and man, Jesus Christ.* And hence it is, that Augustin is so copious in this part of his subject, and shews so marked an anxiety to impress the world with a proper sense of the Mediatorial office of the Saviour. We have now seen what is the amount of the doctrine of Plato concerning the Deity. Has he supplied the defect which we lately discovered in the system of Varro? If Varro appeared to have lost the deity of Plato, is that Deity, when found, more effective than the soul of the world? Was the precious gift of the “life to come," to be expected from such a being? And was the eternal welfare of mankind better secured by the Grecian philosophy, than by the Roman mythology? The god of Plato, from whom all things are said to proceed, is rather an ideal principle than a Supreme Being. He is sometimes called by the equivalent terms of "the world," "Olympus," and the * Brucker states this to have been one of the leading features of the Eclectic philosophy:-Spiritus inferiores esse mediatores inter Deum et homines asserebat (Ammonius); hos colendos ideo esse contendebat, ut ad ineffabile numen aditum pararent. Per. ii. part 1, lib. i. cap. 2. sect. iv. § 21. Compare § 28. "heaven" itself,* and appears to be the constitution of the universe, instead of its governor. At the utmost, he keeps himself aloof from man, and refuses a communication with him, lest he should be contaminated by the approach.† From such a deity, therefore, whatever be his fancied superiority to the deities of the popular mythology, eternal happiness cannot be expected by mortals. Human concerns are devolved to the inferior gods. Are these then the bestowers of everlasting life? The highest of them were formed by the Demiurge, and subsist only through him. In their own natures they are liable to dissolution, and are entirely dependent on his pleasure. But, not being immortal in their own right, they cannot confer on others a property which they do not themselves possess. Finally, is future happiness to be expected from the Platonic demons? Apuleius, who has expatiated at such length, on the properties of their bodies, is utterly silent * Τίνα δὴ καὶ σεμνύνων ποτὲ λέγω Θεὸν ; σχεδὸν ἐρανὸν ὅν καὶ δικαιότατον, ὡς ξύμπαντες ἄλλοι δαίμονες ἅμα καὶ θεοὶ, τιμᾷν τε καὶ ἔυχεσθαι διαφερόντως αυτῷ. In Epinom. p. 1006. † Nullus Deus miscetur homini. Hoc præcipuum eorum sublimitatis ait (Apuleius) esse specimen, quod nullâ attrecta, tione hominum contaminantur. Aug. Civ. Dei, lib. ix. c. 16. concerning any goodness to be attributed to their minds ;* and it has already appeared, that they are subject to the same passions which degrade and enslave mankind, They are therefore wicked beings, and cannot bestow on their votaries the gifts of goodness. Do they then solicit from the superior gods that immortal happiness which is beyond their own ability to grant? The same wickedness still hinders them. They who are thus unfit to bestow eternal life, are equally unfit to convey it; and the precious reward itself would be polluted, if any god should confer it through the mediation of agents confessedly weak and sinful.† * De his universaliter disserens, et tam multa loquens de aëreis eorum corporibus, de virtutibus animorum tacuit. Civ. Dei, lib. ix. c. 3. + Quales preces hominum diis bonis per dæmones allegari putat, magicas, an licitas? Si magicas, nolunt tales; si licitas, nolunt per tales. Civ. Dei, lib. viii. c. 19. CHAPTER VII. PLATO CONTINUED... HIS PRINCIPLE OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL...HIS HISTORY OF THE SOUL...INFERENCES FROM THE WHOLE... FALSE CREATION ASCRIBED TO HIS DEITY... FALSE IMMORTALITY TO THE SOUL. We have seen, that the happiness of the "life to come" was not to be expected from the Platonic ONE, the secondary gods, or the mixed race of demons. The question yet remains, whether this great defect in one of the most celebrated systems of natural religion, were compensated by some other advantage; whether, notwithstanding the incapacity proved against the gods, the soul of man were secure of happiness through any qualities, either derived from without, or resulting from its own nature. To enumerate all the absurd and contradictory opinions of the Pagan schools concerning the soul, would be an unprofitable, if it were not an endless, task. From the time of Thales and Pythagoras, to whom we lately traced some of the earliest attempts in antient the logy, the Greeks disputed concerning the soul and its qualities, whether it might be called body, or not. In the latter case, the question was, whether it were a mere intelligence, endued with the privilege of motion,-whether this motion were perpetual or voluntary,—or whether the thinking faculty were not resolvable into the force of self-moving numbers.* In the former, whether it were of an aërial species, or a fiery composition; or an equal mixture of fire, air, vapour, and another nameless quality, in which consisted its sensation;† whether it were any thing more than warm air, or the breath, or perhaps an homogeneous substance, consisting of the exhalations of the world and the internal vapours of man himself.‡ * Θαλῆς ἀπεφήνατο πρῶτος τὴν ψυχὴν, φύσιν ἀεικίνητον, ἤ ἀυτοκίνητον.—Πυθαγόρας, ἀριθμὸν ἑαυτὸν κινῶντα· τὸν δ ̓ ἀριθ‐ μòv åvтì rẽ vẽ πapaλaußável. Plutarch. de Plaç. Phil. lib. iv. c. 2. In the first book is stated the correspondence between the four parts of the soul, and the virtues of the number four, the celebrated TETρaкTÙs of Pythagoras. † Οἱ δ' ἀπὸ ̓Αναξαγόρω ἀεροειδῆ ἔλεγόν τε καὶ σῶμα-Δημό κριτος, πυρῶδες σύγκριμα —Ἐπίκερος, κρᾶμα ἐκ τεσσάρων, ἐκ ποις πυρώδες, ἐκ ποιῶ ἀερώδες, ἐκ ποιῶ πνευματικῶ· ἐκ τετάρτε τινὸς ἀκατονομάσω, ὅ ἦν ἀυτῷ ἀισθητικόν. ib. c. 3. This is stated at greater length by Lucretius, lib. iii. 232. † Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, πνεῦμα θερμόν—Ἡράκλειτος—τὴν (ψυχὴν ἐν |