HEROIC ASSAULTS ON MARYE'S HEIGHTS. 345 most of Hancock's corps, especially | force Franklin; while Hooker himMeagher's Irish brigade, composed self, believing the attack hopeless, of the 63d, 69th, and 88th New York, required repeated and imperative orthe 28th Massachusetts, and the 116th ders from Burnside to induce him to Pennsylvania, which dashed itself re-order an advance; but Humphreys's peatedly against those impregnable heights, until two-thirds" of its number strewed the ground; when the remnant fell back to a position of comparative safety, and were succeeded as they had been supported, by other brigades and divisions; each to be exposed in its turn to like pitiless, useless, hopeless slaughter. Thus Hancock's and French's corps were successively sent up against those slippery heights, girdled with batteries, rising, tier above tier, to its crest, all carefully trained upon the approaches from Fredericksburg; while that fatal stone wall-so strong that even artillery could make no impression on it-completely sheltered Barksdale's brigade, which, so soon as our charging columns came within rifle-shot, poured into their faces the deadliest storm of musketry. Howard's division supported the two in advance; while one division of Wilcox's (9th, late Burnside's) corps was detached to maintain communication with Franklin on our left. Hooker's grand division was divided, and in good part sent to rëen 11 Gen. Meagher, in his official report, says: "Of the 1,200 I led into action, only 280 appeared on parade next morning." division was at length thrown out from Fredericksburg, and bore its full part in the front attack, losing heavily. And thus the fight was maintained till after dark-assault after assault being delivered by divisions advancing against twice their numbers, on ground where treble the force was required for the attack that sufficed for the defense; while a hundred Rebel cannon, posted on heights which our few guns on that side of the river could scarcely reach, and could not effectually batter, swept our men down from the moment that they began to advance, and while they could do nothing but charge, and fall, and die. And when night at length mercifully arrested this fruitless massacre, though the terraces and slopes leading up to the Rebel works were piled with our dead and our disabled, there was no pretense that the Rebel front had been advanced one foot from the ground held by it in the morning. We had reason enough for sorrow, but none for shame. Franklin, on our left, beside his Heights, towering immediately in their front. Never at Fontenoy, Albuera, nor at Waterloo, was more undoubted courage displayed by the sons of Erin than during those six frantic dashes which they directed against the almost impreg Among his officers who fell, he mentions Col. Heenan, Lt.-Col. Mulholland, and Maj. Bard-nable position of their foe. well, 116th Pa.; Maj. Wm. Horgan and Adj. J. R. Young, 88th N. Y.; Maj. James Cavanagh, 69th N. Y.; and Maj. Carraher, 28th Mass. The London Times's correspondent, watching the battle from the heights, and writing from Lee's headquarters, says: "To the Irish division, commanded by Gen. Meagher, was principally committed the desperate task of bursting out of the town of Fredericksburg, and forming, under the withering fire of the Confederate batteries, to attack Marye's "That any mortal men could have carried the position before which they were wantonly sacrificed, defended as it was, it seems to me idle for a moment to believe. But the bodies which lie in dense masses within 40 yards of the muzzles of Col. Walton's guns are the best evidence what manner of men they were who pressed on to death with the dauntlessness of a race which has gained glory on a thousand battle-fields, and never more richly deserved it than at the foot of Marye's Heights on the 13th day of December, 1862." own 40,000 men, was rëenforced, the | of the two corps of Reynolds (16,000) night before, by two divisions (Kearny's and Hooker's own) from Hooker, raising his command nearly to 55,000. At least half our entire force across the river was thus with Franklin on the left, where the main attack manifestly should have been made, and where Burnside appears to have purposed that it should have been made. But it was after 7 A. M. of the fatal day when Franklin received his orders; which, if they were intended to direct a determined attack in full force, were certainly very blindly and vaguely worded," whereas, a military order should be as precise and clear as language will allow, and as positive as the circumstances will warrant. It is very certain that a Massena or a Blucher could have found warrant in that order for attacking at once with his entire corps, leaving Hooker's men to defend the bridges and act as a reserve; but, if hot work is wanted of a Franklin, it should be required and prescribed in terms more peremptory and less equivocal. He asserts that he expected and awaited further orders, which he never in terms received; at least, not till it was too late to obey them with any hope of success. Franklin's grand division consisted 12"Gen. Hardie will carry this dispatch to you and remain with you during the day. The General commanding directs that you keep your whole command in position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road, and you will send out at once a division, at least, to pass below Smithfield, to seize, if possible, the heights near Capt. Hamilton's, on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported and its line of retreat open. He has ordered another column, of a division or more, to be moved from Gen. Sumner's command up the plank road to its intersection of the telegraph road, where they will divide, with a view to seizing the heights on both of those roads. Holding these heights, with the heights near Capt. Hamilton's, will, I hope, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points. He makes these and W. F. Smith (21,000), with cavalry under Bayard, raising it nearly or quite to 40,000. At 9 A. M., Reynolds advanced on the left; Meade's division, in front, being immediately assailed by Rebel batteries (J. E. B. Stuart's) on his left flank, which compelled him to halt and silence them. At 11 A. M., he pushed on, fighting; while one of Hooker's divisions in reserve was brought across, and Birney's and Gibbon's divisions were moved up to his support. Reynolds's corps being thus all in line of battle, Meade again gallantly advanced into the woods in his front; grappling, at 1, in fierce encounter, with A. P. Hill's corps, crushing back the brig ades of Archer and Lane, and, forcing his way in between them, took some 200 prisoners. Here, in attempting to rally Orr's rifles, which had been disorganized, fell Brig.-Gen. Maxcy Gregg," mortally wounded. But the enemy rallied all their forces; Early's division, composed of Lawton's, Trimble's, and his own brigades, which, with D. H. Hill's corps, had arrived that morning from Port Royal, after a severe nightmarch, and been posted behind A. P. Hill, rushed to the front; and Meade's division, lacking prompt support, moves by columns, distant from each other, with a view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a general movement during the fog. Two of Gen. Hooker's divisions are in your rear at the bridges, and will remain there as supports. Copies of instructions to Gens. Sumner and Hooker will be forwarded to you by an Orderly very soon. You will keep your whole command in readiness to move at once as soon as the fog lifts. The watchword, which, if possible, should be given to every company, will be 'Scott.' "I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, "JOHN G. PARKE, Chief of Staff. "Major-Gen. FRANKLIN, Commanding Grand Division Army of Potomac.' 13 Governor elect of South Carolina. OUR LOSSES AT FREDERICKSBURG. was overwhelmed and driven back, with heavy loss, to the railroad, which they had crossed in their advance, where they made a brief stand, but were again hurled back by an impetuous, determined Rebel charge, losing many prisoners. Meade had already called for aid: and Gen. Gibbon had advanced on his right, and one of Birney's brigades on his left, whereby the enemy were checked and repulsed; Col. Atkinson, commanding Lawton's brigade, being here wounded and taken prisoner. Meade's division fell back, having lost 1,760 men this day out some 6,000 engaged; having, of its three Brigadiers, Gen. C. F. Jackson killed, and Col. Wm. T. Sinclair severely wounded. Maj.-Gen. Gibbon, on his right, was also wounded and taken off the field; whereupon, his division fell back also. 347 The advance of Reynolds's left was for some time retarded by Stuart's cavalry, holding the extreme Rebel right, whose battery opened a most annoying cross-fire on our infantry as it advanced from the Rappahannock. The 9th New York was first sent to take this battery, but failed— taking to their heels instead; when a brigade was brought up by Gen. Tyler, and charged with no better success. A third charge was stopped by the deadly fire of the Rebel battery; when more troops were brought up on our side, and the enemy at length flanked and gradually crowded back to the Massaponax ; but they still maintained a bold front, and kept up the contest till nightfall; having succeeded in diverting from Reynolds's main attack in front a force which he could ill afford to spare. Our losses on this bloody day were not less than 15,000 men; though the number returned as actually killed, wounded, and taken prisoners, foots up but 13,771-as follows: Sickles's division of Hooker's men, which had followed Birney's to the front, took the place of Gibbon's; but Smith's corps-21,000 strong-was not sent in, and remained nearer to Fredericksburg, not determinedly engaged throughout the day. Yet, even Reynolds's and Stoneman's corps Engineers.. (the latter composed of Birney's and Sickles's divisions) showed so strong a front that Stonewall Jackson did not venture to assume the offensive till nightfall; when a very brief experience convinced him that he might better let well alone.1 Total... 50 Killed, Woun'd. Miss'g. Total. Hooker's grand division... 327 2,469 748 3,548 Franklin's grand division... 338 2,430 1,531 4,679 Sumner's grand division.... 480 4,159 855 5,494 7 43 100 .1,152 9,101 3,234 13,771 Not one of these died more lamented than Maj.-Gen. George D. Bayard, commanding our cavalry on the left, who was struck by a shell and mortally wounded; dying that night. But 28 years old, and on the 14 Jackson, with exemplary candor, says in to make preparations for the attempt. In order his official report: to guard against disaster, the infantry was to be Repulsed on the right, left, and center, the preceded by artillery, and the movement postenemy, soon after, reformed his lines, and gave poned until late in the evening; so that, if comsome indications of a purpose to renew the at-pelled to retire, it would be under the cover of tack. I waited some time to receive it; but, he making no forward movement, I determined, if prudent, to do so myself. The artillery of the enemy was so judiciously posted as to make an advance of our troops across the plain very hazardous; yet it was so promising of good results, if successfully executed, as to induce me night. Owing to unexpected delay, the movement could not be got ready till late in the evening. The first gun had hardly moved forward from the wood a hundred yards, when the enemy's artillery reopened, and so completely swept our front as to satisfy me that the proposed movement should be abandoned." eve of marriage, his death fell like a | life, a nobler spirit, a grander, more pall on many loving hearts. benignant destiny! 16 It would be incredible on any testimony less conclusive than his own "0 that Gen. Burnside, on the very heel of this prodigal, horrible carnage, resolved to attack again next day, and on the very point where the enemy's Lee at first reported his losses at "about 1,800 killed and wounded" -one of those preposterous misrepresentations to which commanders on either side were too prone. His actual loss, as embodied in the detailed reports of Longstreet and Jackson, was over 5,000," and may probably | lines had been proved impregnable at be fairly estimated at 6,000, including 500 unwounded prisoners. He claims to have taken 900 prisoners and 9,000 small arms, but no guns. Thus closed what the exulting correspondent at Lee's headquarters of The Times (London) calls “ a memorable day to the historian of the Decline and Fall of the American Republic." Not so, O owl-eyed scribe! but rather one of those days of bloody baptism from whose regenerating flood that Republic was divinely appointed to rise to a purer 15 Longstreet reports his losses thus: killed, 251; wounded, 1,516; missing, 127: total, 1,894. Jackson gives his as-killed, 344; wounded, 2,545; missing, 526: total, 3,415: grand total, 5,309. Among their killed, beside those already mentioned, was Brig.-Gen. T. R. R. Cobb, of Ga., brother of Howell Cobb. Among their wounded, were Brig.-Gens. J. R. Cooke and W. D. Pender. 16 He says, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "The two attacks were made, and we were repulsed; still holding a portion of the ground we had fought upon, but not our extreme ad vance. "That night, I went all over the field on our right; in fact, I was with the officers and men until nearly daylight. I found the feeling to be rather against an attack the next morning; in fact, it was decidedly against it. | a cost of 10,000 men. Another butchery as fruitless and still more demoralizing would doubtless have been incurred, but for the timely and forcible remonstrance of stern old Sumner who never kept out of a fight when there was a shadow of excuse for going in-and who protested, backed by nearly every General in the army, against such suicidal madness. Burnside finally gave way, and thus probably saved the 9th corps (of old, his own) from useless, inexcusable sacrifice. the enemy into their next line, and, by going in with them, they would not be able to fire upon us to any great extent. I left Gen. Sumner with that understanding, and directed him to give the order. The order was given, and the column of attack was formed. "The next morning, just before the column was to have started, Gen. Sumner came to me and said: 'General, I hope you will desist from this attack; I do not know of any general officer who approves of it; and I think it will prove disastrous to the army.' Advice of that kind from Gen. Sumner, who has always been in favor of an advance whenever it was possible, caused me to hesitate. I kept the column of attack formed, and sent over for the division and corps commanders, and consulted with them. They unanimously voted against the attack. I then went over to see the other officers of the command on the other side, and found that the same impression prevailed among them. I then sent for Gen. Franklin, who was on the left, and he was of exactly the same opinion. This caused me to decide that I ought not to make the attack I had contemplated. And besides, inasmuch as the President of the United States had told me not to be in haste in making this attack; that he would give me all the support that he could, but he did not want the Army of the Potomac destroyed, I felt that I could not take the respon "I returned to my headquarters, and, after conversation with Gen. Sumner, told him that I wanted him to order the 9th army corps-which was the corps I originally commanded-to form the next morning a column of attack by regiments. It consisted of some 18 old regiments, and some new ones; and I desired the column to make a direct attack upon the enemy's works. I thought that these regiments, by coming quick-sibility of ordering the attack, notwithstanding ly up after each other, would be able to carry my own belief at the time that the works of the the stone wall and the batteries in front, forcing enemy could be carried.” |