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Quarter Ses

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LUCAS, supported by Morton and Stowe, moved to arrest

sions has a ju- the judgment on an indictment found and tried at the West

risdiction over

conspiracies.

[ *369 ]

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minster Quarter Sessions, which states (q), that Antoniene Rispal, Henry Bolney, and John Delaporte wickedly and unlawfully did conspire, &c. falsely to charge and accuse one John Chilton," that he had then lately taken out of a bag, a quantity of human hairs, which bag was contained in a bale, "which consisted of five bags of hair, of the goods and chat"tels of the said Antoniene Rispal:" that Bolney and Delaporte, in pursuance of the said conspiracy, said to Chilton, that he was a man of credit, and had better make it up, than have his credit blasted: and that A. Rispal, in further pursuance of the said conspiracy, unlawfully and wickedly did extort from said Chilton 30l. and a promissory note for 337. as a composition for the said offence, and to desist from prosecution: whereas the said Chilton was never guilty of the said or the like offence,-to the damage of the said Chilton, to the evil example, &c. against the peace, &c.

*The exceptions taken were, 1st, That the Justices at Quarter Sessions have no jurisdiction over conspiracies, any more than over perjury, usury, and forgery; it not being specified in their commission, nor given them by any special statute: 2dly, The indictment does not charge them to have conspired to fix any crime on the defendant; but only taking hairs out of a bag, which might be a lawful act.

Norton, Solicitor-General, and Baynham shewed for cause, 1st, That the Quarter Sessions, under the general words of their commission, have cognizance of all crimes that tend, either directly or consequentially, to a breach of the peace: that conspiracies have this tendency, in the same manner as libels, which are indictable at the Sessions without being specified in the commission. So is extortion also, and this is a conspiracy to extort. 2dly, The charge is a conspiracy to extort money; (that is the end of the contrivance; the means are insignificant); and that Rispal did actually extort; which is a substantive charge upon him; and therefore, quacunque vid datá, there is ground sufficient for the Court to give judgment against Rispal.

Lord MANSFIELD, C. J.-This case lies in a narrow compass.

1st. The first question is, whether the Justices at Sessions have a jurisdiction over conspiracies. No authority has been cited to shew that they have not, nor that they have. It must therefore be determined upon general principles. The cases of per

(q) See the indictment at length; Cro. Cir. Co. 135 (ed. 1811).

jury (r), forgery (s), and usury (t), stand upon their own special grounds; and it has been determined, that the Justices have no jurisdiction there. This offence of conspiracy is a trespass, and trespasses are indictable at Sessions, though not committed vi et armis. They tend to the breach of the peace, as much as cheats or libels (v), which are established to be within the jurisdiction of Sessions. As therefore there is no authority to the contrary, I think that the Justices had a jurisdiction here (u).

THE KING

v.

RISPAL.

Getting money out of a man, by charge him with false fact, is indictable, whecharged be, or be not, criminal

conspiring to

a

*2dly. Whether a sufficient crime be laid in this indictment, [370] to enable the Court to give judgment. The crime laid is an unlawful conspiracy: this, whether it be to charge a man with criminal acts, or such as only may affect his reputation, is fully sufficient. The several charges in the indictment are not to be considered as distinct and separate counts, but as one and the same united and continued offence, pursued through its different stages. And then it is clear, that the whole will amount to an indictable offence; viz. the getting money out of in itself. a man, by conspiring to charge him with a false fact (w). DENNISON, FOSTER, WILMOT, Js., accord.

Rule for arresting the judgment discharged.

(r) The Justices at Sessions have no jurisdiction over perjury at common law; R. v. Bainton, 2 Stra. 1088; 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 8, s. 38. But they have jurisdiction over perjury under 5 Eliz. c. 9, for s. 9 expressly gives it them; 2 Hawk. ib. But indictments under that statute are rarely preferred.

(s) Reg. v. Yarrington, Salk. 406; R. v. Gibbs, 1 East, 173, in which case it was expressly determined, that the Sessions have no jurisdiction over forgery at common law, and they cannot take cognizance of it as a cheat: and, of course, not of forgery by statute, or any other newly created offence, unless such power be given them by the statute creating such offence. See R. v. Alsop, 4 Mod. 49.

(t) Reg. v. Smith, 2 Lord Raym. 1144, Salk. 680.

(v) 2 Hawk. ubi supra; R. v. Summers, 1 Lev. 139. A justice of the peace may commit a person charged with publishing a libel for want of sureties; Butt v. Conant, 1 Brod. & Bing. 548, 4 B. Mo. 195; in which case the authority of justices in cases of libel is fully discussed, and all the authorities are referred to.

(u) In a case in which a person had been indicted at the Sessions for soliciting a servant to rob his master, Lord Kenyon said, "I am clearly of opinion, that it is indictable at the Quarter Sessions, as fall

ing in with that class of offences, which,
being violations of the law of the land,
have a tendency, as it is said, to a breach
of the peace, and are therefore cognizable
by that jurisdiction. To this general rule
there are indeed two exceptions, namely,
forgery and perjury; why excepted I know
not, but having been expressly so adjudged,
I will not break through the rules of law."
Le Blanc, J., "The general words of the
commission of the peace comprehend all
trespasses; and the word trespasses not
only includes direct breaches of the peace,
but also all such offences as have a tendency
thereto and on that ground conspiracies
have been holden to be cognizable by the
Sessions; not as actual breaches of the
peace, but as tending thereto;" R. v. Hig-
gins, 2 East, 5, where R. v. Rispal was
cited and approved of. See 1 Hawk. P. C.
c. 72; Reg. v. Best, Salk. 174, 2 Lord
Raym. 1167.

(w) See R. v. Spragg, 2 Burr. 993;
Reg. v. Best, Salk. 174, where it is laid
down, that several persons may lawfully
meet and consult to prosecute a guilty per-
son; otherwise, if to charge one that is in-
nocent, right or wrong; for that is indict-
able; S. C. 2 Ld. Raym. 1167; R. v. Gill
& Henry, 2 B. & A. 204; 1 Hawk. P. C.
c. 72; and see also 30 G. 2, c. 24, s. 1;
4 G. 4, c. 54, s. 3; R. v. Parsons, post,
392.

ther the fact

Collusive notes to an edition of not take it out

the Statutes will

of the King's

printer's patent. But Chancery

between two contending patents, by the

summary way of injunction.

TRINITY TERM,-2 GEO. III. 1762.-IN CHANCERY.

BASKETT v. CUNNINGHAM and Others.
S. C. 2 Eden, 137.

DEFENDANT, in conjunction with several booksellers, was publishing, in weekly numbers, A Digest of the Statute Law, containing the statutes at large, methodized under alphabetical heads, with large notes from Lord Coke and other writers of the law. He had contracted with Strahan and Woodfall, the prowill not decide prietors of the patent for printing law books, to print this work, [371] and it was printed at their press. Baskett, the King's printer, (whose patent extends to all statutes, and which was confirmed as against all common printers in the Case of Baskett and the University of Cambridge (a), B. R. M. 32 Geo. 2), filed his bill against the proprietors and the law printers for an injunction; which was now moved for by Yorke, Attorney-General, Sewell, and De Grey, on the authority of that case, and the reasons urged in that argument; and also, because the notes subjoined to the present work appeared to be collusive, and merely calculated to shelter a pirated edition of the statutes (b). Perrot, Blackstone, Wilbraham, and Wedderburn, shewed for cause; 1st, That this book was not within the meaning of the letters patent, being a work of labour and industry, and in a method entirely new; 2dly, That, as they had printed at a privileged press, there could be no ground for an injunction, without determining the respective merits of the two interfering patents, both of which were sanctified by long usage. And though the law patentees in their answer disclaimed any property in the work, and therefore the plaintiff prayed no injunction against them, yet an absolute injunction could not be granted against the proprietors, without virtually including the law printers; for if they were forbid to print anywhere, they were also forbid to print at their press.

LORD CHANCELLOR was of opinion, that the work was entirely within the patent of the King's printer, and that the notes were merely collusive. But he would not interfere between the two contending patents, in the summary method of injunction; but left them to adjust their respective rights in due course of law (c). He therefore ordered an injunction to

(a) Ante, 105; which see, and the notes thereto.

(b) An injunction was granted against a colourable abridgment of the Term Reports; Butterworth v. Robinson, 5 Ves. J. 709. But the publication of an abridgment fairly made will not be restrained; Gyles v. Wilcox, Atk. 143; S. P. Dodsley v. Kinnersley, Ambl. 403, where it was also held, that an abstract of a work published in an annual register or magazine is not a piracy. But sec Macklin v.

Richardson, Id. 694.

(c) A bill by the King's printer in Ireland to establish his right to print and distribute the copies of the statutes for Ireland, under the order of the King, upon the resolutions of both Houses of Parliament of the United Kingdom, and for an account against the King's printer in England in that respect, was dismissed. Lord Eldon, C.-" The question here is upon the legal right of the plaintiff; and, if he can maintain an action upon the legal right,

issue, to restrain the proprietors from printing at any other than a patent press: which, as Woodfall and Strahan were secretly in league with Baskett, and were at that time jointly concerned in a new edition of the statutes, was equivalent to a total injunction; the law printers finding means to elude their contract with Cunningham.

the account is to be granted; if he cannot maintain the legal right, it is impossible to say he has an equity;" Grierson v. Eyre, 9 Ves. Jun. 341. See also to the point of not granting an injunction in cases where

the party applying could not maintain an
action at law for the piracy; Walcot v.
Walker, 7 Ves. Jun. 1; Southey v. Sher-
wood, 2 Meriv. 435. See also Barfield v.
Nicholson, 2 Sim. & St. 1.

BASKETT

บ.

CUNNINGHAM.

IN THE KING'S BENCH.

THE KING V. HARRISON, Chamberlain of London.

S. C. 3 Burr. 1322.

MANDAMUS to admit I. S. to the freedom of the city, having served an apprenticeship with a member of the Clothworkers' Company, and being himself made free of the same. The Chamberlain returns, that I. S. was by trade a butcher, and that, by a by-law of the city of London, all persons exercising that trade shall be free of the Butchers' Company; and therefore he refused to admit him to the freedom of the City. Upon this return, the validity of this by-law was argued by Yates for the Crown, and Eyre for the Chamberlain; and upon the whole, the Court was of opinion, that the by-law was a good one; and that the Case of Wannel and the Chamberlain of London, M. 12 Geo. 1, Stra. 675, on a similar bylaw, with respect to the Joiners' Company, was directly in point; and therefore allowed the return (d).

(d) But see Harrison v. Godman, 1 Burr. 12, where the same by-law was held bad : but that decision appears to have arisen from the defective return to a habeas corpus, which did not set out a special and particular custom to support it. As to bylaws, see Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms.

181; The Gunmakers v. Fell, Willes, 384,
and cases there referred to; Kirk v. Nowell,
1 T. R. 118; R. v. Faversham, 8 T. R.
352; R. v. Ashwell, 12 East, 22; Adley
v. Reeves, 2 M. & S. 53; Vin. Abr. By-
laws (B); Bac. Abr. Id. (B); Com. Dig.
Id. (B 4).

[ 372 ]

By-law, that a butcher in Lon

don shall be free of the Butchers'

Company, good.

HART qui tam v. HAWKINS.

S. C. 3 Burr. 1322.

DEFENDANT was charged in execution for a penalty recovered on a qui tam action, for exercising a trade, contrary to the statute 5 Eliz. (e). Baynham moved on the statute 32 Geo. 2, c. 28, to discharge him from the moiety of the penalty belonging to the informer, upon his giving up all his effects upon oath, according to the provisions of that statute. Norton,

(e) C. 4 in part repealed by 54 G. 3, c. 96: see R. v. Pemberton, ante, 230.

Defendant on a qui tam action cannot be discharged on surrendering his effects, under

the Lords' Act, 32 Geo. 2, c. 28.

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Solicitor-General, contra; because this would prejudice the interest of the Crown, which is entitled to the other moiety; and it is clear, that all the provisions in the statute 32 Geo. 2, extend only to private parties, and not to the King; nor can the interest of the King be severed from that of the informer, till after the debt is levied, and in the hands of the sheriff.

Baynham insisted, that the judgment was entered severally for each, and that the interest was thus severed by the judgment, and not by the execution only.

*Lord MANSFIELD, C. J.-I don't see how it is possible to bring this case within the act. Must the defendant part with his whole substance to the plaintiff for his one moiety? Must the Crown be left totally destitute? Not one of the provisions in the act can apply to the case of the Crown. These acts have had a very long existence, and there is no precedent in this Court of a discharge on a qui tam action, which is a strong reason for disallowing it now. I apprehend, there is no severance of interest between the King and the informer, till the levying of the sum upon execution; and then the sheriff severs it.

DENNISON, J.-You may enter judgment, either jointly or severally, for the whole penalty or for the distinct moieties; but the more regular way is to enter it jointly for the whole. FOSTER, J.-Same opinion.

WILMOT, J.-It is clearly the suit of the informer, till execution; he may be nonsuited: and also the privilege of an attorney has been allowed to take place in these actions; neither of which could happen, were it looked upon as the suit of the Crown (f).

Rule, for discharging the defendant from the informer's moiety, discharged by the whole Court (g).

(f) Scot v. Knapton, T. Raym. 275; Baker v. Duncalfe, 3 Lev. 398, Lutw. 196; Kirkham v. Wheeley, Salk. 30, 1 Ld. Raym. 27, Comb. 319; Wilkinson v. Allot, 1 Cowp. 366.

dictment for an assault, who is directed by the award of the King's coroner to pay so much for costs, and so much for compensation to the prosecutor, is entitled to his discharge, under 32 Geo. 2; R. v. Wake(g) But a person convicted upon an in- field, 13 East, 190.

No action lies

for seducing a

servant after recovery of a pe

ticles from the

BIRD V. RANDall.

S. C. 3 Burr. 1345.

BURFORD entered into articles with Bird, to serve him in the silk manufacture for five years, and to work at the usual hours. Bird articled to employ and pay him wages, and they nalty under ar- mutually bound themselves in the penalty of 100%. to perform these articles. Randall seduced Burford from Bird's service; upon which, he brought his action against Burford for the penalty, which he recovered and received the 29th of March, 1762. And the present action was upon the case, as of Hilary Term last, against Randall, for seducing the plaintiff's ser

servant for his departure.

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