CHAPTER VI.

IMPERFECTION OF CONSCIENCE; NECESSITY OF SOME ADDITIONAL MORAL LIGHT.

IT has been already remarked, that a distinction may be very clearly observed between right and wrong, and guilt and innocence. Right and wrong depend upon the obligations under which we are created; and are, in their nature immutable. Guilt and innocence have respect to the individual, and are modified moreover, by the amount of his knowledge, of his duty; and are not decided solely by the fact, that the action was, or was not, performed.

It is, moreover, to be observed, that the results of these two attributes of actions, may be seen to differ. Thus, every right action, is followed, in some way, with pleasure or benefit to the individual; and every wrong one, by pain or discomfort, irrespective of the guilt or innocence of the author of the act. Thus, in the present constitution of things, it is evident, that a nation, which had no knowledge of the wickedness of murder, revenge, uncleanness, or theft, would, if it violated the moral law, in these respects, suffer the consequences which are attached to these actions by our Creator. And, on the contrary, a nation which practised forgiveness, mercy, honesty, and purity, without knowing them to be right, would enjoy the benefits which are connected with such actions.

Now, whatever be the object of this constitution, by which rewards or punishments are affixed to actions as

right and wrong, whether it be as a monition, or to inform us of the will of God concerning us; one thing seems evident, it is not to punish actions as innocent or guilty, for the rewards and punishments, of which we speak, affect men simply in consequence of the action, and without any regard to the innocence or guilt of the actor.

Let us now, add another element. Suppose a man to know the obligations which bind him to his Creator; and, also, what is his Creator's will respecting a certain action; and that he then deliberately violates this obligation. Now, every man feels that this violation of obligation deserves punishment; and, also, punishment in proportion to the greatness of the obligation violated. Hence, the consequences of any action, are to be considered in a two fold light; first, the consequences depending upon the present constitution of things; and, secondly, those which follow the action, as innocent or guilty; that is, as violating, or not, our obligations to our Creator.

These two things are plainly to be considered distinct from each other. Of the one, we can form some estimate; of the other, none whatever. Thus, whatever be the design of the constitution, by which pain should be consequent upon wrong actions, irrespective of guilt; whether it be, to admonish us of dangers, or to intimate to us the will of our Creator, we can have some conception how great it would probably be. But, if we consider the action as guilty, that is, as violating the known will of our Creator, no one can conceive how great the punishment of such an act ought to be, for no one can conceive how vast is the obligation which binds a creature to his God; nor, on the other hand can any one conceive, how vast would be the reward this obligation were perfectly fulfilled.

As, then, every moral act is attended with pleasure or pain, and, as every one also exposes us to the punishments

or rewards of guilt or innocence, both of which manifestly transcend our power of conception; and, if such be our constitution, that every moment is rendering our moral condition better or worse; specially, if this world be a state of probation, tending to a state where change is impossible, it is manifestly of the greatest possible importance, that we - should both know our duty, and be furnished with all suitable impulsions to perform it. The constitution under which man is formed, in this respect, has been explained at the close of the chapter on virtue. And were the intellect and conscience of man to be in a perfect state, and were he in entire harmony with the universe around him, there can be no doubt that his happiness, in the present state, would be perfectly secured.

It would not, however, be certain, that, with intellectual and moral powers suited to his station, man would be in no need of farther communication from his Maker. Although his feeling of obligation, and his desire to discharge it, might be perfect, yet he might not be fully aware of the manner in which this obligation should be discharged. Thus, though our first parents were endowed with a perfect moral constitution, yet it was necessary that God should make to them a special revelation respecting some portion of his will. Such might also be the case, in any other instance, of a perfect moral constitution, in a being of limited capacity.

How much more is additional light necessary, when it is remembered, that the moral constitution of man seems evidently to be imperfect? This may be observed in several respects:

1. There are many obligations under which man is created, both to his fellow-creatures and to God, which his unassisted conscience does not discover. Such are the obligations to universal forgiveness, to repentence, and many others.

2. When the obligations are acknowledged, man frequently errs, in respect to the mode in which they are to be discharged. Thus, a man may acknowledge his obligations to God, but may suppose that God will be pleased with a human sacrifice. A man may acknowledge his obligation to love his children, but may believe that this obligation may be discharged by putting them to death. Now, it is manifest, that, in both these cases, a man must suffer all the present evils resulting from such a course, just as much as though he knowingly violated these obligations.

3. When men both know the obligations under which they are created, and the mode in which they are to be discharged, they wilfully disobey the monitions of conscience. We act according to the impulsions of blind, headlong passion, regardless of our own best good, and of the welfare of others, in despite of what we know to be the will of our Maker. It is the melancholy fact, that men do deliberately violate the commands of God, for the sake of the most transient and trifling gratification. Hence the confession:

Video, proboque meliora;
Deteriora sequor

has become a hacknied proverb.

And hence, it is evident, that, not only are men exposing themselves to the pains attendant upon wrong actions during the present life; but they are also exposing themselves to the punishments, how great and awful soever those may be, which are incurred by violating our obligations to our Creator and our Judge. The state of human nature, in these respects, I suppose to be vividly set forth by St. Paul, in the epistle to the Romans, ch. 7, v. 7-25.

If such be our state, it is manifest, that, under such a moral constitution as we have above described, our condi

tion must be sufficiently hopeless. Unless something be done, it would seem that we must all fail of a large portion of the happiness, to which we might otherwise in the present life attain, and still more, must be exposed to a condemnation greater than we are capable of conceiving.

Under such circumstances, it surely is not improbable, that a benevolent Deity should make use of some additional means, to inform us of our duty, and thus warn us of the evils which we were bringing upon ourselves. Still less is it improbable, that a God, delighting in right, should take some means to deliver us from the guilty habits which we have formed, and restore us to that love and practice of virtue, which can alone render us pleasing to him. That God was under any obligation to do this, is not asserted; but that a being of infinite compassion and benevolence should do it, though not under obligation, is surely not improbable.

Should a revelation be made to remedy the defects of man's moral state, we can form some conceptions of what might be expected in order to accomplish such a result.

1. Our defective knowledge of moral obligation might be remedied, by a clear view of the attributes of God, and of the various relations which we sustain to him.

2. Our ignorance of the mode in which our obligations should be discharged, might be dispelled, either by a more expanded view of the consequences of actions, or, by direct precept.

3. In order to overcome our temper of disobedience, I know not what means might be employed. A reasonable one would seem to be, the manifestation of the character of Deity to us, in some new relation, creating some new obligations, and thus opening a new source of moral motives within the soul of man.