purpose, causing irreparable damage to the business and property of the plaintiff. Financial pressure, loss of business, interference of freedom of action were imposed by them in order to force the unionization. The law should be and is that the means were unjustifiable and unlawful and the defendants should be enjoined from using them. (Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229; Burnham v. Dowd, 217 Mass. 351; Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497; Purvis v. United Brotherhood, 214 Penn. St. 348; Fink & Son v. Butchers' Union No. 422, 84 N. J. Eq. 638; Harvey v. Chapman, 226 Mass. 191; W. A. Snow Iron Works, Inc., v. Chadwick, 227 Mass. 382; Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255; Cornellier v. Haverhill Shoe Manufacturers Assn., 221 Mass 554; New England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern, 218 Mass. 198; Baush Mach. Tool Co. v. Hill, 120 N. E. Rep. 188 [Mass.], July 16, 1918; Smith v. Bowen, 121 N. E. Rep. 814 [Mass.], February 4, 1919.)

What we have written declares sufficiently the clear and inescapable distinction between the facts and legal principles involved in this case and those involved in Bossert v. Dhuy (221 N. Y. 342).

The right of the plaintiff to a judgment being affirmed, the form or scope of the judgment rendered is not attacked.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

f. Power of Private Party to Restrain Refusal to Handle Nonunion-made Material

A suit in equity was brought by corporations outside the State of New York to restrain the carpenters' unions and others within the State from refusing to handle nonunion-made materials furnished by them. The bill alleged a conspiracy by the members of the union to carry out an unlawful purpose by coercing the refusal to use such nonunion-made materials. The bill was dismissed by the District Court (212 Fed. 259), which decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (214 Fed. 82, 130 C. C. A. 522). The following decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, affirming the lower courts, sets forth the facts and contentions of the parties fully.

PAINE LUMBER Co. v. NEAL, 244 U. S. 459, 61 L. Ed. 1256, 37 Sup. Ct.

Rep. 718 (June 11, 1917).

HOLMES, J.: This is a bill in equity brought by corporations, of states other than New York, engaged in the manufacture of doors, sash, etc., in open shops, against officers and agents of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America and of the New York branch of the same, certain union manufacturers of doors, sash, etc., members of the Manufacturing Woodworkers' Association, and many master carpenters, members of the Master Carpenters' Association, whose business is to install such products in buildings. The bill was dismissed in the District Court (212 Fed. 259), and the decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (130 C. C. A. 522, 214 Fed. 82).

The bill alleges a conspiracy of the members of the Brotherhood and the New York branch to prevent the exercise of the trade of carpenters by anyone not a member of the Brotherhood, and to prevent the plaintiffs and all other employers of carpenters not such members from engaging in interstate commerce and selling their goods outside of the state where the goods are manufactured, and it sets out the usual devices of labor unions as exercised to that end. In 1909 the Master Carpenters, coerced by the practical necessities of the case, made an agreement with the New York branch, accepting a previously established joint arbitration plan to avoid strikes and lockouts. This agreement provides that "there shall be no restriction against the use of any manufactured material except nonunion or prison-made"; the arbitration plan is confined to shops that use union labor, and the employers agree to employ union labor only. The unions will not erect material made by nonunion mechanics. Another agreement between the Manufacturing Woodworkers' Association, the Brotherhood, and the New York branch, also adopts the plan of arbitration; the labor unions agree that "none of their members will erect or install nonunion or prison-made material," and the Woodworkers undertake that members of the Brotherhood shall "be employed exclusively in the mills of the Manufacturing Woodworkers' Association." It is found that most of the journeymen carpenters in Manhattan and part of Brooklyn belong to the Brotherhood, and that, owing to their refusal to work with non-union men, and to employers finding it wise to employ union men, it is very generally impracticable to erect carpenter work in those places except by union labor. It also is found that, owing to the above provisions as to nonunion material, the sale of the plaintiff's' goods in those places have been made less. The workmen have adopted the policy omplained of without malice toward the plaintiffs, as part of the plan to bring about " a nation-wide unionization in their trade."

An injunction is asked against the defendants (other than the Master Carpenters) conspiring to refuse to work upon material made by the plaintiff, because not made by union labor; or enforcing by-laws intended to prevent working with or upon what is called unfair material; or inducing persons to refuse to work for persons purchasing such material, or taking other enumerated steps to the same general end; or conspiring to restrain the plaintiffs' interstate business in order to compel them to refuse to employ carpenters not members of the Brotherhood. It is prayed further that the provision quoted above from the Master Carpenters' agreement and another ancillary one be declared void and the parties enjoined from carrying them out. No other or alternative relief is prayed. The ground on which the injunction was refused by the District Court was that, although it appeared that the agreements above mentioned were parts of a comprehensive plan to restrain commerce among the states, the conspiracy was not directed specially against the plaintiffs and had caused them no special damage, different from that inflicted on the public at large. The Circuit Court of Appeals, reserving its opinion as to whether any agreement or combination contrary to law was made out, agreed with the judge below on the ground that no acts directed against the plaintiffs personally were shown.

In the opinion of the majority of the court, if the facts show any violation of the Act of July 2, 1890, chap. 647, 26 Stat. at L. 209, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 8820, a private person cannot maintain a suit for an injunction under § 4

of the same (Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U. S. 48, 70, 71, 48, L. ed. 870, 880, 881, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 598); and especially such an injunc tion as is sought; even if we should go behind what seems to have been the view of both courts below, that no special damage was shown, and reverse their conclusion of fact. No one would maintain that the injunction should be granted to parties not showing special injury to themselves. Personally, I lay those questions on one side because, while the Act of October 15, 1914, chap. 323, § 16, Stat. at L. 730, 737, Comp. Stat. 1916, §§ 8835a, 88350, establishes the right of private parties to an injunction in proper cases, in my opinion it also establishes a policy inconsistent with the granting of one here. I do not go into the reasoning which satisfies me, because upon this point I am in a minority.

As this court is not the final authority concerning the laws of New York, we say but a word about them. We shall not believe that the ordinary action of a labor union can be made the ground of an injunction under those laws until we are so instructed by the New York Court of Appeals. National Protective Assoc. v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 58 L. R. A. 135, 88 Am. St. Rep. 648, 63 N. E. 369. Certainly the conduct complained of has no tendency to produce a monopoly of manufacture or building, since the more successful it is the more competitors are introduced into the trade. Cases like Kellogg v. Sowerby, 190 N. Y. 370, 83 N. E. 47, concerning conspiracies between railroads and elevator companies to prevent competition, seem to us very clearly not to have been intended to overrule the authority which we cite, and not to have any bearing on the present point. Decree affirmed. MR. JUSTICE PITNEY, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA and MR. JUSTICE VANDEVANTER, dissented.

E. RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT OF LABOR UNION AS DEFEATING INJUNCTION

KEHOE V. LEONARD, 176 App. Div. 626 (Feb. 21, 1917), abstract. Where proceedings have been brought against the president of a labor organization for the purpose of procuring an injunction, the resignation of the president pending the proceedings does not defeat the injunction, when the duly elected successor of such president is substituted, as this is in accord with the Code of Civil Procedure, § 1920.

F. UNINCORPORATION NOT BAR TO SUIT TO RESTRAIN UNION HEITKAMPER v. HOFFMAN, 99 Misc. 543 (April, 1916), abstract. Where a defendant union was sued by naming its treasurer, alleging it to be an unincorporated association, it was held, against the contention of counsel that it could not be sued in an action, that the Code of Civil Procedure, § 1919, does not limit an action against the treasurer or president to one where money damages is claimed. The court said:

"An unincorporated association has no standing as a legal entity but the statute provides a convenient method by which such associations are bound by the judgment rendered in such an action."

G. MODIFICATION OF TEMPORARY INJUNCTION W. B. Coon Co., INC. v. MEINHART, 112 Misc. 650 (July, 1920), abstract. In proceedings for the modification of a temporary injunction in a strike case, where the injunction restrains "all persons without connecting them with those charged as defendants, the injunction will not be vacated but modified by adding apt words such as "acting in combination or collusion with them or in assertion of their rights and claims."

III. STRIKE AS EXCUSE FOR DELAY IN MAKING REPAIRS ON VESSEL

A vessel was put in dry dock for repairs, and remained there three months. No express contract for the repairs was made. The reasonable value of the use of the dry dock and of the repairs was admitted to be $39,984.08. The owner of the vessel, in order to get possession, paid $30,000 to the Dry Dock Company without prejudice, and gave a stipulation for the balance, and in its cross-libel alleged that the repairs should have been completed by October 9, or a little over thirty days after it was accepted for repairs, and that it was deprived of its use of the steamer for thirty-seven days, at the reasonable rate of $500 a day or $18,500 in the aggregate. It appeared that on October 14th, or nine days after the vessel was laid up for repairs, the employees of the Dry Dock Company demanded an eight-hour day without deduction, but the company refused and informed them that they must work a straight nine-hour day. Consequently, 80 or 90 per cent of the employees struck. Although the company attempted to secure an adequate force of men, it could not so do. There was no violence during the strike although picketing was kept up and much persuasion was used toward new and old employees. The men gradually came back without a change of hours and no trouble occurred thereafter.

The United States District Court for the Western District of New York was of the opinion that the Dry Dock Company made the repairs to the vessel in a reasonable time. On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals the court disposed of the issues in an opinion the material parts of which follows:

THE RICHLAND QUEEN, 254 Fed. 668, 166 C. C. A. 166 (Nov. 13, 1918), in part.

Judge Hazel was of the opinion that the Dry Dock Company, in view of all the circumstances, made the repairs to the steamer in a reasonable time, and was not liable under the decision of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York in Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Browns, 58 N. Y. 573. In that case, however, there was an agreement to deliver coal within a fixed time, with an express exception of interference by strikes. No time was fixed in the case under consideration for making the repairs, so that the obligation of the Dry Dock Company was to make them within a reasonable