Opinion of the Court-HADLEY, J. [25 Wash. The rule as conclusive, and that it cannot be attacked. as to the conclusiveness of the officer's return is subject to limitations. As stated in 22 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 198: "There is another limitation arising in the distinction to be made between facts which are presumed to be peculiarly within the knowledge of the officer, and such as are not. Thus, he is presumed to know best the time, place, and manner of service, but not all other facts stated in his return." Numerous authorities are cited in support of the above statement in the text. The case of Bond v. Wilson, 8 Kan. 228 (12 Am. Rep. 466), is there cited, and the reason of the rule is stated in the course of the opinion in that case. The court, at pages 230 and 231 of the opinion, says: "In the systems of practice adopted in this country, the safeguards being removed, it has become necessary to adapt the rule to the altered condition of the law. The sheriff not only executes original process by service upon the defendant personally, but by leaving a copy at his usual place of residence. The sheriff also determines whether a minor is over fourteen years of age, and serves accordingly. He also determines who is president, mayor, chairman, or chief officer of a board of directors; and also what is the usual place of business of a corporation, and who has charge thereof, and serves his process accordingly. Is his determination of such questions final? Must the defendant suffer the judgment to stand in such cases, and resort to his remedy against the officer? . . We find upon examination that the courts have generally held the sheriff's return on mesne and final process conclusive between the parties and privies, though this is by no means a rule of universal application; but that in cases of original process there has been a general disposition to let in the truth. . we know of no statute that makes a sheriff a final and exclusive judge of where a man's residence is, or what is the age of a minor, or who are the officers of a corporation, or where their place of business is; and July, 1901.] Opinion of the Court-HADLEY, J. when the statute made it the duty of the sheriff to ascertain these facts it did not make his return of such facts conclusive. Of his own acts his knowledge ought to be absolute, and himself officially responsible. Of such facts as are not in his special knowledge he must act from information, which will often come from interested parties, and his return thereof ought not to be held conclusive.” To the same effect are the following cases: Crosby v. Farmer, 39 Minn. 305 (40 N. W. 71); Randall v. Collins, 58 Tex. 231; Nietert v. Trentman, 104 Ind. 390 (4 N. E. 306); Grady v. Gosline, 48 Ohio St. 665 (29 N. E. 768); Godwin v. Monds, 106 N. C. 448 (10 S. E. 1044); O'Con ner v. Wilson, 57 Ill. 226; Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 328 (76 Am. Dec. 269); Dobson v. Pearce, 62 Am. Dec. 158, note. This is an attack upon the judgment and all proceedings thereunder. If respondents hold any title to the land, it is derived from the judgment and sale thereunder. Appellant has brought his action as authorized by statute, and seeks what may be termed both legal and equitable relief. That which may be said to appeal to the equity side of the court relates to the alleged cloud upon his title, created by the said judgment. We think, therefore, that the remedy sought here comes within that outlined in § 495, of 2 Freeman on Judgments (4th ed.). It is there stated as follows: "A judgment pronounced without service of process, actual or constructive, and without the defendant's knowing that a court has been asked to adjudicate upon his rights, is regarded with such disfavor at law that a variety of motions, writs, and proceedings are there provided to overthrow it; and in many courts it is at all times and upon all occasions liable to be entirely disregarded upon having its jurisdictional infirmity exposed. But proceedings in equity are peculiarly appropriate for the exposure of this infirmity. They permit of the formation of issues. 37-25 WASH. Syllabus. [25 Wash. upon the question of service of process, and of the trial of those issues, after full opportunity has been given to those who seek to sustain, as well as to those who seek to avoid, the judgment. If, at such trial, it satisfactorily appears that the defendant was not summoned, and had no notice. of the suit, a sufficient excuse is shown for his neglect to defend, and equity will not allow the judgment, if unjust, to be used against him, no matter what jurisdictional recitals it contains." We think, therefore, that the demurrer to this complaint should be overruled, and an opportunity given appellant to submit evidence, under the averments of his complaint, as to the facts concerning service of summons in the former action. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to the court below to overrule the demurrer. REAVIS, C. J., and ANDERS, MOUNT and WHITE, JJ., concur. [No. 39.5. Decided July 18, 1901.] J. A. STRAIN, Appellant, v. S. S. YOUNG et al., Respondents. ELECTIONS-INCREASE OF COUNTY INDEBTEDNESS BY VOTE-WHAT CONSTITUTES A THREE-FIFTHS VOTE-CONSTRUCTION OF CONSTITU TION. Under art. 8, § 6 of the constitution, forbidding any county to become indebted in excess of one and one-half per centum of the taxable property in such county, "without the assent of threefifths of the voters therein voting at an election to be held for that purpose," it is not necessary that a proposition for increasing the county's indebtedness submitted at a general election should obtain three-fifths of the highest vote cast at such general election, but no more is required than that such special proposition, in order to carry, receive three-fifths of the votes cast by the voters who specially vote thereon. July, 1901.] Opinion of the Court-HADLEY, J. Appeal from Superior Court, Garfield County.-Hon. CHESTER F. MILLER, Judge. Affirmed. Frank Cardwell, for appellant. Gose & Kuykendall, for respondents. The opinion of the court was delivered by HADLEY, J.-This action was brought by appellant against respondents, who constitute the board of commissioners of Garfield county. It is alleged in the complaint that on the 13th day of July, 1900, the court house and all county buildings of Garfield county were totally destroyed by fire, and that said county cannot secure buildings for county purposes except by building them. A resolution passed by the board of county commissioners of said county on the 9th day of August, 1900, is set out in the complaint, which resolution is to the effect that the question of contracting county indebtedness and issuing bonds of said county in the sum of $20,000 to secure money for the purpose of purchasing suitable grounds and erecting thereon and equipping public buildings for the use of said county be submitted to the voters of said county at the general election to be held on the 6th day of November, 1900. It also appears from the complaint that due notice of the submission of said question was given as required by law, and that at said election there were cast in said county four hundred and sixty-two votes, and no more, "for incurring county indebtedness and issuing bonds in the sum of $20,000 for court house and other county purposes," and two hundred and twenty-six votes, and no more, "against incurrring county indebtedness and issuing bonds in the sum of $20,000 for court house and other county purposes." It also appears that at said election there were cast in said county one thousand twenty Opinion of the Court-HADLEY, J. [25 Wash. three votes, and no more, for presidential electors. Said vote upon the question of incurring indebtedness was canvassed at the same time and place as the vote for presidential electors and state and county officers, and thereafter the board of county commissioners of said county declared that three-fifths of the voters of the county had voted in favor of incurring county indebtedness in the sum aforesaid. Afterwards the said board of commissioners caused notice to be given of a time and place when sealed bids would be received for the sale of bonds of said county in the sum of $20,000, to be issued for court house purposes. Bids were accordingly submitted and afterwards said board of commissioners entered into a contract with Roberts Bros. of Spokane, Washington, wherein and whereby it was agreed to sell to them $20,000 of the bonds of said county, in the denomination of $1,000 each, bearing four and one-half per cent. interest, at a par valuation, with $75 premium. It is alleged that said Roberts Bros. now decline to receive and pay for said bonds for the reason, as they claim, that, inasmuch as three-fifths of those who voted for presidential electors did not vote for said bonding proposition, the said proposition failed to carry. It is also alleged that said board of commissioners are claiming and asserting that said proposition was duly carried, and that the board are now negotiating with other persons for a sale of said bonds, and are threatening to sell, and will issue, sell, and deliver, them, unless restrained by an order of court; that said board have already entered into a contract for the construction of a court house at a cost of $18,000, and said court house is now under process of construction. The value of the taxable property of said county, as shown by the last assessment for state and county purposes, is alleged to be $1,777,460, and the existing indebtedness is $26,771.73. There are taxes due and de |