the subject. It is undoubtedly the duty of Congress to provide by law for a prompt and just compensation to individuals whose property is thus seized; but, until Congress has provided by law for such cases, and appropriated money out of the national Treasury for such objects, the War Department can have no authority over the subject. I have purposely avoided inquiring into the authority of the quartermaster to make the impressment in this case, or into the sufficiency of the proof offered by the claimant in support of his claim to compensation. And my previous remarks have been founded entirely upon the presumption that Mr. Edwards, the quartermaster, had authority to impress in the manner he did; that the evidence offered by the claimant is sufficient to establish the fact of the impressment; and that the property was applied to the use of the United States. If either of these presumptions is, however, negatived by the facts of the case, (as seems to be the opinion of the Third Auditor,) then the claimant could not have the relief asked for, even if the War Department were clothed with the authority to grant relief in such cases, and money had been appropriated from the Treasury for that purpose. If a person makes an impressment who has no authority to do so, the individual, and not the United States, is responsible in damages for the act. Having come to the conclusion that Congress alone can grant the relief asked for, any further remarks from me on the subject are unnecessary. I am, sir, &c., &c., FELIX GRUNDY. To the SECRETARY OF WAR. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, April 16, 1839. SIR: I have had the honor to receive your communication relative to he claim of John Compton, assignee of Garrigues Flaujac. This claim is set up under the act of Congress approved June 15, 1832, ntitled “An act to authorize the inhabitants of the State of Louisiana to nter the back lands;" and the act of Congress supplementary thereto, aproved February 24, 1835. The first clause of the first section of the act of June 15, 1832, is in the ollowing words: "That every person who, either by virtue of a French Spanish grant recognised by the laws of the United States, or under a aim confirmed by the commissioners appointed for the purpose of ascer. ining the rights of persons claiming lands in the State of Louisiana, or y virtue of any title derived from the United States, owns a tract of land rdering on any river, creek, bayou, or watercourse, in the said Territory, d not exceeding in depth forty arpens, (French measure,) shall be entitled a preference in becoming the purchaser of any vacant tract of land adcent to and back of his own tract, not exceeding forty arpens (French easure) in depth, nor in quantity of land that which is contained in his n tract, at the same price, and on the same terms and conditions, as are may be provided by law for the other public lands in the said State." This provision of law clearly gave to those inhabitants of Louisiana who re, at the time of the approval of the act, owners of a tract of land situd on any river, creek, bayou, or watercourse, and to those only, the right to enter an additional quantity in the rear thereof. The act does not apply to those who may become owners thereafter, nor to those who may have been owners of land before; but to those only who were owners of any tract of land, in the manner described by the act, at the time of its approval. Those persons who were entitled to the benefits of this act, were also required to make the entry within three years from the date thereof; which time was, however, by the supplemental act of February 24, 1835, extend ed to the 15th of June, 1836. This supplemental act was not intended to enlarge the benefits conferred by it, in any other respect than in point of time. The only remaining inquiry, therefore, is, was Compton or his as signee (Flaujac) the owner of a tract of land, as described in the act of June 15, 1832, at the date of its approval? I will proceed to answer this inquiry. On the 20th of May, 1826, an act of Congress was approved, entitled "An act for the relief of Garrigues Flanjac, of Louisiana ;" and the following is the whole of the act: "Be it enacted, &c., That Garrigues Flaujac, of the county of Opelousas, in the State of Louisiana, or his legal representatives, are hereby authotized and empowered to locate a certain tract of land, derived from an order of survey in favor of Louis Berton de Antilly, for three thousand two hundred (3,200) superficial arpens of land, being forty arpens in frout by forty arpens in depth, on both sides of bayou Grosse Tete, in Louisiana; and which said tract of land was confirmed by an act of Congress dated the 28th day of February, 1823, in conformity with the report of the regis ter and receiver of the eastern land district of Louisiana; the said tract of land thus confirmed having been surveyed and sold by the United States: which location shall be made upon any of the unappropriated public lands in the southwestern district of Louisiana, south of the Red river: Provided, That the said location shall, as far as possible, be made in one body, and conform as nearly as practicable to the lines of the public surveys: And provided, also, That the said Garrigues Flanjac, or his legal representatives, before such location, shall release to the United States, in such manuer as the Commissioner of the General Land Office shall direct, all his right, title, claim, and interest, in the land heretofore confirmed to him on the said bayou Grosse Tête; and the said release and location shall be made in ose year from aud after the passage of this act." In this act is comprised a history of this claim, from its inception up to that date; and the supplemental act of May 1, 1834, still further extends the history. It is in the following words: "That Garrigues Flaujac, of Louisiana, or his legal representatives, be, and they are hereby, authorized to locate the tract of land of three thousard two hundred arpens, described in the act to which this is supplementary, upon any of the unappropriated public lands in the southwestern district of lands south of Red river, in portions of not less than eight hundred superficial arpens, couforming, as nearly as practicable, to the lines of the public surveys: Provided, That, in addition to the release heretofore ese cuted, the said Flanjac shall further, within one year from the passage of this act, release to the United States, in such form as the Commissioner & the General Land Office may direct, all right, title, and claim to or in any lands heretofore located pursuant to the act of which this is a supplement: And provided, further, That the new location herein authorized shall le made in one year from and after the passage of this act.” Pursuant to the provisions of this act, an entry was made of the tract in front of the one now claimed, and situated on Red river. This being done, the tract of land now claimed, and lying in the rear of that thus entered, was claimed as a back pre-emption, under the law of June 15, 1832, already referred to; and on the 24th of May, 1836, the land officers at Opelousas allowed this additional entry to be made under the law. This entry, however, the Commissioner of the General Land Office considered not warranted by the law, and refused to sanction it by any official act of his; and he asked your instruction on the point whether the said tract of land was subject to entry as a back pre emption: which question is referred by you to me. Upon a view of the foregoing facts, it appears clearly that, at the date of the act of June 15, 1832, the legislative grant made by Congress to Flaujac was unlocated; and could not, therefore, be considered as complete, in respect to this or any other particular tract or parcel of land. Flaujac was not, therefore, the owner of this particular tract, under the law of 1826 for his relief, at the date of the law of 1832; and could not be entitled to its benefits. Nor was he entitled to the benefits of this law under the supplemental act of 1835; which, as before stated, merely extended the time within which an entry might be made by a person entitled under the provision of the former act. Nor can I discover that the claimant has any right to the land in controversy, as an incident to an original Spanish title of which he is the assignce; for, if he might otherwise have had such a right, the laws referred to afford positive proof of its having been expressly relinquished by his assignor. My opinion, therefore, is, that the land in controversy was not subject to pre-emption under the act of June 15, 1832, entitled "An act to authorize the inhabitants of the State of Louisiana to enter the back lands," nor under the provisions of the act supplemental thereto. I am, sir, &c., &c., To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. FELIX GRUNDY. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, SIR: I have had the honor to receive your communication of the 13th stant, relative to the claims of Doctor Glenn and others to enter lands nder the pre-emption laws, in which my opinion is asked upon the legal estions involved in the said claims. The main question involved, is, whether the land claimed is subject to try under the pre-emption laws; or, on the contrary, has been reserved ad taken out of the class of public lands, and consequently withdrawn om the operation of those laws? In accordance with the request conined in your letter, I shall proceed to answer this inquiry. On the 3d of March, 1817, an act of Congress was approved, entitled An act to set apart and dispose of certain public lands for the encourageent of the cultivation of the vine and olive." The title of this act very arly explains its general nature and design. It was to appropriate a cern portion of the public domain for the encouragement of the cultivation the vine and olive. In accordance with this general design of Congress, e body of the act provided that four contiguous townships of land, in a tain land district within the then Territory of Mississippi, (now the State of Alabama,) should be set apart from the class of public lands, and reserved from public and private sale, and devoted to the objects and purposes specified in the law. Pursuant to this law, four townships of land, including the land now claimed by Doctor Glenn and others under the pre-emption laws, were actually reserved; and that portion of the language of the law which makes the reservation, makes it without modification or limitation; and the reservation, being thus made indefinite and unlimited by the law, must necessarily have so continued ever since, unless some subsequent legislation of Congress has altered its nature and extent. The next inquiry, therefore, is, has any such legislation taken place? I have carefully examined the various acts and supplements of acts of Congress, &c., professing to alter or amend the act of March 3, 1817, under which the original reservation was made, (namely, the acts approved April 26, 1822; February 19, 1831; February 19, 1833; and March 2, 1837 and can discover in them no intention on the part of Congress to throw back into the class of public lands the four townships above referred to. Nor can I discover in either of the pre-emption laws any evidence warranting the conclusion that the National Legislature designed that these lands should be subject to the operation of those laws. On the contrary, their provisions appear to me plainly to manifest an opposite intention on the part of the Legislature; for all of these expressly provide that lands re served by law shall not be subject to entry under their provisions. It is also a very strong, if not conclusive, consideration in favor of the same opinion, that it was no part of the general motive and intention of the Legislature, in making the pre-emption laws, to throw back into the class of public lands, and subject to the operation of the general land system of the nation, those tracts which had been excepted and taken out of them by some special law, and for some special purpose. But the true design of those pre emption laws was to give pre emption rights to settlers upon those lands which undeniably belonged to the class of public lands, and were subject to the operation of the general land laws of the United States. My opinion, therefore, is, that as those lands only are subject to the night of pre-emption which belong to the class of public lands, and which, but for the pre-emption laws, would be subject to the operation of the geners! land system of the country; and that, as Congress has excepted and taken the land in controversy out of the class of public lands, and has never ma ifested any intention on its part to replace them, or subject them to re emption entries,-the original reservation must be considered as still in force. and the four sections of land now in controversy as not subject to entry the manner claimed by Doctor Glenn and others. Were any thing further necessary on this subject, a conclusive argument as to the intention of Congress is furnished by the act of 2d of March, 1837; by the 2d section of which, it is expressly provided that any remainder of said four sections not disposed of by the 1st section of this act, shall be subject to entry af one dollar and twenty five cents per acre, by the trustees of the Demopolis Female Academy, in trust for the use and benefit of said institution. The first section of this act had made provision for those who held clas to portions of said four sections of land under the Tombigbee Association and by the 2d section, a right to enter the whole residuum is vested in the Demopolis Female Academy, thereby excluding all other purchasers. I am, sir, &c., &c., To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. FELIX GRUNDY SIR: I have had the honor to receive your communication of the 16th instant, relative to the legality of the contract (a copy of which is before me) entered into between the Fifth Auditor, (Mr. Pleasanton,) on behalf of the United States, and Charles W. B. Morgan, William R. Rodman, and Edward Merrill, for themselves. The questions presented by you to me are 1. "Is the contract illegal, in respect to the time of payment stipulated?" 2. "If so, and the United States decline to comply with its stipulations, only so far as the articles are delivered and the services are performed, is the other party to the contract bound to fulfil or continue it?" On the 31st of January, 1823, an act of Congress was approved, entitled "An act concerning the disbursement of public money;" the first section of which provides, "that from and after the passing of this act, no advance of public money shall be made in any case whatever; but in all cases of contracts for the performance of any service, or the delivery of articles of any description, for the use of the United States, payment shall not excced the value of the service rendered, or of the articles delivered previously to such payment: Provided, That it shall be lawful, under the special direction of the President of the United States, to make such advances to the disbursing officers of the Government as may be necessary to the faithful and prompt discharge of their respective duties, and to the fulfilment of the public engagements: And provided, also, That the President of the United States may direct such advances as he may deem necessary and proper, to such persons in the military and naval service as may be employed on distant stations, where the discharge of the pay and emoluments to which they may be entitled cannot be regularly effected." This law very plainly commands that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury of the United States, on a contract for the performance of any service, or the delivery of any articles, until the service has been actually rendered or the articles delivered, except in the cases embraced by the terms of the two provisions above quoted. The contract under consideration is clearly included in the general provisions of the law, and is not excepted out of their operation by the provisces. If, therefore, this contract does stipulate for the payment of money out of the national Treasury for the performance of any services, or the delivery of any articles, before the actual rendition of the services or delivery of the articles, it is clearly so far made in violation of the law, and not binding on the United States. But if the language of this contract clearly admits of two constructionsthe one of which will render it conformable to the law, and the other a violation of the law-the former construction ought, in my judgment, to be given to it. And my opinion is, that the contract under consideration does fairly admit of a construction in accordance with the law to which reference has been made; for, after stating the services to be rendered to the United States, by furnishing the oil and other articles necessary for the use of the various light-houses of the United States, the contract further states the rate of compensation, and stipulates that "the said sum" be paid to the party of the second part, on the first day of April in each year, or as soon thereafter as may be. Now, in view of the law as above stated, (which law both the contracting parties must be presumed to have known when the contract was made,) is it not reasonable to suppose this stipulation |