judicial bench. As it is-the judges of the land are frequently compelled to receive instructions from the bar, and to content themselves with the law as propounded to them by counsel, according to the interpretation that the interests of his client may, for the while, require him to attach to its ordinance.

We are fully borne out in these observations, by a strict analysis of the present state of the American bar; the general character and inefficiency of the men who occupy the judicial seat; the slender means at their disposal; the very few amongst them of any eminence or talent, and those few, annually decreasing by desertion from their ranks. During our sojourn in the State of New York, we were witness to two such cases: one, in the instance of Judge Sutherland of the Supreme Court; the other, of Judge Cheevers, Chief Judge of the Common Pleas; each of this State, and both retiring from the bench, for the purpose of accepting subordinate situations in their own courts.

1

act

a

The Albany Evening Journal, published at seat of government, announced the retirement Judge Sutherland in the following notice, with r marks:

"Judge Sutherland resigned his seat upon th

the

of

JUDGE SUTHERLAND.

111

Bench of the Supreme Court this morning, and was immediately appointed by the Court, its Clerk at Geneva, in the place of Nathan Williams, deceased.

"Judge Sutherland, in announcing his resignation to the Court, stated, that he was compelled to do so, in consequence of the insufficiency of the salary. He had not, he said, by the studied, strictest economy, during any of the twelve years that he had held the office, been able from the salary to support his family. By devoting, as he had done, the whole of his time to the duties of the bench, his private affairs, by long neglect, had become necessarily deranged, and, in short, that after nine years hard service, he was now as many thousand dollars poorer than when he took office."

But there are other and equally strong objections to the frequency, as to the manner of these appointments, and the inadequacy of their remuneration; fraught as they are with mischief, and charged with difficulties that scarcely need specification. A "door is here opened," to adopt the language of an eminent modern writer," to party intrigue, and for the more dangerous purposes of private hostility and cabal, which it will ever require the strong reaction of popular virtue and steady habits to keep shut. How often will eminent lawyers, who would adorn these tribunals, refuse to accept a seat on the bench, when the terms of office are so precarious; and from those who do accept, what firmness and integrity are required, to overcome the temptations which the varying chances of re-elections will create! Among

such shifting succession of judges what is the prospect of sound constitutional decisions! Every new incumbent will pronounce, it may be, a new set of principles; and the law of the land will take its form and colour from every fresh election, and be a mottled patchwork, instead of an uniform robe without a seam. Still more glaring becomes the policy of the principle when the appointments are annual. To displace the judges from the Supreme tribunal every year, to give place to successors, who in another year are to share the same fate, and thus to make the temple of Justice the scene of a pageant, which enters on the stage, and then withdraws, like the shadowy kings of Banquo's line, is more a solemn trifling with the great ends of justice, than the policy of a wise and prosperous government."

"The duties of the judges are to expound the laws of the land, to pronounce those rules, and define those rights, which affect the character, the property and person of every individual in the community: upon the secure enjoyment of those rights, political, civil, and religious, depends the welfare of every citizen, and whatever interferes with their protection by the judicatory, whatever diminishes in the least degree, the certainty that impartial and just decisions will be pronounced from these tribunals, impairs the stability of those rights, and undermines the pillars of national prosperity. Every thing, of course, that tends to make the judge dependent on any extraneous power, whither popular caprice, party spirit, or executive, or legisla

APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES.

113

tive patronage, or displeasure, is an essential defect in the constitution of these tribunals, and threatens danger to the public at large."

The following are the modes of appointment, the time for holding office, &c. &c. in the several States composing the Republic in 1836.

The Judges those of the Supreme Court of
each government.

In Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maryland and Maine, the mode of appointment is by the Governor with the consent of the Council, a distinct body from the General Assembly.

In New Jersey, by the Council and General Assembly.

In New York, Kentucky, Indiana, Louisiana, and Missouri, by the Governor, with the consent of the Senate, the smaller branch of the General Assembly.

In Pennsylvania and Delaware, by the Governor.-South Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia, Ohio, Mississippi, Alabama, and Illinois, by the Legislature.

Term for holding office.

In Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Tennessee, Louisiana, Illinois, no limit is prescribed.

In Connecticut, Alabama, and Maine, the limit is seventy years of age; in Missouri and Mississippi it is sixty-five.

In New York it is sixty years.

VOL. I.

In New Jersey, Ohio, Indiana, the judges are appointed for seven years.

In Georgia, for three years, and in Rhode Island and Vermont, for one year only.

The causes of removal are generally the same throughout the different states.

The mode of removal.

In all the states except Rhode Island, Maryland, and North Carolina, the judges may be removed after conviction upon impeachment. In Rhode

Island no provision is found in the Constitution for removal in any manner. In Maryland removal follows conviction on a presentment of a grand jury of the Supreme Court.

In Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Illinois, Alabama, Mississippi, and Missouri, the judges may be removed by the Government upon the address of both houses of the legislature. In others two-thirds-in others threefourths must unite in this address.

Salaries.

In Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, Mississippi, Illinois, Alabama, Maine, and Missouri, the salaries of the judges may be increased but cannot be diminished.

In New Hampshire, South Carolina, Georgia, and Louisiana, the salaries can neither be increased nor diminished.

« PreviousContinue »