Opinion of the Court-REAVIS, C. J. [25 Wash. ically change and seriously impair the whole police system of the state." It seems to be conceded in Callan v. Wilson, supra, that there was a class of petty or minor offenses not usually embraced in public criminal statutes, and not of the class or grade triable at common law by a jury. The following authorities are pertinent and well considered: McGear v. Woodruff, 33 N. J. Law, 213; People v. Justices, 74 N. Y. 406; Byers v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. St. 89. The offense with which the respondent is charged is one peculiarly against the peace and order of the municipality, and comes within the rule announced by the courts in the sister states having constitutional declarations similar to our own. The word "riotous," used in the ordinance, is evidently used in its popular meaning as wanton and boisterous, and has no allusion to the technical crime of riot. It will be observed in the discussion of this question and in an examination of the authorities that the courts look to the nature of the offense, rather than to its designation by name, so that but little profit is found in refining upon the definition of misdemeanors. It is the petty nature of the offense which usage has placed in the jurisdiction of municipalities, and which offenses are not usually designated in the body of the criminal law as public crimes. And, too, the punishment is made to fit the crime. It is limited, and precedents are found where courts have adjudged such ordinances void because the penalty was too severe. The reasons for such summary jurisdiction are numerous and apparent, and the custom almost universally exists, and is consistent with the fullest and completest protection of the most sacred guaranties of the constitution. The penalty affixed by the ordinance in question is less than the limit of $100 fine. Aug. 1901] authorized by the legislature, as the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace designated as a police justice is herein construed. The judgment is reversed, with direction to the superior court to quash the writ of prohibition. ANDERS, DUNBAR and WHITE, JJ., concur. [No. 3641. Decided August 27, 1901.] WEST COAST MANUFACTURING AND INVESTMENT COM- APPEAL-SUPERSEDEAS BOND-SUFFICIENCY. A judgment in favor of defendant for costs upon the dismissal of plaintiff's action is a judgment for money, and a supersedeas bond upon appeal therefrom need only be in a sum double the amount of such costs, in addition to the $200 penalty required in the appeal bond, under Bal. Code, § 6506, which provides that the penalty of an appeal bond shall not be less than $200, and, in order to effect a stay of proceedings, where the appeal is from a final judgment for the recovery of money, it shall be in a penalty double the amount of the damages and costs recovered in such judgment. PLEADING-BREACH OF WARRANTY OF TITLE-IMMATERIAL AVERMENTS. In an action for the breach of a covenant of title, in a warranty deed, the action of the court in striking from the complaint, on motion of defendant, the words, "and claimed to own and held itself out as the owner of all the lands to deep water," was not erroneous, when such stricken matter referred to claims made by defendant a year prior to the execution of the deed, since the intention of the parties must be gathered from the deed itself, when there is no ambiguity in its terms. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-WARRANTY OF TITLE-LIABILITY OF VENDOR Where a grantor conveys a tract of land by metes and bounds, with full covenant of warranty of title, he is bound by his covenant as to the whole tract, although a portion of it was openly, plainly, visibly and notoriously tide land, claimed by the Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. [25 Wash. state, and from which the grantee was subsequently evicted by the state under claim of paramount title. SAME-COVENANT AGAINST PERSONS-WHEN INCLUDES STATE. A grantor who warrants his title generally against "all persons whatsoever" is liable thereon, although the outstanding para mount title rests in the state instead of in a person. SAME-ACTION FOR BREACH-WHAT CONSTITUTES EVICTION. When the paramount title is in the state and the covenantee in a deed from a private grantor is ordered by the state to either vacate or to purchase the land, and he accordingly purchases from the state in order to protect improvements made by him while in possession under his grantor's deed, the purchase must be considered such an eviction as to constitute a breach of the covenants of title and for quiet enjoyment. SAME LIMITATIONS. The statute of limitations will not begin to run against an action for breach of covenants of warranty of title and for quiet enjoyment until the eviction of the grantee. Appeal from Superior Court, King County.-Hon. WILLIAM HICKMAN MOORE, Judge. Reversed. James Kiefer, for appellant. Piles, Donworth & Howe, for respondent. The opinion of the court was delivered by WHITE, J.-Respondent moves to dismiss this appeal for the reason that no appeal bond has been executed or filed as required by the statute. The judgment appealed from was entered pursuant to an order sustaining the respondent's demurrer to appellant's complaint, appellant having elected to stand on its complaint, and the action having been accordingly dismissed on the merits. The judgment is that the plaintiff take nothing by the action, and that the defendant recover of the plaintiff its costs and disbursements to be taxed. From the recitals in the judgment it may be conceded that it is a final judgment on the merits. The record shows that the amount of the Aug. 1901.] Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. costs and disbursements taxed is $10. The judgment of dismissal, and the amount of costs taxed, are set forth in the recitals of the bond. The penalty of the bond is in the sum of $250. The condition of the bond is to the effect that the appellant will pay all costs and damages that may be awarded against it on the appeal or on the dismissal thereof, not exceeding two hundred dollars, and will pay and satisfy and perform the judgment appealed from in case it shall be affirmed, and any judgment or order which the supreme court may render or make, or order to be rendered or made, by the superior court from which the appeal is taken. The respondent contends that, inasmuch as the bond is both an appeal and supersedeas bond, the penalty, under § 6506, Ballinger's Annotated Codes and Statutes, should be in the sum of at least four hundred dollars. Under § 6506, supra, the penalty of an appeal bond shall not be less than two hundred dollars, and, in order to effect a stay of proceedings, where the appeal is from a final judgment for the recovery of money, it shall be in a penalty double the amount of the damages and costs recovered in such judgment; in other cases it shall not be less than $200, and sufficient to save the respondent harmless from damages by reason of the appeal, as the judge of the superior court shall prescribe. While the judgment appealed from was a judgment for costs, it was as much a judgment for money as if it had been for a principal sum and costs. The statute is clear, and there is no room for construction. It means just what it says, viz., that all final judgments for money may be superseded on appeal by a bond for double the amount of such judgment. Here there is a judgment for ten dollars, and a bond in the penal sum of two hundred and fifty dollars. A bond for $220 would have been sufficient and a literal compliance with the statute. The fact that Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. [25 Wash. it is more than the exact sum cannot militate against the appellant. The purpose of a supersedeas bond is to protect the respondent in the collection of his judgment and in the enforcement of the relief awarded him by the judg ment. All the respondent could obtain by this judgment was the sum of ten dollars. Upon the payment of this amount the respondent was bound to fully satisfy and discharge the judgment upon the records of the court. The bond in this case is more than double the amount of the money judgment appealed, and two hundred dollars additional, as required by law. Under the conditions of the bond, the respondent was fully secured in the amount recovered by it in the judgment, as well as for costs and damages up to two hundred dollars on appeal. The motion to dismiss the appeal is therefore denied. The complaint in this action, omitting formal allegations, is substantially as follows: "Second. That on or about the 22d day of October, 1889, the plaintiff purchased from the defendant a certain tract of land, situated in Ballard, King county, Washington, and paid part of the purchase money expressed in the deed hereinafter mentioned, and thereafter, on the 13th day of August, 1890, upon payment by the plaintiff of the balance of the cash consideration for said purchase, the defendant by its officers thereunto duly authorized. made, executed, and delivered to the plaintiff its certain deed to said premises, in the words and figures following, to wit: ""This indenture, made the 13th day of August, 1890, between The West Coast Improvement Company, a corporation duly incorporated, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Washington, the party of the first part, and the West Coast Manufacturing and Investment Company of Ballard, Washington, also a corporation, the party of the second part: "Witnesseth, that the said party of the first part for and in consideration of seven hundred and fifty dollars |