against stale demands, and operating upon the remedy only, without destroying the debt, but as an act of prohibition, qualified with respect to time, but otherwise absolute. Consequently, after the expiration of the time limited without suit. charges embraced by the Statute do not constitute a debt capable of being applied or set-off against the charges of the adverse party, in the liquidation of mutual accounts. Nor is it to be considered, as an ordinary "Statute of Limitations liable to be avoided by a new promise of "the defendant." Maples vs. Avery, (In Error,) 6 Conn. Rep. 20, 24.

GEORGIA.

The Act of Limitations of Georgia does not apply to mortgagees. The possession of the mortgagor is not adverse. Higginson vs. Mein, 4 Cranch's Rep. 415.

KENTUCKY.

The Act of Limitations applies to suits brought by petition and summons. Banks vs. Coyle, 2 Marsh. Rep. (Ky.) 564.

The 5th section of an act passed February 9th, 1819, 1 Dig. Laws of Kentucky, 537. limiting the time of bringing suits against executors and administrators, is confined to actions on contracts made by the decedent. Contracts made by executors or administrators, although in fulfilment of an executory contract made by the decedent, are not within the act. Cummins vs. Kennedy, 3 Litt. Rep. 121.

LOUISIANA.

Prescription for three years bars an attorney's action for professional services. Morse vs. Brandt, 2 Mart. Rep. (N. S.) 515.

MARYLAND.

B. Harwood filed a bill in chancery in 1805 against the heirs at law of R. Rawlings, on a bond executed by R. Rawlings in 1789; it was admitted that the personal estate of R. Rawlings was insufficient to pay the complainant's demand. The heirs by their answer relied on the Act of Limitations; and to prevent the operation of that Act, the complainant exhibited a judgment obtained by him in 1802, on the administration bond executed by the administratrix of R. Rawlings. KILTY, Chancellor, (at February term, 1813,) said; "The defence set up of the claim being barred by "the Act of Limitations, is one which the chancellor would not be disposed to countenance, if he had a discretionary power. But as it is relied on, he considers himself bound to say, that it is a "bar to the relief prayed."-Decreed, that the bill be dismissed, but without costs. The complainant appealed from this de

cree; but the COURT OF APPEALS affirmed it. Harwood vs. Rawlings' heirs, 4 Harr. & Johns. Rep. 126.

By an order of the orphan's court in August, 1797, the executrix of C. S. was directed to deliver to S. W., one of her sureties in the testamentary bond, all such part of the estate of the testator as remained in her hands. S. W. entered into bond to the state, dated in September, 1797, reciting the order, and conditioned that he should deliver and pay all the goods, &c. which should come to his possession by virtue or under the order, or the value thereof, agreeably to law, "to such person or persons as have a right to demand the same, when he shall be thereto legally required," &c. An action of debt was brought on this bond in September, 1811, at the instance of one of the creditors of the deceased testator, against one of the sureties therein, who pleaded general performance, and the Acts of Limitations of 1729, ch. 24, and 1715, ch. 23. Held, that a creditor was not entitled to have the bond sued; as S. W. could not pay the debts of the deceased, nor recover debts, nor pay legacies, nor settle an account in the orphan's court. That he may be likened to one who has letters ad colligendum. That he was liable to the administrator de bonis non, (the executrix being dead,) if one was appointed; and if none appointed, to nobody.

Held also, that the bond above mentioned executed by S. W., on which the action was brought, was the thing in action, and not the judgment mentioned in the replication obtained by the creditor against the executrix of C. S. in 1803; and that the Act of Limitations was a bar to the action. The State, use of Chamberlaine's Ex'rs. vs. Wright, 4 Har. & Johns. Rep.

148.

A plea of the Act of Limitations is a bar to an action on a bond given to the state, by a trustee appointed under a decree of the court of chancery for the sale of the real estate of a deceased person, &c. where the bond was executed more than twelve years before the institution of the action. As where A. Q. was appointed a trustee, under a decree of the court of chancery, to sell the real estate of J. S., deceased, and gave bond as such to the state, with J. M. and C. S. his sureties, on the 20th of December, 1795, and the action was brought on the bond against C. S., one of the sureties, on the 4th of May, 1809, who pleaded the Act of Limitations, to which there was a general demurrer. The demurrer was overruled. Schell vs. The State, use of Sower, 3 Harr. & Johns. Rep. 538.

Under an act of the Legislature incorporating a company, shares were to be subscribed for to be paid in five instalments; four of the instalments had become due more than three years before the

suit was brought against the defendant, who was a subscriber, and who pleaded the Statute of Limitations. The last instalment of $20 was not barred. Held, that although the last instalment of $20 was not barred by the Statute of Limitations, yet as the county court had not jurisdiction of that sum, that court did not err in their direction to the jury, that the plaintiffs were barred of their right of action by the defendant's plea of the Act of Limitations. The Baltimore & Havre de Grace Turnpike Company vs. Barnes, 6 Harr. & Johns. Rep. 57.

MASSACHUSETTS.

Land under a prior attachment to its full value, is property that may by the common and ordinary process of law be attached, within the meaning of the Statute of Limitations. So, of shares in a Bank or Insurance Company. Byrne vs. Crowninshield, 1 Picker. Rep. 263.

The name of a person subscribed to a promissory note, with intent to attest the signing thereof by the maker, is a sufficient witnessing within the Statute of Limitations; although there are no words over the name indicating the intent of his subscription. Faulkner vs. Jones, 16 Mass. Rep. 290

The endorsee of a promissory note, cannot avail himself of the notes' being witnessed, to take it out of the Statute of Limitations. Russell, Ex'x. vs. Swan, 16 Mass. Rep. 314.

66

In order to expedite the settlement of estates, as well as to re"lieve executors and administrators from vexation and uncertainty, the term of four years is limited, within which all creditors "whose debts are due and payable, must present their claims or "be forever barred." Royce vs. Burrell & Al.,12 Mass. Rep. 398. (Per PARSONS, Ch. J. delivering the Opinion of the Court.)

Suits by one town against another, for expenses incurred in the support of paupers, are limited to two years after the cause of action accrued. Needham vs. Newton, 12 Mass. Rep. 453.

The Statute of Limitations of the State of New York, cannot be pleaded in bar to an action commenced ip Massachusetts by inhabitants of New York, upon a promissory note executed in New York by the Defendants, citizens of Massachusetts. Pearsall & Al. vs. Dwight & Al., 2 Mass. Rep. 84.

Nor where both parties are citizens of New York. Byrne vs. Crowninshield, 17 Mass. Rep. 55.

Within six years after the dissolution of a partnership, one of the partners died, and within two years after the grant of Letters

of Administration on his estate, but more than six years after the partnership was dissolved, his administrators brought a Bill in Equity against the other partners, to compel them to account. PARKER, Ch. J. who delivered the Opinion of the Court, said; "The "Plea of the Statute of Limitations cannot avail, because until the "dissolution of partnership, there was no subsisting cause of ac"tion for the settlement of accounts between the partners. "Clark Chandler died in 1824, within six years after the dissolu"tion, and the Bill was brought by his Administrators within two "years after his death, so that by St. 1793, c. 75, the right of ac"tion remained." Chandler & Al., vs. Chandler & Al., 4 Picker. Rep. 81.

Where an administrator dies within four years from the grant of administration, and an administrator de bonis non, is appointed, actions of creditors are not barred until after the expiration of four years from this last grant of administration. Hemenway vs. Gates, Administrator, &c. 5 Picker. Rep. 321.

Two persons having been appointed guardians of a spendthrift, sold his real estate by virtue of a licence granted by the Court of Common Pleas, and credited him in their guardianship accounts with the proceeds, which they applied to the payment of his debts, some of the debts being paid by one guardian and some by the other. The letters of guardianship were afterwards revoked, and the spendthrift and his heirs avoided the sales of the real estate, the licence having been granted without any authority, and thereupon the guardians were compelled, upon their covenants, to refund the money paid by the purchasers. It was Held, that the guardians had a right of action against the spendthrift'e administratrix for the amount refunded, so much having been originally paid by them for the spendthrift upon a consideration which had failed; that this right did not accrue until the sales were avoided and the money refunded, so that the Statute of Limitations began to run from that time. Shearman & Al. vs. Akins, Admx. 4 Pick. Rep. 283.

Notwithstanding the proviso in St. 1793, c. 59, §9, an action will lie against a town after two years, upon a verbal promise of the overseers to pay the expenses incurred in supporting a pauper legally chargeable to such town; such a promise being barred only by the general Statute of Limitations. The Inhabitants of Belfast vs. The Inhabitants of Leominster, 1 Picker. Rep. 123.

NEW JERSEY.

The 6th Section of the "Act for the limitation of Actions," passed 7th February, 1799, (New Jersey Rev. Laws, 411,) which limits the commencement of suits on specialities to .16 years, ap

plies not only to bonds executed after, but also to those executed before the passage of that act. Marston vs. Seabury, 2 Penn. Rep. 435.

Where an Executor pays money to a legatee, and six years after the payment, upon a settlement in the Orphan's Court, discovers that he has paid the legatee more than he was entitled to, and brings an action to recover the money overpaid; the action is barred by the Statute of Limitations. Ely vs. Norton, Exor. (On Certiorari,) 1 Halst. Rep. 187.

NEW YORK.

The act to settle disputes concerning titles to lands in the county of Onondaga, (Sess. 20. c. 51.) is a constitutional act. Jackson ex dem. Lepper vs. Griswold, 5 Johns. Rep. 539.

The award of the commissioners, under the act is considered as a matter of record to take effect from its date; and unless a dissent has been entered within two years from the date of the award it is conclusive. Ibid.

The date of the award is prima facie evidence of the time of its being made; and strong evidence will be required to show that the date on the face of the award is not the true time. Ibid.

The act applies only to interfering and adverse claims. Jackson ex dem. Fonda vs. Teele, 7 Johns. Rep. 28.

An award in favour of the grantor in a deed, will enure in favour of the grantee, it being in favour of the title; and the grantee, there being no dispute between him and the grantor, need not dissent. Jackson ex dem. Fonda vs. Teele, 7 Johns. Rep. 28.

None but persons aggrieved need file a dissent. Ibid.

Infants, and others, under legal disabilities at the time of the award must file their dissent within three years after coming of age, or the removal of the disability, otherwise they will be barred. Jackson ex dem. Cornelius vs. M'Kee, 8 Johns. Rep. 429. S. P. Jackson ex dem. Boyd vs. Lewis, 13 Johns. Rep. 504.

The limitation in the act, as to the time of filing a dissent, cannot be set up against such of the lessors in ejectment, as were feme coverts at the time the award was made; and bringing the action during the coverture is no waiver of the saving clause in the statute. Jackson ex dem. Bunt vs. Ransom, 10 Johns. Rep.

407.

But the filing a dissent being, by the act, a condition precedent to a right of recovery, an action cannot be maintained before a