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tees having become bankrupts, it was held, that this clause applied only to an assignment by act of the party, and not to an assignment by operation of law. (a) Absoluta sententia expositere non indiget. Lord Coke says this is the case where the words are plain without any scruple, and absolute without any saving.(b)

(a) Bloxam and another, assignees, v. Elsce, 6 B. & C. 169. (b) 2 Inst. 533.

CHAPTER XII.

OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION.

§ 438. We shall now enter upon the main and most important question which arises under this branch of our subject that of interpretation and construction of statutes. Under this head, we shall have occasion, in the prosecution of our inquiries, to go somewhat into the doctrines and rules adopted by ethical writers, and writers upon the civil law, and incidentally, to some extent consider the rules that obtain in the interpretation, and construction of written instruments, and commercial contracts. We should remark, however, that the rules adopted in the latter class of instruments, do not always prevail in the construction of statutes.

§ 439. Interpretation and construction, when applied to statutes, have been sometimes considered as synonymous terms. Lieber, in his admirable work on Legal and Political Hermeneutics, defines interpretation thus:"Interpretation is the art of finding out the true sense of any form of words-that is, the sense which their author intended to convey-and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea which the author intended to convey. Construction is the drawing of conclusions respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expressions of the text, from elements known from, and given in the text-conclusions which are in the spirit, though not in the letter of the text. Interpretation only takes place if the text conveys some meaning or other. But construction is resorted to, when, in comparing two different writings of the same individual or two different enactments

by the same legislative body, there is found contradictions where there was evidently no intention at such contradictions one of another, or where it happens that part of a writing or declaration contradicts the rest. When

this is the case, and the nature of the document or declaration, or whatever else it may be, is such as not to allow us to consider the whole as being invalidated by a partial or other contradiction, then resort must be had to construction. So too, if found to act in cases, which have not been foreseen by the framers of those rules, by which, we are nevertheless obliged, for some binding reason, faithfully to regulate as well as we can an action respecting the unforeseen case.

§ 440. In politics it signifies generally the supplying of supposed, or real imperfections, or insufficiencies of a text, according to proper principles and rules. By insufficiency is to be understood, both imperfect provisions for the cases, which might, or ought to have been provided for, and the inadequateness of the text for cases, which human wisdom could not foresee. He illustrates this, in the instance of the application of a very ancient charter, to cases arising out of entirely and radically new relations, which have since sprung up, and which cases nevertheless clearly belong to that province of human action for which the charter was intended. This definition of construction, in its application to text of inferior authority or importance which partially militate with the demands of superior authority, will show us, that construction is the causing of the text to agree and harmonize with the demands or principles of superior authority, although they are not, according to the immediate and direct meaning of the words constituting the text, contained in it. Thus it is construction which saves in many instances from sacrificing the spirit of the text, or the object, to the letter of it, or the means by which that object was to be obtained.

§ 441. It has been very justly said by him, that without construction, written laws, in fact any laws or other texts containing rules of action, specific or general, would in many cases become fearfully destructive to the best and wisest intentions-nay, frequently produce the very opposite of which it was purposed to effect. After laying down the rule, that the constructor is not allowed to proceed without rule, or arbitrarily, but is to draw conclusions from the elements given in the text, he holds that the proper principles of construction are those which ought to guide us in good faith and conscience, and that they may be two-fold. 1st. If the text itself is the declaration of fundamental principles, which we are bound to follow in a certain sphere of action, and of certain fundamental forms, which are to regulate our actions, in this case, construction signifies the discovery of the spirit, principles and rules that ought to guide us according to the text, with regard to subjects on which that declaration is silent, but which nevertheless belongs to its province. If, for instance, a political constitution or charter, has been adopted or granted to regulate our political actions, and a case occurs which has not been provided for, but which is of an undoubted political character, we have to search for its true spirit and act accordingly in the case under consideration. 2d. Or there may exist principles or rules of superior authority, and the problem of construction then is, to cause that which is to be construed to agree with them. In this case the principles and rules of superior authority are, the subjects that lie beyond the direct expressions of the text, mentioned in his previous definition. For instance, if a law be passed, parts of which are contrary to the fundamental law of the state, it is called construing the law, when the proper judges declare those parts to be invalid. In its most general adaptation of the term, construction

signifies the representing an entire whole from given elements by just conclusions.

§ 442. He divides interpretation into close, extensive, extravagant, limited or free, predestinated, and authentic ; -close interpretation is, where for just reasons connected with the formation and character of the text, we are induced to take the words in their narrowest meaning. Extensive interpretation, interpretatio extensiva, is where it inclines us towards adopting the more, or most comprehensive signification of the words. Extravagant interpretation, interpretatio excedens, is that mode of interpreting which substitutes such meaning as is evidently beyond the true meaning, and hence not genuine interpretation. Free or unrestricted, interpretatio soluta, is that which proceeds simply on the general principles of interpretation in good faith, not bound by any specific or superior principle. Limited or restricted interpretation, interpretatio limitata, takes place, if other rules or principles than the strictly hermeneutic ones limit us. Predestinated interpretation, interpretatio predestinata, is that where the interpreter, either consciously or unknown to himself, yet laboring under a strong bias of mind, makes the text subservient to his preconceived views, or some object he desires to arrive at. An instance of this is where cunning and art are exerted in attempts to show that the text means something which was not, according to the interpreter's own knowledge, the meaning of the author or utterers. This latter species he denominates artful. Authentic interpretation is that which proceeds from the author or utterer of the text himself. The latter is, more properly speaking, but a declaration, and not an interpretation.

§ 443. If a legislature or monarch give an interpretation, it is called authentic, though the same individual who issued the law to be interpreted, may not give the interpretation. This proceeds upon the reason that the

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