Witness my hand, G. May;" with intent to defraud W. Jefferys. The prisoner pretending to be entitled to parochial relief, went to Jefferys's shop with the order, saying she had brought it from May the overseer of the poor, and desiring him to let her have the articles on the credit of it. After conviction judgment was respited; and nine of the judges, on a conference in July 1754, were clearly of opinion that the writing was not a warrant or order for the delivery of goods within the statute; considering that the words "warrant or order," as they stand in the act, are synonymous, and import that the person giving such warrant or order has or at least claims an interest in the money or goods which are the subject matter of it, and has or at least assumes to have a disposing power over them, and takes on him to transfer the property, or at least the custody of them, to the person in whose favour such warrant is made. And though this case must fall within the mischief, yet in the construction of an act so penal the strict letter of it ought not to be departed from. Williams's case, 937. On the authority of Mitchell's case, it was determined in Williams's case that a note to a tradesman requesting him to let the 1775. bearer have certain goods, is not within the statute, though most 1 Leach, 114. of the judges said they should have doubted the propriety of the 2 East's P. C. former case had it been res integra; but it having been so long acquiesced in, they thought it could not be departed from. Accordingly in Ellor's case, a note in the following form; "Messrs. Songer, please to send £10 by the bearer, as I am so ill, "I cannot wait on you, Eliz. Wery." was holden not to be an order within the statute. The prisoner was therefore acquitted of the felony; but detained, and at a subsequent sessions convicted of a misdemeanor. In Clinch's case it was holden that an order of this kind ought to be directed to some person in particular, and it ought to appear that the person, whose name is subscribed to the order, had an authority to make it. But if it purport to be an order which the party has a right to make, although in truth he has no such right, and though no such person exists as he who is supposed to have made it, it comes within the statute. Ellor's case. O. B. 1784. 938. Clinch's case. 1 Leach, 540.. 949. Leach, 94. A forged order on a banker for payment of money, purporting to be made C. Lockett was convicted of knowingly uttering a forged order R. v. Lockett, for the payment of money in these words; "Messrs. Neale, For- O. B. June 1772. dyce, and Down, pay to Wm. Hopwood or bearer 161. 10s. 6 d. 2 East's P. C. R. Vennest;" with intent to defraud John Scoles. The prisoner applied to Scoles, a colourman, and agreed to purchase goods to the amount of 101. Os. 6d. which he was to send for; and he took away with him a little Prussian blue. He came again, pretending to be in a hurry, and presented this note, which he said was a good one; and Scoles gave him 67. 10s. being the difference. No such person by one who as R. Vennest kept cash at Messrs. Neale and Co's., nor did it appear kept cash with that there was any such man existing. The question submitted to him, is within the judges was, whether this were an order within the statute, being the statute, in the name of a fictitious person? the doubt arising on what is though made in said in Mitchell's case. The judges after very long consideration a fictitious name, at last agreed in Trin. Term 1774, that this was forgery. They one who had no thought it quite immaterial whether such a man as Vennest existed authority to or not; or if he did, whether he had kept cash at the banking draw on him. house of Messrs. Neale and Co.; it was sufficient that the order . or in the name of 2 East's P. C. 1 Leach, 204. A forged order for obtaining the reward, &c. for apprehending a vagrant not under hand and seal, &c. not within the statute. Shepherd's case. 2 East's P. C. A bill of exchange may be laid as an order for payment of money. R. v. Powell, 2 Blac. Rep. 787. 2East's P.C. 976. 1 Leach, 77. assumed those facts and imported a right on the part of the drawer to direct such a transfer of his property. But in these cases it is not necessary to specify the particular goods in the order, provided it be conceived in terms intelligible to the parties themselves to whom it is addressed. Nor is the statute confined to orders or warrants in commercial transactions. In R. v. M'Intosh, 2 East's P. C. 942. an order for payment of prize money, and in R. v. Graham, 2 East's P. C. 945. a forged order of a magistrate upon the high constable of a division, or the treasurer of the county, to pay a reward of 10s. to the prisoner for apprehending a vagrant under the stat. 17 G. 2. c. 5. § 5. were holden to be orders within the meaning of the 7 G. 2.; though in the latter case, the 18th § of the act subjects the party forging such order to a penalty of 501. Benjamin Rushworth was indicted at York Sum. Ass. 1816, MS. for forging an order for the purpose of obtaining the sum of 41. 10s. for apprehending and conveying certain vagrants: but the order not being under hand and seal, as required by 17 G. 2. c. 5. § 5., and being addressed to the County Treasurer, instead of to the High Constable, as that statute also requires, Bayley, J. thought it was not such an order for payment of money as was within the statute, and directed an acquittal. A bill of exchange may be stated as an order for payment of money. In R. v. Shepherd the forged instrument, which was set out, was precisely in the form of a bill of exchange, and in the indictment it was stated to be an order for payment of money. It was objected that it ought to have been laid to be a bill of exchange. But in Mich. T. 1781 the judges were unanimously of opinion that it was properly laid. It was observed, that the indictment and the draft were the same, as in Lockett's case, (ante) where all the judges held the conviction proper; and that every bill of exchange seemed to be an order for payment of money, though not vice versa. With intent to defraud any person or corporation.] The intent to defraud and the party to be defrauded must be stated in the indictment; and the proof must agree with such allegation. But it need not state the manner in which the party is to be defrauded; for that is matter of evidence. The statute 7 G. 2. c. 22. was confined to those cases where the forgery was committed with intent to defraud individuals and not corporate bodies. R. v. Harrison, O. B. 1777. 2 East's P. C. 988., and therefore the stat. 18 G. 3. c. 18. was passed to remedy this defect. III. Indictment and evidence. It is necessary to set forth in the indictment the instrument forged in words and figures. R. v. Mason, 2 East's P. C. 975. It is sufficient if it be set forth in words and figures, after the words" as follows" without saying according to the tenor following." R. v. Powell. 2 East's P. C. 976. So it is sufficient to describe the instrument as 66 a paper writing, &c. purporting to be such an instrument," &c. R. v. Birch and Martin; 2 East's P. C. 980, and 2 Blac. Rep. 790. But the word purport imports what appears on the face of the instrument; and therefore if it be stated in the indictment that the instrument purports to be so and so, and the instrument when set forth does not accord with what it is said to purport, it is bad. 883. In Jones's case in 1779 the instrument was described to be Jones's case, a paper writing purporting to be a bank note; but the court were Dougl. 300. 2 East's P. C. of opinion that as it did not purport on the face of it to be a bank note, the indictment could not be supported; and that this defect could not be supplied by the representations made by the party when he passed off the note. So in J. Reading's case 1793, where the indictment charged that the prisoner being possessed of a bill of exchange, purporting to be directed to J. King, by the name, &c. of J. Ring, forged the acceptance of the said J. King, judgment was arrested, because the bill did not purport to be drawn on J. King, as stated in the indictAnd Buller, J. in delivering the opinion of the judges at the O. B., observed that the indictment, as drawn, was absurd and repugnant in itself; for the name and description of one person or thing, could not purport to be another. Again in Gillchrist's case, the indictment was for forging “a paper writing, purporting to be an order for payment of money, dated &c. with the name of Thos. Exon thereunto subscribed, purporting to have been signed by Thos. Exon clerk, and to be directed to George Lord Kinnaird, Wm. Moreland, and Thomas Hammersley, of, &c. bankers and partners, by the name and description of Messrs. Ransom, Moreland, and Hammersley, for the payment of the sum of 107., &c.;" the tenor of which said false writing, &c. is as follows, viz. “ Messrs. Ransom, Moreland, and Hammersley, please to pay to Mr. Brooks or bearer the sum of ten pounds for Thos. Exon; Sept. 11th 1794," with intent to defraud the said George Lord Kinnaird, &c. A motion was made in arrest of judgment, and upon a conference with the judges in Easter Term 1795, it was resolved by ten judges present, that the judgment should be arrested, because the word purport imports what appears on the instrument itself. It means the apparent and not the legal import; And that this bill of exchange could not purport to be directed to Lord Kinnaird, because his name did not appear on the face of the bill. And these determinations have been acted upon in various subsequent cases. Reading's case, O. B. Sept.1793. 2 Leach, 590. 2 East's P. C. 981. Gillchrist's case, 982. 2 Leach, 657. But a merely literal variance is not fatal; as in Hart's case, where 2 East's P. C. the word was written in the indictment "received," and it was 977. "reicevd" in the bill of exchange itself. So where the prisoner was indicted for uttering a bill of exchange Oldfield's case. directed to Messrs. Masterman, Peters, & Co. with a forged in- Durham Sum. dorsement thereon; and it was objected that there was a variance Ass. 1811. in the indictment, which imported to set out the bill according to cor. Bayley, J. its tenor, inasmuch as the letter r in Messrs. was omitted, and the MS. C. C. R. abbreviation Messs. might stand for words which Messrs. could not; the objection was overruled, and the judges, upon the point being referred to them, held the indictment sufficient, But, if by addition, omission or alteration, the word is so changed as to become another word, the variance will be fatal. 2 Russ. 1482. R. v. Beach. I Cowp. 229. Form of Commitment for felony in uttering a forged Bank County of To G. C. esquire, one of the justices of our lord the king, assigned to keep the peace within the said county. the constable of in the said county, and to the keeper of the common goal at Warwick, in the said County. THESE are to command you the said constable in his said majesty's name, forthwith to convey and deliver into the custody of the said keeper of the said common gaol the body of A. O. charged this day before me the said justice upon the oaths of A. I. A. W. and others, with feloniously uttering, publishing, disposing of, and putting away at Birmingham in the said county, on the -day of now last past, a certain false, forged, and counterfeited bank note, purporting to be a note of the governor and company of the bank of England, for the payment of one pound, he the said A. O. at the time of uttering, &c. [or as the case may be] well knowing the same to be false, forged and counterfeited, with intent to defraud the said governor and company, contrary to the form of the statutes in such case made and provided. And you the said keeper are hereby required to receive the said A. O. into your custody in the said common gaol, and him there safely keep, until he shall be from thence discharged by due course of law. Hereof fail you not. Given under my hand and seal, the day of and twenty. in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred Fornication. See Lewdness. 6 G. 3. c. 29. Pieces to be marked. Frame Work. Sect. I. Frame work knitters. II. Frame work breakers. [57 G. 3. c. 126.] I. Frame work knitters. BY 6 G. 3. c. 29. § 1. all frame work knitted pieces, and stockings made of thread, cotton, worsted or yarn, or any mixture of all or any of the said materials, or of any other materials, except such as shall be made of silk only, which shall contain three or more threads, shall be marked with the same number of ilet-holes, and no more, as there are threads contained in each piece or pair; and such ilet-holes shall be made distinctly in one direct line, or in the same course, and shall not exceed the distance of three inches from the two extreme ilet-holes; and no such ilet-holes shall be made or placed within the distance of four inches of any letter, figure, 6 G. 3. c. 29. mark or other device, which shall be put or woven in any such goods or manufactures; and all such ilet-holes shall be made within four inches of the top or end of every such piece or pair ; and no ilet-hole, or imitation thereof, shall be made or put in any frame work knitted piece or pair of stockings, upon any account whatsoever, except as herein-before directed. § 2. Provided that nothing herein shall prevent any manufacturers from using remnants, or materials of any sort, in the welts and tops of stockings only, at any distance not exceeding three inches from the top, although the same shall not contain so great a number of threads as are contained in the legs of such stockings. § 3. If any master frame work knitter or master hosier, or any Penalty on not other person, shall make or work, or cause or procure to be made marking. or wrought, any frame work knitted goods of any the materials aforesaid, or any mixture thereof (except such as shall be made of silk only), without being so marked; he shall forfeit the same, and also 51. for each piece of such frame work knitted goods, or pair of stockings. § 4. 5. 6. Provided that the said penalty of 51. shall not extend to any journeyman, apprentice, servant, or person not making such goods or manufactures on his own account: but such person offending herein shall forfeit not exceeding 40s. nor less than 5s. for each piece or pair; but if he can prove that the goods by him unduly marked were so marked by direction of his master, or the person by whom he was employed, in that case he shall not be subject to any penalty. § 7. And if any frame work knitter, hosier, or other person shall Selling unmarksell or expose to sale any of the said goods, not duly and truly ed goods. marked as aforesaid, he shall forfeit the same, and also 57. for each piece or pair. § 8. Provided, that if the person prosecuted for selling or exposing the same to sale, shall discover the vender or seller thereof, so as he may be convicted; such person shall be discharged from any penalty or forfeiture inflicted by this act. be recovered. § 9. One justice where the offence shall be committed (not be- Penalties how to ing a frame work knitter, hosier, or proprietor of frames,) may convict the offender, on the oath of one witness: and if on such conviction the penalties or forfeitures shall not be forthwith paid, the said justice shall issue his warrant to levy the same by distress, rendering the overplus, if any; and if no goods, or not sufficient, can be found, such justice shall, on oath thereof made to him by the person who shall have the execution of the warrant, commit the offender to the common gaol of the place where the offence shall be committed for any time not exceeding three months, unless the penalties and forfeitures shall be sooner paid and satisfied: all which penalties and forfeitures shall be applied half to the informer and half to the poor. § 10. Persons aggrieved may appeal to the sessions, giving ten Appeal. days notice in writing of his intent to the justice, and within two days after notice entering into recognizance before a justice with two sureties to try the appeal at such sessions: and the justices there, on due proof of such notice and recognizance, shall hear and determine the same, and award costs to either party, as they shall |