* * It may be asked what advantage would be derived from an expatriation law if the public law gives the right so clearly. The same question could as well be asked of a naturalization law. As was held by our government with great clearness and entire correctness in Koszta's case: "The conflicting laws on the subject of allegiance are of a municipal character, and have no controlling operation beyond the territorial limits of the countries enacting them. Neither Austrian decrees nor American laws can be properly invoked for aid or direction in this case, but international law furnishes the rules for a correct decision, and by the light from this source shed upon the transaction at Smyrna are its true features to be discovered." This opinion was held with reference to a transaction within the limits and jurisdiction of a third power, but if the conclusions we have reached and attempted to sustain in this article are correct, the language is equally applicable to the case of a naturalized citizen found within the territory of the government of his former allegiance. But while this is a correct statement of the relation of municipal law to the subject, the advantage of an expatriation law would be political and argumentative rather than legal or real. It would complete our policy and strengthen our position upon the subject-matter. It would give us a body or system of statute laws upon the subject consistent with themselves, consistent with international law, and will deprive foreign governments and their diplomatists of a technical though immaterial advantage which they mistake for something substantial. The President, in his last annual message, after succinctly stating what had been the position of the government upon the subject of expatriation and national allegiance, said: "Peace is now prevailing everywhere in Europe, and the present seems to be a favorable time for an assertion by Congress of the principle, so long maintained by the executive department, that naturalization by one state fully exempts the native-born subject of any other state from the performance of military service under any foreign government, so long as he does not voluntarily renounce its rights and benefits." Now Congress can assert this principle either wholly or partially. It would be done only partially, either by declaring that in future the government will demand and enforce an observance by others of this principle, or by simply applying the principle, in the form of an expatriation law, to our own citizens, saying nothing of the future policy of the government as to its own naturalized citizens; and it can assert the principle stated in the message, in its entirety, by doing both of these things, which is believed to be the course best adapted to the subject and entirely just in itself. Not that we have a right to prescribe a rule, by statutory enactment, to measure the rights or regulate the conduct of other governments, but only that we have the right to insist upon what we consider as lawful and just, under the law of nations, regardless of our statutes or theirs, and the declaration of our intention to do so may facilitate an understanding rather than precipitate a conflict. Upon this subject it is worthy of notice that during our late civil war, when the question of exemption from military service, for various reasons, became one of very great interest, Congress enacted that "all able-bodied male citizens of the United States, and persons of foreign birth who have declared on oath their intention to become citizens," shall constitute the national forces, and be liable to draft within certain ages, exemption being granted for certain mental and physical defects. To this line of distinction it was objected that a foreigner might have been here for years, partaking of all the benefits of the country and of the protection of the government, but if from neglect, or a more selfish and cautious motive, he had omitted to take the preparatory oath, he was exempt under the act. This was admitted, but it was urged in answer that we must regard the views and opinions of foreign governments, and only assume such a position in the statute as could be defended against their objections; that men who had not made the preliminary declaration of intention were merely foreigners domiciled in the United States, and still under the allegiance of their parent governments, at least their governments might so claim, and we might thus incur the risk of a misunderstanding, at a very inopportune moment, besides checking in a material degree the tide of agricultural and mechanical immigration, by requiring service of those only domiciled, or of any except the fully naturalized; those who had declared, under the statute, their intention to become naturalized, and those who, with or without these conditions, had exercised the right of suffrage. The writer was on the committee which arranged the details of the bill, and it has since seemed strange that it did not then occur to himself and his colleagues of the committee that the line drawn was not a very substantial or satisfactory one in the eyes of other governments, nor entirely just to ourselves. Those governments which maintain the doctrine of the indissoluble allegiance of birth, hold our own naturalization laws, and the acts of their own subjects done under those laws, as null and of no effect whatever; because, in their view, neither the laws nor the acts of their subjects, nor both combined, can dissolve the natural allegiance. From their point of view we have no more right to demand military service of a naturalized citizen, or of a person who has taken the preliminary oath of intention, or of one who has voted, with or without such compliance with the act of Congress, than we have to demand it of a merely domiciled foreign subject, because the naturalized citizen, or the hasty or presuming voter, not being, in the opinion of such governments, released from his original allegiance by these things, is still subject to the command of his native government. We are therefore at liberty to deal with the matter on its own merits, and in doing this it may well be considered whether the duty of defending the government, as of paying taxes for its support, should not be exacted of every one permanently settled within its jurisdiction, and accepting its protection. In the event of irreconcilable difference of opinion between the United States and any foreign government upon the law of these cases, the ultimate resource for a solution of the difficulty has been stated with much force and clearness in a despatch addressed by General Cass, while Secretary of State, to our ministers abroad in relation to several most important and interesting maritime questions: "They (the United States) claim the right to decide for themselves what is the law of nations, and they yield the same privilege to other independent powers. If positions are assumed by other nations which affect injuriously the rights of this country, and which it believes are in contravention of the code of international law, its remedy is well defined and depends upon itself. A just deference is due to those differences of opinion which may honestly arise in the vast variety of subjects involved in the intercourse of nations; and they should be considered in a spirit of reasonable forbearance but that limit passed, duty and honor equally enjoin resistance." The latest attempt at negotiation between the United States and any foreign government upon this subject which has been made public, was with Prussia. During the last residence of the late Mr. Wright at Berlin the Prussian government was brought by that valuable public servant, who was an ardent and able defender of the rights of our naturalized citizens, to make proposals, which, though not deemed entirely satisfactory and acceptable by the present administration, were certainly a long way in advance of anything that government has heretofore conceded. In the progress of the correspondence upon the subject Mr. Seward observes to Mr. Wright: "The United States have accepted and established a government upon the principle of the right of men who have committed no crime to choose the state in which they will live, and to incorporate themselves as members of that state, and to enjoy henceforth its privileges and benefits, among which is included protection. This principle is recommended by sentiments of humanity and abstract justice. ˆ It is a principle which we cannot waive." It is a principle we cannot waive without being false to our origin, to our institutions, to our history, to the highest interests of humanity, to natural right and to international law. It is very certain we will not waive it. It is very desirable that other governments will discern the justice and necessity of yielding their assent to it without further or serious controversy. NOTE.-By accident a quotation from Bynkershoek, who succeeded Grotius and Puffendorf, and who was the greatest lawyer of his day, was omitted from its proper place in the argument until the foregoing was in print. He affirmed in clear terms the right of expatriation, and said that with all nations except China, Muscovy, and England, it was, and had always been, the right of each man to change his nationality, "De se transplanter ailleurs, et par là, de depouiller la sujettion où l'on etait, par rapport au Souverain du pays qu'on a quitté."* It would seem that since his time several other governments have been willing to join in the lead of China on this question. England has sometimes objected since then to both the internal and foreign policy of China on other subjects; and when we consider how very different was the Muscovy of the 17th century from the Russia of the 19th, England appears to have been curiously assorted, as put by Bynkershoek, on a question of law and internal and foreign policy. To-day China heads the list of nations adhering to one view of this great question, while the United States head the list adhering to the opposite and rational view. COPENHAGEN, August, 1867. Mr. Yeuman to Mr. Seward. [Extract.] No. 87.] * * LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, * * * * SIR: * Referring to the subject of my communication of the 4th December, 1866, and which was numbered by the department in my despatch No. 43, I have now to say that when I wrote it I was ignorant of the fact that the whole subject-matter had been so thoroughly investigated by any government as was done by the British government in 1860 and 1861. I now forward to the State Department, in the package named above, a book printed by order of the House of Commons, and kindly procured for me by my very obliging colleague, Sir Charles Murray, the English envoy at this court. I have perused it with much interest and instruction, and from its dimensions you will perceive it was no small undertaking. The book comprises the report of a committee of the House of Commons, a vast mass of evidence comprised in the answers to several thousand questions put to witnesses who were examined, the official opinions of nearly all the diplo *Du Juge Competent des Ambassadeurs, chap. III, sec. VI. matic agents in the service of the British government at that time, and reports or statements, furnished upon request, by the foreign offices of nearly all the governments with which Great Britain holds diplomatic intercourse. Very much of all this has relation to subjects of minor interest to the American statesman and diplomatist, such as a scale of pensions and the service that will entitle to a pension, the question of unpaid attachés, messengers' leave of absence, interchange of persons and service between the state department and legations abroad, and between the legations and the consular force, and to a system of examination for admittance into the diplomatic service. But much of the contents of the book also relates to the questions I discussed in my above-named despatch No. 43, and by the evidence and opinions upon those subjects I have been confirmed in all the views I then ventured to express. There are also in this book many suggestions worthy of consideration in regard to the general conduct of diplomatic business, among which I may mention that I have been especially interested by the evidence upon the question raised as to the effect of the publication of "blue books," and upon the benefits of a private correspondence between the head of the foreign office and the ministers abroad. I am not advised that this investigation led to any material change in the organization of the diplomatic service of Great Britain. The term of unpaid service among the junior attachés was shortened and made definite. Upon several points wherein change had been proposed the evidence differed widely. The result of all the evidence seemed to be that the British service was organized at least as well as any other; and as to compensation, while the diplomatists were complaining of being underpaid, Parliament was complaining of the large amount of money the diplomatic service was costing the country. Upon this subject it will be observed that besides outfits, retiring pensions, a greater working force of attachés and secretaries, and practically a life estate in the office, four considerations certainly very material, the English diplomatic agent has generally about three times the amount of annual salary received by his American colleague. The French and Russian compensations are not so easily estimated, owing to the several different forms in which they are made, but it appears probable they are no less well served than the English. I will not here discuss whether this monstrous disparity redounds to our interests and our political and national influence. As to its compatibility with our institutions, it is directly the reverse, because it tends to attach a property or money qualification to the office, which it is confessed in the book is really the case in England, notwithstanding their much better pay. My attention was arrested in a marked manner by the answers to questions Nos. 1137, 1185, 1356,' 1403, 1617, 1765, and 2234. I marked with pencil various passages in the book as I read it, which was done with the intention of making an abstract or summary of its contents for the department and others who might feel interested in the matter; but I have concluded that the value of any such epitome would not compensate for the labor of making it, and that in any event the unabridged original would be more satisfactory to those who should wish to examine the questions thoroughly, and I therefore send the book to the department. It is probably already in the department library, but it is also possible that the attention of yourself and of the appropriate committees of Congress has not been called to its interesting contents. It will of course be understood that in marking so many passages in the book I have not thereby always indicated my approval of the opinions expressed, or indicated any opinion of the significance of the facts stated, but only that the matter noted was worthy of consideration in making such a synopsis of the evidence as I had at first intended doing. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. GEORGE H. YEAMAN. Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward. [Extract.] No. 89.] * * * LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, * * * * SIR: Since my last despatches with reference to that [the North Schleswig question] matter there has been much discussion and interest in relation to the subject throughout Europe. I have not deemed it necessary to repeat to you all the mere reports upon the subject, but I may now say that it appears tolerably certain that France took the initiativeof diplomatic representation and interference in behalf of Denmark by insisting upon the execution of the fifth article of the treaty of Prague, it having been inserted into the preliminaries of Nicholsbourg at the instance of the Emperor. This movement from Paris has been promptly and energetically repelled by the cabinet of Berlin, upon the ground that Prussia can submit to no interference by any other power in the relations between Prussia and German affairs. It seems nearly as plain that Austria has declined the invitation of France to make a joint representation to the cabinet of Berlin, and that Russia, without a formal representation, has contrived to make her opinions known and to throw her influence in favor of Denmark. It seems that England has done nothing except to indicate a tolerably plain intention to do nothing. If it is a matter of any interest to the government of Berlin to know the opinions and wishes of other governments in Europe, it is now sufficiently clear that the course pursued on the subject is distinctly condemned by some, and regretted by all. But this may in the end injure Denmark by misleading her. It is the opinion of some of my colleagues that Denmark counts too much and unreasonably upon the active and efficient aid of other powers, and that this expectation may make her more unyielding than good policy would indicate. No nation is going to war about the Schleswig question. It may be used as one pretext for war when France and Prussia fight, but its real use and importance will be to enable France to draw Denmark into an alliance; and that was the object of the late preliminary representation. It was known beforehand precisely what fate it would meet with. * * * * * By invitation, about a dozen French journalists and members of the assembly are on a visit to Copenhagen. They are such as have shown most interest in behalf of Denmark, and are the guests of the citizens. French and Danish flags are flying side by side on private and public buildings. The invitation and the visit, at this juncture, have made their natural suggestions to the German mind. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. GEORGE H. YEAMAN. Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward. No. 93.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: The French visitors have returned to Paris, after a most pleasant sojourn in Denmark, attended with much hospitality and many very marked attentions. Before their departure, the King conferred on the deputies to the French assembly the order of the Grand Commander. This has much pleased the people here; for it is alleged that in view of the relations between Denmark and Prussia, between Prussia and France, and in turn between France and Denmark, it required some decision and boldness to take the step. There has been for some months much rumor of state or political marriages in northern Europe: first, between the Princess Louise, of Sweden, and the Prince Royal Frederick, of Denmark; then between the same princess and Prince Albert, of Prussia, cousin of the prince royal of that kingdom; and now again it is to be between Sweden and Denmark. I have never been acquainted with enough consistency or evidence of these things to make them of much consequence. Still they are interesting from the view taken of them here. First, the Scandinavian or national party rejoiced at the prospect either of ultimate Scandinavian union, or at least of the greater probability of an alliance between Sweden and Denmark in any contest with Germany. Then followed some chagrin, and fear that the policy of Sweden had changed, and that the cabinet of Stockholm was looking to an alliance with that of Berlin, with the view of effecting the ultimate partition of Denmark. Then followed a little elation when it was semi-officially announced here that the Swedo-Prussian alliance was broken off; the "Emperor," who is usually thought to be ubiquitous, was thanked and praised, and the devoirs of Prince Frederick are again supposed to be delightfully in the ascendant. Of course I do not know what marriage will occur, and what will not; but the whole matter is of much less political importance than some have supposed, and much less than it might have been in times gone by. The time and the political system that gave importance to state marriages, so far as they affected alliances, seem in a great measure to have passed away, and I cannot regard such things as of much importance in countries where public opinion and constitutional government have made so much progress and obtained such foothold as they have in Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. GEORGE H. YEAMAN. Mr. Yeaman to Mr. Seward. No. 95.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR Referring to the subject of my despatch, No. 70, of the 28th May last, and to your circular of the 29th March last, received at this legation the 30th July last, and to your despatch of the 6th July last, No. 46, I have now to say that recent publications, in both European and American papers, stating that some of the diplomatic servants of the United States had appeared in military uniform, in virtue of the construction given by the department in that circular to the two acts of Congress affecting the subject, have only served to place other members of the diplomatic service in a still more embarrassing position. I have already declined to attend some occasions at which uniforms were worn, (also attending one in citizen's dress when my absence would have subjected me to unjust criticism, and given rise to false and unjust inferences against my government,) and my absence from fêtes where uniforms are worn, of course gives rise to an explanation. Then when the announcement is made that American diplomats at other capitals wear uniforms, that causes inquiries and observations and gives rise to another explanation; and when that explanation is made the wondering foreigner thinks he has discovered at last that after all we have classes and castes, and that a gentleman who has been in the military service is something more than an American citizen, and that they were mistaken in supposing that a man not actually in the public service was only a private citizen, and that a diplomat was only a diplomat while in that service. |