May, 1901.] Opinion of the Court-FULLERTON, J. trial court, but is raised here for the first time. This being so, we are of the opinion that the objection comes too late. In Neis v. Farquharson, 9 Wash. 508 (37 Pac. 697), we held that the objection that there was no proof that the plaintiffs ever presented their demand or claim to the administrator for allowance or rejection, as they were required to do by the statute, could not be taken for the first time in the appellate court. In principle, there would seem to be no difference between that case and the case at bar. The statute makes it a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action against an administrator that the claim be first presented to him for allowance or rejection; and if the administrator waives this requirement of the statute, by failing to make the objection in the trial court, it must be a waiver on the part of the county to fail to object in that court that the claim sued on has not been presented to its board of commissioners. The purpose of the rule is to give the claimant an opportunity to supply the requisite pleadings or proof, as the case may require, which he cannot do if the objection is made for the first time on appeal. As bearing upon this point see the following cases: Nye v. Kelly, 19 Wash. 73 (52 Pac. 528); Fitzgerald v. School District, 5 Wash. 112-114 (31 Pac. 427); Bank of Stockton v. Howland, 42 Cal. 129; Drake v. Foster, 52 Cal. 225; Sheel v. Appleton, 49 Wis. 125 (5 N. W. 27); Benton v. Milwaukee, 50 Wis. 368 (7 N. W. 241); Clarke v. Lyon County, 8 Nev. 181. The evidence disclosed that a portion of the goods described in the complaint had been sold by a receiver appointed in a suit brought by the appellants against the respondent, Rose, the said E. C. Merrill, and one McLaughlin, to recover certain taxes alleged to be due the county of Pierce by Rose and Merrill. The judgment entered in this suit was reversed by this court, and the suit ordered dismissed. It is urged that the appellants cannot be held responsible for the acts of the receiver, and that the court erred in instructing the jury that the receiver's acts were unauthorized in law and wholly void; that his acts were in law the acts of the appellants, and that they are responsible to the respondent for them. We find no error in this instruction. The uncontradicted evidence abundantly shows that the appellant, Judson, as treasurer, together with other officers of the county, instituted the action, directed and controlled the acts of the receiver, and actively participated in all of the proceedings. These acts, being without authority of law, rendered the county, and the officers actively participating therein, liable to answer to the respondent for all damages suffered by him because of such acts. Hoexter v. Judson, 21 Wash. 646 (59 Pac. 498). Errors are also assigned to the rulings of the court in the admission and exclusion of certain evidence. But an examination of the record fails to convince us that they are of sufficient merit to warrant a reversal of the case. The judgment is affirmed. REAVIS, C. J., and ANDERS and DUNBAR, JJ., concur. [No. 3717. Decided May 2, 1901.] THE STATE OF WASHINGTON OF THE RELATION OF T. N. HENRY, Respondent, v. JOHN MACDONALD et ux., Appellants. Under the school law of 1897, as amended in 1899, which provides that it shall be the duty of parents and guardians of children between the ages of eight and fifteen years to send them to school at least three months in each year; that any parent May, 1901.] Opinion of the Court-REAVIS, C. J. or guardian who, after notification by the county superintendent, refuses or neglects to send such child to school, shall, upon complaint of such superintendent, be summoned before the judge, who shall have power to issue an order commanding the parents to place the child in school, or appear before him and show cause for refusal so to do; and that any person summoned before a superior judge to answer why he has not kept such child in school, who fails to give satisfactory cause for refusal to comply with the law relating to school attendance, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined; no authority is vested in the superior judge to adjudge such parent or guardian guilty of contempt for failure to comply with an order to place a child in school, since the only penalty the statute imposes is to declare the offense a misdemeanor punishable by fine. SAME PENALTY -NOT EMBRACED IN TITLE OF ACT. Under § 19, art. 2, which provides that no bill for an act of the legislature shau embrace more than one subject, which must be expressed in the title, a section in the school law defining a misdemeanor and providing for its punishment is illegally embraced within an act entitled "an act to establish a general and uniform system of public schools in the state of Washington." Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County.-Hon. OLIVER V. LINN, Judge. Reversed. Charles D. King, for appellants. George H. Funk, for respondent. The opinion of the court was delivered by REAVIS, C. J.-Upon the complaint of the county school superintendent, citation was issued from the superior court of Thurston county to appellants, Macdonald and wife, to show cause why they did not send their three minor children to the common school in the district in which appellants resided, and also commanding appellants to bring the three children into court for examination as to their proficiency in the course of education prescribed in the common schools. Thereafter, upon hearing, an examination was had of the proficiency of the children and of the reason Opinion of the Court-REAVIS, C. J. [25 Wash. of the parents for not sending them to school, and the court peremptorily ordered appellants to send the children to the school in session in the district. Thereafter, upon failure of the appellants to comply with such order, they were held as for a contempt and punished by a fine of $20 each; and the order directed that, in default of the payment of such fine, the appellants should stand committed to the custody of the sheriff of Thurston county until such fine be paid or they discharged in pursuance of law. The court also entered a judgment against defendants for the costs of the entire proceedings. These proceedings were taken under § 71, 171 and 177, of the school law, as amended by § 25 of the act of March 15, 1899. The principal act is entitled, "An act to establish a general, uniform system of public schools in the state of Washington, and repealing" various school laws theretofore existing, approved March 19, 1897 (Laws 1897, p. 356). Section 71 of the principal act (Laws 1897, p. 385) imposes the duty on all parents, guardians and other persons having immediate custody of any child or children between the ages of eight and fifteen years to send them to school at least three months in each year. Section 171 of the principal act (Laws 1897, p. 424), declares, in substance, that any person summoned before a superior judge to answer why he has not kept children under his care in school as provided in the law relating to school attendance, and failing to give satisfactory cause for his refusal to comply with the law, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined in the sum of not less than ten nor more than twenty-five dollars for each offense. Section 177 of the principal act, as amended in 1899 (Laws 1899, p. 324), declares that any parent or guardian who, after being notified by the county school superintendent of the provisions of the law, shall further refuse or neglect to send such child to school, shall, May, 1901.] Opinion of the Court-REAVIS, C. J. upon complaint of the superintendent, be summoned before the judge, who shall have power, if the child be under the care of a parent or parents, to summon the child or children and parents before him, and, if he shall find upon inquiry that the child has not already attained a reasonable proficiency in the common-school branches for the first eight years of study in the common schools, the judge shall issue an order commanding the parent or parents to place the child in school, or appear before him and show cause for the neglect or refusal so to do. The only question deemed material here is the power of the judge or court to inflict the judgment for contempt which was entered against appellants. The three sections mentioned are all from the general school law that seem pertinent to the inquiry. These sections, taken together, are somewhat vague in their meaning, and it is difficult to determine the intention of the legislature. They are found, as arranged in the act, numbered widely apart, but evidently all relate to the same subject matter, viz., the compulsory education of children where for any cause such education is neglected. Section 71 imposes the duty primarily upon the parents, guardians, and other persons having immediate custody of the children. Section 171 provides that any one summoned before the superior judge who does not show satisfactory cause for refusal or neg lect to comply with the duty imposed by the law shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punished for each offense in a sum of not less than ten nor more than twenty-five dollars. Section 177, as amended, should logically precede in its order § 171, because § 177 declares the procedure by which any one having the custody of a child, and who does not comply with the school law, shall be brought before the judge of the superior court for an examination and hearing, and prescribes further that the |