YATES, J.-No person can gain a settlement by a service, which he was not capable of hiring himself to. The master might have revoked his consent, and called him back at any time. There is no privity between the first master and the second. I think the settlement is where he last served under the apprenticeship for forty days. ASTON, J.-The difficulty has arisen from the apprentice's happening to have hired himself to one of the same trade. Had it been another trade, no man could have entertained a doubt. Lord MANSFIELD, C. J.-This is no service to the master, nor an assignment of the apprentice. But the indenture continues, and disables him from gaining another settlement. Per tot. Cur.-Orders confirmed (m). (m) So where the master being dead, the widow told the apprentice he must not stay with her, and that he was at liberty to work where he thought proper; upon which he served two years in C.: he did not gain a settlement there; R. v. Chirk, Burr. S. C. 782; indeed in that case she had not taken out administration, and had not any interest; as to which point, see R. v. Barnsley, 1 M. & S. 377. So where the master said he had no further employment for him, he might go where he pleased; R. v. Crediton, 1 East, 59. So where a person told the original master that he had got his apprentice at work, to which the latter replied, "I am glad of it, he was a bad lad, and I could make nothing of him;" R. v. St. Helen, Stonegate, 1 East, 285. So where the master having quitted business, his apprentice hired herself as a servant for fifty-one weeks, and her master afterwards expressed his approbation at her having gone into that particular service, she did not gain a settlement by such hiring; R. v. Ashby de-la-Zouch, 1 B. & A. 116. So where MONEY and Others v. LEACH. S. C. 3 Burr. 1742; 19 How. St. Tr. 1002. ERROR from Common Pleas. Action of trespass and false imprisonment, for breaking and entering the house of the defendant in error (the plaintiff below) and imprisoning him for five days, without any reasonable or probable cause. The defendants below, now plaintiffs in error, pleaded the general issue, and also a special justification, stating his Majesty's speech, 19th April, 1763, and the North Briton, No. 45 (n), (n) This celebrated No. 45 has given rise to many reported cases besides the present one. See the report of a similar action, Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205. John Wilkes, Esq., the author, was arrested by a general warrant from the Secretary of State, April 30th, 1763, but being brought up in C. P. by habeas corpus, he General war rants are illegal and void. [ MONEY v. LEACH. 23d April, 1763, highly reflecting on the same, and published by one John Wilkes:-That the Earl of Halifax was then Secretary of State, and a lord of the Privy Council; and, upon information given him of the said libel, and producing the same before him, 26th April, 1763, he issued his warrant (o) in writing, under hand and seal, to the defendants and another, being four of his Majesty's messengers in ordinary, requiring them (taking a constable to their assistance) to search for the authors, printers and publishers, of the said seditious and treasonable libel, and to apprehend and seize them, together with their papers: That the plaintiff Leach was a printer, and had printed some former numbers of the North Briton (stating them): That, on 27th April, 1763, the defendants had information, that he was the printer of No. 45; and therefore they, 556 with one Thomas Freeman a constable, did enter the plaintiff's house, the door being open, and search for the printers of the said libel: That they found the plaintiff and his servants reprinting a new edition of the North Briton; whereupon they took him into custody, and kept him four days, till the Earl of Halifax had leisure to examine him: and then, it appearing that he did not print the said No. 45, he was discharged; which are the same, &c.-Leach replies, de injuriá suâ propriâ absque hoc, &c. And thereupon, and upon the general issue aforesaid, issue was joined, and came on to trial, before Pratt, C. J., 29th November, 1764, at Guildhall: At which time a bill of exceptions was tendered by the defendant's counsel, and on 10th December following, was sealed by the Chief Justice; stating the proof of the facts in the declaration, and " that the counsel for the defendants, in order to acquit defendants under the general issue, did prove the King's speech, libel, office of Lord Halifax, information, and warrant to the defendants being his Majesty's messengers (as before stated in their justification), and that it was the long and frequent usage of office to grant and execute such warrants; that they had such grounds of suspicion, and did such acts, &c. as are stated in the said plea;and that it was proved, that plaintiff was not the author, printer, or publisher, of the said paper, No. 45. Whereupon the counsel for the defendants insisted on the benefit of the stat. 24 Geo. 2, c. 44, for indemnifying constables, &c. acting in obedience to the warrants of justices of the peace; and that the matters aforesaid were conclusive evidence (p), for that purpose and to bar the action of the plaintiff. The counsel Bill of exceptions. fine of 500l., and to be imprisoned for ten action against R. Wood, Esq., for breaking and entering his house, who justified under the general warrant of the Secretary of State: the plaintiff had a verdict for 10001. damages; Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft, 1, 19 H. S. T. 1154, S. C. (0) See the form, 3 Burr. 1747, Bull. N. P. 317. (p) Chichester v. Philips, T. Raym. 404, T. Jones, 146; Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161; Bull. N. P. 315. for the plaintiff insisted, that neither the defendants nor the De Grey, Solicitor-General, for the plaintiff in error, made three points: 1st, That, under the stat. 7 Jac. 1, c. 5, the defendants had a right to give the special matter in evidence on their plea of Not guilty; or, in other words, that Lord Halifax was a justice of peace under the equity of that statute. 2d, That the special matter so to be given in evidence was a sufficient justification, which includes the legality of the warrant, and the manner of its execution. 3d, That the defendants, being officers in the execution of justice, were excusable, even if the warrant was illegal, the plaintiff not having pursued the directions of stat. 24 Geo. 2, c. 44.-1st, Before Edw. 3d. there were different species of justices (s). The great officers of state were so, as being incidental to their offices. Secretaries of State are certainly conservators of the peace, ex necessitate rei, being officers as old as the Crown. The statute Edw. 1st., commented on by Lord Coke, 2 Inst. 556, refers to the seal in custody of the principal Secretary: the seal is as old as the Crown: the Secretary as old as the seal. They have great powers by prescription, recognized by the Courts of law, in treason, felony, and even misdemesnors. The present misdemesnor is a crime against the State. Private defamatory libels are no otherwise public offences than assaults and batteries are, but seditious libels are immediately levelled against the existence of government. In K. against (q) S. 6, which enacts, that no action shall be brought against any constable, headborough, or other officer, or person aiding him, for any thing done in obedience to any warrant of a justice of peace, until demand hath been made of the perusal and copy of such warrant, and refused: And in case, after such demand and compliance, any action shall be brought against such constable without making the justice defendant, on producing such warrant at the trial, the jury shall find for the defendant, notwithstanding any defect of jurisdiction in such justice. (7) Whereupon a writ issued to Pratt, C. J., commanding him to appear personally in K. B., "wheresoever, &c."' VOL. I. to confess or deny his seal to the bill of (s) Justices of the peace have power to G G MONEY V. LEACH. 557 ] -- Kendal and Roe, 5 Mod. 84, Comb. 343, Salk. 347 (t), the Case of Secretary Trumball: held incident to the office of Secretaries to commit (v). So Qu. and Darby, Fortesc. 140 (u), and the King and Earbury (w), 1733, coram Lord Hardwicke, C. J.; the defendant was seized, by a Secretary's warrant, with his papers: Motion to be discharged with his pa] *pers: Held, that he could not be discharged, nor his papers restored upon motion. See Barnardiston for the fact only. From 1 Ed. 3, to 2 Hen. 5, the magistrates were called only wardens, conservators, and commissioners of the peace. In Hen. 5th's time, called justices, because then made justices of Oyer and Terminer. Conservators therefore are still kept on foot, and the modern justices have half their authority merely as conservators. They hold Sessions as justices: they apprehend merely as conservators; Kelynge, 76; 2 Roll. Abr. 95, caption of indictment need not call them justices. It is reasonable, that all conservators by prescription, as the Master of the Rolls confessedly is, should have the benefit of the statutes in question. Stat. 2 H. 5, c. 4, justices of the peace shall be resiant in their shires, except lords named in the commission, and the justices of Westminster-Hall. There are therefore some justices not named in the commission. The intention of all acts of Parliament must govern their interpretation: Plowd. 366; Co. Litt. 24 b; 10 Rep. 101 b; Plowd. 147; Plowd. 36; Bro. Parl. 20; Wentw. Exec. 67; Plummer and Whichcote, T. Jones, 62. And in Moor, 845, Phelps and Winchcombe, though a deputy constable is not named in stat. 7 Jac. 1, yet held to be within it.-2d, Whether the special matter is a sufficient justification, exclusive of the statute 24 Geo. 2. Objections to the warrant are: 1. That it is uncertain as to person: 2. Unlimited as to power. It is no objection to the legality that it is capable of being abused. It is a prescriptive power. It has constantly been used, as far as records will reach. It must therefore be presumed to have been always used beyond the time of memory. No judicature can subsist, if a possibility of abuse, and of a time when it did not exist, be allowed to shake it. Usage establishes a right: K. and Bewdley, 1 Wms. 207; India Co. and Skinner, Comb. 342; 6 Mod. 179. The very jurisdiction of the Courts at Westminster depends on usage; as in case of quo minus, ac etiams, ejectments, new trials, &c.-Similar warrants have been brought before this Court for a century past, and never dis (t) S. C. 1 Ld. Raym. 65, Holt, 144, Skin. 596, 12 Mod. 82, 12 How. St. Tr. 1299. (v) S. P. Howel's Ca., 1 Leon. 70; Helyard's Ca., 2 Leon. 175, which were commitments by a Secretary of State: but in both cases the return to the habeas corpus was held insufficient for not stating the cause of commitment; Yaxley's Ca., Carth. 291, Salk. 351, Comb. 224, Skin. 369, S. C.; R. v. Erbury, 9 G. 1, 8 Mod. 177; R. v. Despard, 7 T. R. 742. Per Lord Kenyon, C. J.: "Secretaries of State are allowed the power of commitment in order to bring offenders to trial;" 1 Bla. Comm. 338. See also Beardmore v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 244; Entick v. Carrington, Id. 275, 290, 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, 1045. (u) 19 How. St. Tr. 1014, n. S. C. (w) 7 G. 2, W. Kelynge, 161, 2 Barnard. 293, 346. allowed. And yet, 1 Hal. 578, it is incumbent on the Court MONEY v. LEACH. * 559 ] Dunning for defendant in error.-The sole question is, whether this case is within the statute 24 Geo. 2; for that involves the questions on 7 & 21 Jac. 1. Consider, 1. Whether Lord Halifax was a justice of peace: 2. Whether messengers are constables, headboroughs, &c.: 3. Whether the present action is brought for any thing done by a justice of peace. 1. Secretaries of State are not justices, strictly taken. I allow, they may commit for high treason (y): so held in Kendal and Roe; doubtless upon good reason, though what that reason is, does not appear. They are not conservators of the peace, though of similar authority in case of high treason. The conservatorship not incident to the office of secretary or privy counsellor. What powers they have, already established by law, are founded merely in prescription. But the power now claimed is not pretended to be older than the revolution. The statute, 24 Geo. 2, begins with officers inferior to the Secretaries of State; therefore cannot extend to them. In the King and Loxden (z), an appointment of five overseers was held to be bad, [ *560 ] because the statute begins with number 4, and proceeds downwards. The mischief intended to be remedied by the act appears in the preamble. Not a word of secretaries or messengers there. Not in the contemplation of the Legislature. 4 Inst. 175, in margin, held that statute, 7 Jac. 1, does not extend to officers not named in the act. 2. Messengers are not recognized by any law as officers for the execution of justices' warrants. 3. This warrant, if good, is to apprehend the author, printers, and publishers of the North Briton, No. 45. The plaintiff is confessedly neither. The probable cause of suspicion alleged is founded neither on fact nor law. As to the validity of a general warrant to seize authors, &c. with their papers, it cannot be supported by usage, unless that usage is general to all magistrates, and not confined to this particular (a) 3 How. St. Tr. 293. (y) They may commit for treason generally, R. v. Wyndham, 1 Stra. 3, S. C. cited Andr, 272; Vin. Abr. Bail, (H ́a), * pl. 7; S. C. 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 16, s. 4, |