fore the husband would be liable for necessary physic for the wife (i), for lodging (k), clothing, &c. (); for dresses, which, though costly are not above the station of the defendant (m): for food (n), education and other necessaries for his children (o); but not for a debt which his wife has contracted under illegal circumstances (p). The question, what are and what are not necessaries, must depend on the rank, situation, and circumstances of the husband (q), and is a question for the consideration of the jury (r). It ought rather to depend on his estate than his degree; for one of high degree may be of low estate (s); yet, however low a man's circumstances may be,

(i) Harris v, Lec, 1 P. Wms. 482.

(k) Beaumont v, Weldon, 1 Ventr. 255.
(1) Dyer v. East, 1 Ventr. 42; 1 Mod. 9.
(m) Morton v. Withens, Skinn. 348.

(n) Ross v. Noel, Bull. N. P. 136.

(0) Garbrand v. Allen, Comb. 450; Calverley v. Plummer, 2 Lev. 16. [A father is liable for the maintenance of his illegitimate child if he adopts it as his own, though no order of affiliation have been made upon him (Hesketh v. Groning, 5 Esp. 131; see Shaw v. Whiteman, Peake 42 (3rd Ed.)); but not for children of his wife by a former husband (Tubb v. Harrison, 4 T. R. 118; Cooper v. Martin, 4 East, 76); unless he adopts them as part of his family (Stone v. Carr, 3 Esp. 1.) ]

(p) Fowles v. Dinely, 2 Str. 1122; Anon. 2 Show, 283.

(q) Per Lord Mansfield, C. J., Ozard v. Durnford, Selw.

N. P. 279.

(r) Bac. Abr. Baron and Feme, H. Per Best, C. J., Hunt v. Blaquiere, 3 M. and Payne, 122.

(s) Per Hale, C. B., Bac. Abr. supra.

if he allows his wife to assume an appearance above that which he is in a condition to support, he will be answerable for the consequences (t).

As long as the husband and wife live together, the husband will be liable, however immoral and improper the conduct of the wife may be (u); so, if after she has committed adultery, and eloped, the husband receives her again (r); so, if she has committed adultery, and the husband leaves her, but allows her to remain in the house, and gives no notice to tradesmen of her situation (y). The same rule holds, where a man and woman cohabit without being really married (z); or where a marriage has taken place de facto, but is void on account of a prior marriage subsisting (a); for if he holds her out to the world as his wife, it is but reasonable that he should be liable for debts contracted by her in that character. But if the marriage can be disproved, the husband will not

(t) Waithman v. Wakefield, 1 Campb. 120, per Lord Ellenborough, C. J. [But the tradesman must exercise a reasonable degree of caution. Ib.]

(u) Bac. Abr. Baron and Feme, H. Robinson v. Greinold, 1 Salk. 119.

(x) Harris v. Morris, 4 Esp. 41; Robinson v. Gosnold, 6 Mod. 171.

(y) Norton v. Fazan, 1 B. & P. 226.

(z) Watson v. Threkeld, 2 Esp. 637; Hudson v. Brent, Esp. Dig. 124; Carr v. King, 12 Mod. 372; Norwood v. Stevenson, Andr. 227.

(a) Robinson v. Nahon, 1 Campb. 245.

be liable after cohabitation has ceased (b); nor will his executor be liable for debts which she has contracted since his death, whether information of his death had or had not been received at the time of the contract (c).

authority

butted.

As the implied authority given by the husband The implied rests only on primâ facie evidence, it is liable to may be rebe rebutted by express proof that the husband prohibited the vendor (or his agent), from giving credit to the wife (d); and in such case he will not be liable even for necessaries. Or the presumption of authority may be rebutted even by implication; as, where, during temporary absence, the husband made an allowance to his wife, for supplying herself and her family, and a tradesman, with notice of this circumstance, furnished butcher's meat on credit (e). So, the husband is not liable where he supplies her with every necessary suitable to her rank and station, and a tradesman allows her to incur an extravagant debt without the husband's knowledge (ƒ).

(b) Munro v. De Chemant, 4 Campb. 215, cor. Lord Ellenborough, C. J.

(c) Blades v. Free, 9 B. & C. 167; S. C. 4 Man. & Ry.

282.

(d) Etherington v. Parrott, 1 Salk. 118; Longworth v. Hackmore, Bull. N. P. 135; Rawlins v. Vandyke, 3 Esp. 250, per Lord Ellenborough, C. J.

(e) Holt v. Brien, 4 B. & A. 252.

(f) Seaton v. Benedict, 5 Bingh. 28; Baker v. Baber, Selw. N. P. 284; Keniston v. Goodall, ibid.

No presumption of authority where the goods are

not necessa

In general, where the goods furnished are not necessaries, the presumption is against the assent of the husband having been given, and the onus ries. of proof lies on the plaintiff; therefore, where the vendor brought an action for expensive jewellery furnished to the wife, but could prove neither assent nor knowledge on the part of the husband, he was nonsuited (g). So, where the vendor supplied costly dresses to the wife, without authority, and took her note in payment, it was held that he could not recover (h). The husband will not be liable for money lent to his wife, without his authority (i); even, as it seems, if the money was applied to the purchase of necessaries (k). Otherwise, if the money was lent at his special instance and request ().

But express authority may be given.

If the husband gives express authority to his wife to act as his agent, or what amounts to the same, allows her to contract with his knowledge, he will be liable whether the contract be for necessaries or not. This was held even where the parties had been separated for some time, the

(g) Montague v. Benedict, 3 B. & C. 631 ; Montague v. Espinasse, 1 C. & P. 356, 502; Montague v. Baron, 5 D. & R. 532. (h) Metcalfe v. Shaw, 3 Campb. 22.

(i) Stone v. M'Nair (in error), 7 Taunt. 432; S. C. 4 Price 48; 1 B. Moore 126.

(k) Ibid.; 1 Salk. 387. [But the husband would be liable in equity; Harris v. Lee, 1 P. Wms. 482.]

(1) Stephenson v. Hardy, 3 Wils. 388; S. C. 2 Bl. Rep. 872.

husband having been imprisoned, and the wife in the meantime having conducted the business, and after his return having continued the management (m). The assent of the husband may be implied to contracts of the wife, where he has ratified previous contracts of the same nature and in the same business (n). A feme covert may, with her husband's assent, indorse a promissory note (o), or bill of exchange (p), or borrow money (q). But if the vendor has given credit to the wife alone, as by debiting her in his books, or drawing bills for her acceptance, the husband will not be liable for the goods,- although proof can be given that he has seen them in her possession (r).

promise to

ing.

If after the husband's death the wife promises Subsequent to pay a debt which she has previously contracted, pay is bindthe moral obligation will be a sufficient consideration to support the promise (s); but all the circumstances, which show that the money was

(m) Petty v. Anderson, 3 Bingh. 170; S. C. 2 C. & P. 38; see Plimmer v. Sells, 3 Nev. & M. 422.

(n) Forsyth v. Milne, Paley Pr. & A. p. 163. 3rd Ed.

(0) Coates v. Davies, 1 Campb. 485; Barlow v. Bishop, 1 East, 432; S. C. 3 Esp. 266.

(p) Prestwich v. Marshall, 4 C. & P. 594; S. C. 7 Bingh. 565; Prince v. Brunatte, 1 Bingh. N. S. 435.

(q) Stephenson v. Hardy, 3 Wils. 388.

(r) Bentley v. Griffin, 5 Taunt. 356; see Metcalf v. Shaw, 3 Campb. 22; Taylor v. Brittan, 1 C. & P. 16 n.

(s) Lee v. Muggeridge, 5 Taunt. 36.