was held clearly by the whole court, that fuch entry was fufficient to avoid the statute, and that they would not hear an argument on the point. S 23. By the statute 4 Ann. c. 16. f. 16. it is enacted, that no claim or entry, to be made of or upon any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, fhall be fufficient within the ftatute of limitations; unless, upon fuch entry or claim, an action fhall be commenced within one year, next after the making of fuch entry or claim, and be profecuted with effect. § 24. Where a perfon acquires a new right, he is allowed a new period of twenty years to purfue his remedy, though he has neglected the first; it being a maxim in law, Quando dua jura in una perfona concurrunt, æquum eft ac fi effent in diverfis. § 25. A tenant in tail of lands, held in ancient demefne, conveyed them by fine in the court of ancient demefne to three perfons, for their lives; and afterwards levied another fine of the reversion, in the fame court, to the ufe of himself and his heirs. It was determined, that the first fine created a dif continuance of the eftate, and took away the entry of the issue in tail during the lives of the three perfons, to whom the first fine was levied; but that the fecond fine did not make any discontinuance and therefore, although the iffue in tail had neglected to bring his formedon within twenty years after the death of his anceftor, when his right firft accrued; yet, when the And followed by an Action. Where a perfon acquires a new Right. Hunt v. Bourne, 1 Salk. 339. 2 Salk. 421. laft life dropped, the discontinuance was determined, and the heir acquired a new right of entry, for the pursuit of which he was allowed by the ftatute 21 Jac. 1. a new period of twenty years. For, when a perfon has a right, and several remedies, the difcharge of the one is not a discharge of the other: and the word "right," in the statute of limitations, means á right of entry. Upon a writ of error in the House of Lords, it was contended for the plaintiff, ift, That the fine did not create a discontinuance, the confequence of which was, that the right of entry of the iffue in tail commenced immediately on the death of the tenant in tail, which happened in 1663, above twenty years before the iffue entered, and therefore his entry was barred by the statute of limitations. 2dly, That the difcon. tinuance, if any, did not determine with the estate for three lives, but ftill continued to bar the entry of the 'iffue in tail by the common law; because a fee paffed by the first fine to the cognizee, and therefore the discontinuance was of the whole fee. But if the first fine alone did not work a discontinuance in fee yet the second fine and warranty did, in order that the warranty might be preserved. 3dly, That the entry was barred by the statute of limitations, which enacts, that no person shall enter into lands but within twenty years after his right or title fhall firft defcend or accrue. In this case the first right or title that defcended, was a right of action, viz. to a formedon, which accrued to the iffue immediately on the death of the tenant in tail, which happened above thirty-five years before, and the iffue having neglected for above twenty twenty years to fue for the estate was thereby barred, not only of his action, but of his entry alfo. For otherwise a man might enter into lands when he had no way by law to recover them, having loft that remedy by his own default; which would be abfurd and inconvenient with respect to purchasers, and the difturbance of long poffeffors. On the other fide it was contended that the only question in the cafe was, whether the leffor of the plaintiff might lawfully enter after the determination of the estate for three lives, granted by the first fine; for it was not pretended that a fine levied in a court of ancient demefne would bar an eftate tail. That the first fine made a discontinuance of the estate and took away the entry of the tenant in tail during the lives of the leffees only; but that the grant of the reverfion, by the fecond fine, did not make a difcontinuance in fee; and confequently when the last life dropped in September 1793 the discontinuance was determined, and the right of entry revived and therefore the iffue in tail might lawfully enter, and was not barred by the ftatute of limitations, his right not accruing till 1693. The judgment was affirmed. $ 26. It is faid by Lord Hardwicke, that a remain- 1 Vef. R.278. derman, expectant on an estate for life or years, to whom a right to enter, or to bring an ejectment, is given by the forfeiture of the tenant for life or years, is not bound to do fo. Therefore, if he comes within There must be an adverfe Poffeffion. his time after the remainder attached, it will be good: nor can the statute of limitations be infifted on against him, for not coming within twenty years after his title accrued by forfeiture. 5 27. No perfon can be barred by the ftatutes of limitation, unless he is out of poffeffion. Thus, Lord Coke, speaking of the ftatute of fines, which is in fact 9 Rep. 106 a. a ftatute of limitations, fays, "He, who has the estate Run. Eject. 60. 66 66 or interest in him, cannot be put to his action, entry, or claim: for he has that, which the action, entry, or claim, would veft in or give him."From which it follows, that no perfon can plead the ftatutes of limitations, unless his poffeffion has been adverse to that of the perfon who claims against him. § 28. A perfon is not affected by the ftatutes of limitation, where the poffeffion is in the hands of his tenant, who has paid him rent within the time of limitation: for, the poffeffion of a leffee for years is the poffeffion of his leffor, and payment of rent is an acknowledgement of the poffeffion; fo that, during the continuance of the leafe, and payment of rent, the leffor is in no fort of default: for he cannot enter and take the actual poffeffion, till the lease be expired, but then it seems he fhould, because his right of entry then firft accrues. § 29. Where a perfon has conveyed away the legal eftate in lands to a trustee for himself, for any parti cular purpose, and continues to hold the poffeffion he he becomes tenant at will to fuch trustee; and, his poffeffioff not being adverse to the title of the trustee, the ftatutes of limitation will not operate in fuch a cafe. $30. Joint tenants, coparceners, and tenants in common, having a joint poffeffion, and occupation of the whole; it follows, that the poffeffion of any one of them is the poffeffion of the others or other of them, fo as to prevent the ftatutes of limitation from affecting them: nor will the bare perception of all the rents, and profits, by one, amount to an oufter of the other. § 31. In ejectment on a trial at bar, the ftatute of limitations was infifted on; but it was ruled by the Vide Tit. 18, 19, 20. Ford v. Grey, court, that the poffeffion of one joint-tenant was the poffeffion of the other, fo far as to prevent the statute 2 Atk. 632. of limitations. The fame point was determined as to coparceners in the cafe of Davenport v. Tyrrell; and, as to tenants in common, in the cafe of Fairclaim v. Shackleton, which have already been stated. Tit. 19. f.9. Royston, § 32. A perfon being feised in fee, having two Reading v. daughters, devised his lands to his grandfon by his eldest daughter in fee, the eldeft daughter being dead at the time of the devife. The grandfon died without iffue; and the heir of the grandfon being the heir on the part of the father, and the heir of the coparcener, entered into the land, and took the profits by moieties for |