consequences of their own rash ness. Upon the whole, if the discussions which occurred during this session on our commercial policy are read with some degree of pain, on account of the frequent statements of distress which they force upon our attention; every re flecting mind will, on the other hand, experience a countervailing pleasure in the contemplation of the liberal views of our national interests, adopted and proclaimed by the leading members, both of the Ministry and of the Opposition. CHAP. VII. Mr. Brougham's Motion concerning the Droits of the Crown and Admiralty-The objectionable Nature of the Principle on which the Civil-List was settled-True Principle of the Civil-List-Instances of the Modes in which the Droits accrued-Their liability to Abuse-Mr. Canning's Speech in Reply-Alteration in the future Management of these Funds-Debate in the House of Lords on the same Subject-The Civil-List-Lord John Russell's Motion for Delay and Inquiry—Mr. Tierney's Speech for Inquiry -Provision for the Servants of the late King-The Budget-The Expenditure-The Ways and Means-Funding of Exchequer Bills and new Loan-Lottery Bill-Mr. Hume's Resolutions respecting the Collection of the Revenue-Mr. Lushington's CounterResolutions-Lord A. Hamilton's Motion concerning the Appointment of a fifth Baron of the Exchequer in Scotland-Opposed by the Lord Advocate and Lord Castlereagh-Ministers_in a Majority of only Twelve-A new Vacancy in the Scotch Exchequer occurs, and is not filled up. CERTA ERTAIN resolutions respect ing the Civil-list had been moved by the chancellor of the exchequer on the 2nd of May; but before they had been fully taken into consideration, Mr. Brougham, on the 5th of May, moved, "That it is expedient, with a view to the arrangement of his majesty's Civil-list, to take into consideration the droits of the Crown and Admiralty, 4 per cent West-India duties, and other funds not usually deemed hitherto to be within the control of parliament, and to make such provision touching the same, as may be consistent with the honour and dignity of the crown, the interests of the subject, and the maintenance of the constitution." In supporting his proposition, he affirmed that nothing was worse adapted for the real honour, comfort, and dignity of the crown, than the method in which the civil-list had been settled. Any man could tell what was the revenue of the French king or the American president: but as to the real salary of the king of England, only an adept in finance could give any information respecting it. Was it dealing fairly with the king to mix up with the little he was allowed (and a little it undoubtedly was) to defray his private expenses, and keep up his honour and dignity, the salaries of the judges, the income of the chancellor of the exchequer and his friends, presents to foreign ministers, and a vast accumulation of claims and allowances to officers, great and small, of all sorts and conditions? Some of them it was below the dignity of the sovereign even to name, and all below his true honour and character to have mixed up and confounded with his own person and demands. But it was said, that "to simplify matters in this way, to make accounts clear and explicable, would be beneath the dignity of the crown." Admitting it for a moment, was there nothing to be gained by it-were popularity, and the full approbation of the king's subjects worth no conşideration? Supposing there might be some slight defalcation of dignity, was there no advantage in preventing great defalcations of a pecuniary kind, which had been perpetually occasioned by the absurd, confused, gothic mode of keeping accounts? after all, where would be the loss of dignity, if the people told their prince"You shall be paid largely, liberally, cheerfully, without a murmur from the people, who well know that your interests and theirs are inseparably unitednot as at present, but by a fixed, constant, determined grant out of the consolidated fund." That, in truth, was his proposition; but the chancellor of the exchequer, in his love for mystery, seemed to think that there was something subline in obscurity. The misfortune for him, however, was, that we lived in a prying age, when men would not be satisfied with being told, that they must not examine and scrutinize. The true principle of the civillist, said Mr. Brougham, was, that whatever appeared to be necessary for upholding the state and dignity of the monarch, should be liberally and cheerfully given. He conceived, that it should not be voted, once for all; but that it should continue as long as those circumstances remained, under which it was granted. When they became altered, it was right that parliament should make a new arrangement. Why was the settlement made permanent? Because, for the term of his life, the sovereign gave up his hereditary revenues. But, notwithstanding that, circumstances might, from time to time, make the old arrangement improvident. The House could be practically convinced of this fact. His late majesty reigned for sixty years; and during that period, there were six new arrangements, besides eight different payments in aid of the civil-list. It would appear, that even nine years were too long for the continuance of this provident system. The arrangement of 1760, was made as if it were supposed that the monarch was to live only nine years; but in 1769, a debt of 8,000,0007. had accumulated; and in 1777, it was found necessary to grant 60,000%. more per annum. An arrangement for life could not proceed on any one conceivable principle. The only impartial course was, for parliament to take possession of those hereditary revenues-to place them to the account of the consolidated fund, and to pay, from the latter, a proper sum to maintain the dignity of the crown. They should wholly separate from the civil-list, the salaries of the judges, the salary of the Speaker of the House of Commons-a situation that should be as independent as that of the sovereign himself—and the payments made to foreign ministers. There was a great number of contingent nish condemnations the sum of 2,200,0007. was derived. So that large sums were not wanting in the list, more than small ones. charges connected with the civillist. There were 30,000l. for foreign ministers, and various charges of a miscellaneous nature. He did not mean to say that these were improper. They might be very necessary. But let any individual look over the accounts, and he would at once perceive, that the whole of these items would be as soon paid, if an estimate of them were laid on the table of this House, unless they were manifestly improper, as they were under the existing system. Why could not these demands be submitted to the House, in the same way as the army extraordinaries were laid before them? Why could they not be introduced by estimate and proposal? Why should not questions be asked, and explanations be given, within the walls of that house? that was the only course that could satisfy the public-ployed in the furtherance of corthat could enforce economy-that could prevent abuse. Mr. Brougham then mentioned some instances of the manner in which the sums that formed the droits of the crown, accrued to it. In 1817, the sum of 130,000l., fell to the crown, in consequence of the demise of a rich lunatic. In 1807, an individual, who had no heirs, died intestate; his property, to the amount of 47,000l., went to the crown. In 1816, the crown got possession of 62,000l. in the same way. In 1804, prize-money to the amount of 105,000l., was received on one occasion. In the same year there was another sum of 40,000l., and a third of 55,0007. In 1806, those droits were augmented by 155,000l.; and at one period there came in nearly the whole proceeds of the Dutch prizes, amounting to 1,657,0007. From the Spa There was another source, too, of great importance, though not so productive as those to which he had alluded. He meant the revenue derivable from the Leeward Islands, from Gibraltar, from Scotland, &c. which amounted to a very large sum. How was it disposed of? in pensions. It was not under the control of parliament, and might be expended as the reward of good services or bad services, or as the meed of favouritism for no services at all. So that the property of those dying intestate, and without heirs or next of kin, the proceeds of certain captured vessels, and the other sources of revenue which he had mentioned, might all be em rupt practices or of special jobs. He would not contend, that such a use had been made of those funds. He merely alluded to the possibility of their abuse; and he conceived, that pensions derived from those occasionally-accumulating funds, were not so pleasing to the public, as those which came through the more regular and steady channel of the legislature. If these droits were suspicious in their application, in their origin they were ten thousand times worse. As every prize made before declaration of war formed part of them, they were, in fact, premiums for going to war without the usual proclamation; and on these funds ought to be written, in indelible characters, "The purchase money of the honour, the good faith, the pure and unsullied good name of England." If he wanted a proof that they were so, he had only to refer to the Dutch war, in the time of Charles II.: that war was undertaken for the purpose of seizing the Smyrna fleet-for which perfidious action Providence punished that monarch, by overwhelming him and his ministers in discomfiture and disgrace. But, to come to later times, what did they think of the Dutchwhat of the Spanish prizes ? 2,200,000l. were acquired by attacking unarmed, defenceless men-men who knew no reason for such a proceeding, except that they had dollars on board their ships. His advice, therefore, was, that the crown should be requested to resign these funds, receiving in their stead an ample remuneration, and that the royal dignity should henceforth be wholly maintained out of the consolidated fund. It was now a new reign; and if, in opposition to the clear law of the question, in opposition to the constitutional view of its principle, in the face of numerous precedents of mischievons abuse derived from history -if the House neglected to wipe away a foul blot on the honour of the country, by giving up a vile relic of feudal barbarism, useless for any national purposes, and serving only as an occasion of calumny to our carping rivals and bitter enemies-if now, when this mischief could be done away, without injury to the crown and with benefit to the people, the House should suffer the opportunity to be lost, it would, in fact, go the length of saying, that these droits ought to remain for ever a lasting anomaly in the law and constitution, a perennial source of abuses, and a perpetual stigma on the character of the country. VOL. LXII. As soon as Mr. Brougham sat down, Mr. Canning rose, and declared, that he and his colleagues would reject with disdain any boon, which was offered as an inducement to barter away the royal prerogatives. "The honourable mover, said" Mr. Canning, "wishes that the regal department of the state may be re-cast anew, and every vestige of ancient feudal monarchy abolished. That we could erect something new that would merit great praise, I am not prepared to deny. The new fabric might be clean and neat as the American government, and intelligible as the president of the United States; but I am unwilling that every trace of antiquity should be done away in the British constitution. Nothing is so easy as to frame a system that will look neater on papera system that, by stripping the king of all exclusive and princely ornaments, would render monarch and his ministers, in dignity and form, what they are in reality, but in a more suitable and efficient character-the mere functionaries of the people. There is but one step further to complete the improvement: it is, as the king is paid a fixed and calculated salary, so let ministers be removed in form as they are in substance, as well as new ministers appointed, by this House. The monarch would then be separated from all the darkness of ancient times. The honourable gentleman (continued he) has expatiated on the danger of leaving the crown in possession of a power of conferring pensions charged on funds, not within the control of parliament. But, for my own part, I think it better that the patronage of the Crown [H] the |